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BEYOND PSYCHOANALYSIS *

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Psychoanalysis has rediscovered in the so-called "nervous" patient the significance of the emotional life but has attempted to conceive it scientifically from a purely materialistic point of view. This attempt could succeed only to some extent. For the problem of *anxiety*, which Freud first came up against in his patients is not to be explained entirely biologically in the human being. Still less can the problem of *love* be thus purely biologically explained, although Freud attempted to trace it as well as anxiety back to the sexual impulse. The fault lay in the method, namely, in the attempt to explain everything finally from the materialistic viewpoint. Even if we assume to be right the presupposition that everything has developed from the primitive biological, then this concept has only a heuristic value in the sense of a genetic comprehension, whereas it is insufficient as a principle of causal explanation. From a definite moment of development all these human phenomena which are built up over the purely biological attain a life of their own and a significance of their own. By reducing them to the original biological, even if this always succeeded in individual cases, little more is gained than would be the case if for example one wanted to understand an individual's entire life merely from his heredity. Psychoanalysis tried to avoid this error in emphasizing the individual's personal destiny. Only in doing this it has fallen into a similar error in believing that everything can be reduced to the *individual's past*. Thus even in actual experience psychoanalysis has emphasized the repetition of the individual's past and has not correspondingly valued the individual's own present life and its own actual significance.

* Read before the Boston Society of Psychiatry and Neurology, April 19, 1928.

Nearly all the divergencies of opinion within the psychoanalytic school as well as a great part of the criticism of psychoanalysis in general go back to this one cardinal point, namely, the tendency to reduce everything to the biological. The fundamental importance of the biological shall not here be denied. The question is only whether that in particular which we comprehend under the name "psychical" entirely lends itself to such a way of consideration or whether for a full understanding and estimation of it, it does not rather need a supplement which only a *philosophical* manner of reflection might offer. Freud's great merit was the overthrow of the medical superstition that the psychical is a matter of nerves, which indeed only represent the instrument on which the human emotional life is played. His error was that in place of the medical theory of nerves he wanted to put the biological sex theory which was supposed to entirely explain everything. As the physiological nerves afford the instrument, so the biological sex provides the material for that which makes up our emotional life.

Thus Freud has dethroned the medical materialism with regard to the so-called neuroses, but what we really want to thank him for is, that he failed in the attempt to set up in its place the purely biological and so involuntarily has brought the real psychical into its own again. Finally, the psychoanalytic theory itself has led to the acknowledgment of the fact that along with the biological principle there is operative in mankind an equally strong *ethical principle*. The unconscious, incidentally a purely spiritualistic concept, cannot be entirely reduced to the impulse life. Indeed it is even shown that in many human beings the inhibitions manifesting themselves as anxiety and guilt are stronger than the impulses, that these inhibitions themselves, so to say, operate "as a driving force" although in a different way from the biological impulses. In a word we see that the psychical has become a force at least equal to the biological and that all human conflicts are to be explained just from this fact. Freud's later work has been a constant struggle against admitting this, and so he tried to apply biological concepts as a means of final explanation in the psychical sphere where they are inappropriate. For just as the guilt problem can be only fully comprehended from the ethical side so the complete understanding of the love life is to be found only *beyond the sexual impulse* in the Ego.

Hence Freud, with the right instinct, has given his discoveries mythical names, such as the Oedipus Complex. In doing this he believed to have explained the myths themselves, which indeed are

mental products and hence are not to be understood from a purely biological viewpoint. To want to explain the Œdipus myth simply from the biological relationship of the child to the parents is just as unsatisfying as to expect to understand the childish emotional life from this mythical nomenclature. Those Freudian concepts show the right feeling that these psychical processes are to be grasped and understood only mythically, that is in other words psychically. This unspoken insight is Freud's great accomplishment, for he himself is a myth creator in the grandest style, in Plato's sense a real philosopher. According to his own admission, fascinated by the natural scientific world view, he interpreted everything "mythical"—not merely in tradition, but in the human beings themselves—biologically, and on the other hand called biological discoveries by mythical names. So he could not correctly interpret what was in between, namely, the purely psychical, and fully estimate it in its own significance.

Freud's work which appeared with the name of "Psycho-Analysis" is only in small part analysis of the psychical, which according to its nature represents an elementary entity. It is much more *interpretation* than analysis, and analysis only in so far as it attempts in the chemical sense, a reduction to the final (biological) elements, which indeed ultimately lie as the foundation of all phenomena. In the psychical sphere the fundamental biological facts are not so important as their interpretation, first of all by ourselves, then by others. The former we call rationalization, the latter explanation or interpretation. But these phenomena themselves represent a part of the psychical. In other words, the psychical itself is only to be understood phenomenologically. One might say that in the psychical sphere there are no facts, but only interpretations of them. On that account the dream has been justifiably called the psychical phenomenon par excellence. In the dream we ourselves interpret physical and psychical states (facts), but this "interpretation" is as little "analysis" of "facts" as is our analytic "interpretation" which represents only another kind of symbolization and rationalization.

Psychoanalysis as developed by Freud is thus only to some extent a method of finding out the biological facts lying as the foundation of the psychical life. It corresponds rather to a definite way of interpreting the psychical. It started as a biological interpretation of the psychical but finally led Freud himself to the threshold of acknowledging another kind of interpretation, namely, the ethical, by postulating the concepts of the Super-Ego and of the consciousness of guilt. But we did not need psychoanalysis to make us aware of those facts.

Since Breuer's first attempt to cure a patient by the cathartic method the only really new *fact* that psychoanalysis has given us is *the analytic situation*. And from this one fact Breuer fled. Freud, on the other hand, succeeded in interpreting it, by justifying it as a repetition of an earlier situation which he called Œdipus situation. However, this was only another kind of flight from the fact of the analytic situation, an intellectualized flight from a fact in which the interesting and valuable is just that which is new, that which lies beyond the "transference," that is, *beyond the repetition of the Œdipus situation*.

After the possibilities of interpreting the analytic situation had exhausted itself (in Freud's Libido Theory) in projecting back to the infantile, I began the analysis of the analytic situation itself as a new fact. From this I hope finally to understand and to develop synthetically and constructively new psychical values. The first which the analytic situation presents and teaches us to understand is the *emotion of love*. And it presents this as an *actual* relationship of sentiments and not merely as the transference of the child's attitude towards the parents. It is the origin, development and passing of this human relationship of sentiments which the analytic situation artificially produces and teaches us to understand. The analysis of this transference process gives us insight into a part of the ego-psychology, but that is simply psychology, for what we designate as "ego" is ultimately nothing but our psychological ego, our psychical, in contrast to the biological which represents only material for the psyche.

What we secondly can develop from the analytic situation besides the understanding of the love emotion, is the *ethical*. By that I do not mean any specific ethics, but simply the ethical, given in the relation of two human beings as portrayed in the analytic situation. Whilst the mechanism of being in love can be studied in the patient's *ego*, the ethical element cannot be developed without the analysis of the *other* person which in the analytic situation is the analyst. This analysis of the analyst I intend to give elsewhere as part of the analytic technique. In contrast to the ego-psychology as revealed to us in the state of being in love, one might designate ethics as the *Thou-Psychology* (Du-Psychologie). It is a kind of "mass psychology" in a constructive sense of which the sexual ethic represents only a specific part. Freud saw in the analytic situation only a repetition of the infantile Œdipus situation, and so in the state of being in love he saw in essence the biological and libidinal moment—not

the ego side; similarly the ethical also remained purely external, namely, a primitive father morality as incorporated in the Old Testament Jehovah who punishes and rewards his chosen people. This is not merely a comparison; for religion itself is the primitive external preliminary towards an ethic and places the responsibility on the god who operates with rewards and punishment. Hence also the surpassing part which the castration threat plays in Freud's theory.

Thirdly, what the psychoanalytic situation presents to us is a new approach to the *theory of cognition* which gives a new understanding of the relation of the ego not only to fellow beings but to reality in general. The insight to be gained here is so fundamental and so far-reaching that I must keep it for a separate presentation. I can here only indicate its special application to the analysis and to the understanding of the analytic situation itself. I mean the ideas alluded to by me for the first time in the Trauma of Birth, that that which we consider the analytic theory and therapy to a certain degree is nothing other than interpretation of the analytic situation. This is not intended to be a valuation but only a problematical question which *à priori* expresses nothing as to whether this theory or the therapeutic conclusions drawn from it, are right or wrong. One must only bear in mind that the situation permits of different interpretations which again correspond to definite attitudes towards it. One must also be conscious of the fact that one interprets specifically a situation typical and symbolic for the individual concerned, and so the general conclusions drawn from it may be of doubtful value. As in the case of the dream which itself represents an interpretation of (external or internal) stimuli, our interpretation corresponds to a further interpretation—of another kind; so the patient in his associations and reactions “interprets” the analytic situation which we then further interpret in the meaning of the analytic theory, itself again representing an attempt to interpret the analytic situation.

So from the analysis of the analytic situation there appears a kind of *meta-psychoanalysis* which has not only a general theoretic importance going beyond the narrower psychoanalytic sphere, but also essentially influences the technique. For the explanation of the difference one might use the following simile: the customary analysis corresponds to arithmetic where things have a definite material value; Meta Psychoanalysis corresponds to algebra where all signs including the arithmetical have a definite *symbolic* value. They symbolize arithmetical quantities without operating with figures themselves.

Let us start from the technical therapeutic side from which this

knowledge was gained. Then we see how the patient—whether at the beginning or in the course of the analysis—uses the psychoanalytic theory itself as material for presentation (or symbolization) of his own emotional life. But when we understand the algebraic meaning and valuation of these presentations and operations then we need no longer go back in every instance to the arithmetical value. But we can solve the problem in a much more general way, generally in the meaning of the patient's destiny which we so to say reduce to a general denomination.

The use by the patient of the analytic material for a symbolic presentation of his emotional life is not only an inevitable result from the analytic situation which disturbs or complicates the process, but it can and must be made the basis of the whole proceeding if one does not want to fall into error. I would like to illustrate this in the form of an algebraic example. Some years ago an analyst who was then analyzing a chemist once complained to me that he could not get anywhere with the work because the patient brought up so much material from his own science chemistry, about which the analyst did not understand. It seemed to him almost necessary that he himself should study chemistry in order to understand the patient. I remarked that this besides being impracticable, was too much to be expected because one could not possibly learn the psychical language of every single patient one treated. To-day I would give far more consoling advice, namely, instead of which to let all patients learn one and the same language which the analyst himself speaks, thus they would easily understand each other. This language is the psychoanalytic theory—no matter of what school or coloring. The essential thing is that the patient speaks or learns to speak the same language as the analyst in order to make himself understood. And the analyst apart from what he is conscious of doing in any case instructs the patient in his language which the cultured patient of to-day already knows a little about before he comes for analysis.

So far this state of affairs would be comparatively simple if the analyst had been conscious of this fact and of the advantages which it offers him.

When the patient had learnt, for example, in the analysis the significance of the Œdipus or castration complex and repeated this in his reactions, then the analyst was content, even more than that, was delighted with this echo of confirmation, without understanding that the patient with it wanted to express something definite in the present analytic situation. In other words, when the patient learnt more or

less of the language and was able to converse in it tolerably well, then the analyst praised or blamed him according as to whether he correctly handled the theoretical grammar or used correctly the necessary vocabulary. Thus like the bad instructor he only laid value on the external, formal imitative, *whereas the real content of what had been expressed in the analytic language had not been valued*. After all it does not make much difference whether the pupil learns the rules of the language in a newspaper article or in a philosophical work. But with regard to the content it makes all the difference.

In other words in the course of the development of psychoanalysis, the analytic doctrine has already become material to be analyzed, just as much as every other kind of material whether chemical, philosophical or religious, which the patient uses. Still more important is the application of this viewpoint to the origin and development of the analytic theory itself—or more correctly speaking, to the analytic theories which the patient in the analysis uses as material of presentation. That is, even the analyst in the elaboration of the theory cannot avoid doing this. He is easily tempted to interweave the patient's presentation of the analytic material into his theory. And every investigator—obviously according to his personality and development uses something else. Freud uses the biological *sexuality* as material for the presentation of a psychological theory, Jung uses *ethics*, Adler and Stekel the *social element*.

So far nothing could be said against this inevitable use of material, if one is only conscious or ultimately becomes so of what really he is doing with it. When one like Freud uses biologic material, may one not draw the conclusion from this that the psychology constructed with it is biologically based? If, like Jung, one uses ethics as material may one not draw from this the conclusion that one has now produced a synthetic psychology such as he claims in his doctrine of types? The synthetic element is as much one *factor* in the psychical life as the analytic (Freud) or the constructive (Adler) and destructive (Stekel), but it is not the psychical itself, which only in its function is conceivable and hence is scarcely to be comprehended.

The psychoanalytic doctrine and movement has thus reached a point where it itself has become a psychological problem. At the same time—as such—it leads to a new psychology and with it to a real world view which is produced as a sediment from the solution of this problem. After the overcoming of the materialistic, ethical, and social ideology in the field of psychology, a psychological—or if one likes—a metapsychological psychology must be constructed.

This psychology would have to deal only with tendencies and their effects. On this account it should value the material necessarily used in no other way than in its psychical significance. In leaving out the different ideologies foreign to the emotional the psychical content itself crystallizes and in its turn then throws a new light on the biological, ethical and social aspects of psychology.

This natural process of development leads beyond the psychoanalytic theory. This ultimately proves to be a way—or more correctly a detour—a way back to philosophic theory of cognition. It concerns also the therapeutic aspect which finally led to the admission that the neuroses are not a medical but a social, that is, ethical problem. The two chief problems of philosophy, the theory of cognition and ethics thus finally also represent the main problems with which psychoanalysis is really occupied, because they represent the chief problems of the human psychical life. Fundamentally they correspond to a single great problem, to the contrast between the ego and the Thou, between the Self and the world, between the inner and the outer. The theory of cognition attempts to determine the relationship between the inner and the outer, between appearance and Being, between phantasy and reality. Ethics tries to determine the more particular relationship of the ego to other similar egos, thus to the Thou. The psychological manifestations of these facts to which belong all philosophical and psychological theories as well as all individual expressions of our psychical life, may be treated under the title of an Ego-Psychology and of a Thou-Psychology.

The problem dealing with the inner and the outer leads us back again to the material of psychology. We can best of all discuss this in the two basic concepts of the analytic psychology, the problems of anxiety and of guilt. Anxiety originally relates to something external, an object or a situation; whereas guilt is, so to say, an inner anxiety, a being afraid of oneself. Anxiety is thus a biological concept, guilt is an ethical concept. So the great problem of the inner and the outer in a scientific sense could be formulated as the problem of biology versus ethics (or the reverse), in other words, as the great conflict between our biological and our purely human Self.

Psychical therapy of every kind operates only in so far as this conflict, manifesting itself as an ethical one, is partially or temporarily adjusted. We accomplish this by either strengthening or weakening the inner or the outer, in other words either by unburdening the inner conflict by externalizing it or by building up the inner, namely, intensifying the Ego. To these attempts at unburdening or recon-

structing belong the individual analysis of neurotics, as well as the whole of psychoanalysis as a movement, or religion, or art, or war. Thus art unburdens in the catharsis (as an example tragedy), religion in the cult, analysis in the leader. On the other hand all these manifestations have their constructive effects, namely, art in its development as an expression of personality, religion in its development towards ethics, analysis in its guidance to self knowledge and self responsibility.

In the whole development of humanity, as I already pointed out in "Der Kunstler" (1907) and later in the Trauma of Birth (1924) one can notice an increasing tendency to internalization, which is temporarily interrupted by reactions of externalization. These naturally are always of a social nature. They take on a more destructive form in war and revolution, in sects in the religious sphere, or a more constructive nature in the forms of technical inventions. In any case, these manifestations of externalization are always mass movements, whereas the tendency to project within has an individualistic character, proceeds from single individuals and aims at the individualization of persons. Psychology, in relation to this view, adopts a particular attitude. It is purely individualistic, aims at knowledge of the ego, of the individuality, but also uses in its material all data and facts concerning the external, reality, the Thou. Thus it is in essence a *science of relations*, which easily runs into the danger of overestimation of either the one or the other factor in itself, instead of dealing with the relationship between the two.

In psychoanalysis this has been the case to a very large degree. Psychoanalysis began as the psychology of the unconscious which, however, was not directly inferred intuitively from one's own ego, but as it were by a detour through another. This other was a patient, that is, an individual in whom the one side of the problem entered strongly in the foreground, apart from the fact whether one saw in it the biological (sexual problem) or the ethical (guilt problem). The strength of psychoanalysis lay in this starting point, but in the course of its development it has become more and more a weakness and has led to ever greater onesidedness. From the viewpoint of our general statements it is perhaps no accident that parallel with the inward trend of psychoanalysis, with the advance in the knowledge of the individual, it has yet taken on the character of an external movement, if one likes, a mass movement. This externalizing trend was a counterbalance against the threatening danger of a too far-reaching introversion. To this may be added the fact that the creator of such

an inward turning tendency which aims at increasing individualization whether it may be of a religious, artistic or scientific nature, yet needs for his justification its entry to the group, to the mass.

Here we come up against the problem of guiltfeeling in the creative individual, and we already find it in its rudiments at a quite primitive organic stage. At that stage (as I already mentioned in *Der Kunstler*) the individual's tendency to develop, striving for independence of the external world leads finally to division at the limit of growth. This division is equivalent to isolation, to disaster, to death. Thus Freud has revealed the *guiltfeeling beyond the pleasure principle*, that is, has gained the insight that in human beings it is not always the biological impulses which give the driving force, but from a definite point of development it is the inhibition, anxiety and guilt. If we analyze further we discover *beyond the guiltfeeling*, which seems insurmountable, the problem of individuality. In differentiation from the ego which is a purely psychological concept, I would like to designate the biological part of our personality as the Self, whereas the third part of our personality, namely, character, is an ethical concept. Thus the development of the personality extends with the Self far into the biological, but the problems and conflicts with which we have to deal first begin there where this biological Self comes into collision with the ethical, the character, and that is the case in the sphere which we have psychologically designated as Ego.

At the *biological level* all deviation from the normal manifested as change, brings first of all a danger, the danger of nonsurvival or death, before it can be borne out in single individuals as development. At the *psychological level* this phenomenon manifests itself as *anxiety*—of danger, failure, death, in essence as anxiety of the other ego which interferes with the unfolding of one's own Self. At the third stage, the *ethical level*, we see the same state appearing as the guilt problem, that is, as anxiety of one's own ego the free development of which seems to bring about to the other, danger, ruin, or death.

But at this psychical level the significance of the emotional life becomes evident. Death at the biological level is the prototype of separation. Anxiety also separates, isolates one individual from the other. But here there is already shown a uniting effect, namely, the trend towards *group formation*, the mutual and temporary protection against danger. But the guiltfeeling unites the ego to the other, as emotion in general, the essence of which I would like to designate as that which unites the human being with the fellow human being. In

socialization this union takes place with the mutual guaranteed protection of all against all; in love with the pleasurable identification with the other. The more we individualize ourselves, that is, remove and isolate ourselves from others, the stronger is the formation of guiltfeeling which originates from this individualization and which again in turn unites us emotionally with the others. This is the psychological basis of our ethical socialization. But with the increasing tendency towards individualization this social bond is not sufficient. The individual needs a stronger, more individual personality relationship which on the other hand strengthens the guiltfeeling and so emotionally unites the individual to another individual. At this psychical level this uniting element is *love*, which finally in its fulfillment unites again biologically the individual with the other and thus with the species. But whereas sexuality in the biological sense signifies in essence growth and multiplication, if one likes the preservation of the individual in the species through reproduction, love has the function of uniting emotionally the individual as such, the personality with the other individual. In this way the feeling of the individual isolation leading to anxiety, guilt and conflict, is removed. In a word sexuality is a biological ego-expansion, love is an emotional or psychical ego-expansion. Hence we understand why in our love life the ethical is of importance equal to the biological. But only in this way also can we understand all disturbances, problems and conflicts which are produced from this and with the alleviation and solving of which psychoanalysis as a therapy is concerned.

For even the neurosis has been revealed in its ultimate analysis as a moral problem. The individual separated chiefly by anxiety and bound to the fellow human being only by guilt, again has to be united with humanity and the world biologically as well as socially, through the positive love emotion. This I consider the real task of psychotherapy. It is a long way from the medical therapy of nervous disturbances which Freud at first wanted to heal by a kind of sexual dietetics, to the understanding of the neurosis as a guiltproblem. It is the fundamental difference between two opposite world views, the *materialistic* and *philosophic*, in a more specific sense the *biological* and *ethical*. Psychoanalysis has pushed forward far in both directions but it has failed to see the problem in its full bearing and significance much less to solve it. But we are grateful to it for again bringing up this primal problem and for opening up new ways towards its understanding, perhaps to a better solution of it.

EPILEPSY AMONGST THE CHINESE: WITH THE ANALYSIS OF A CASE

By JAMES LINCOLN MCCARTNEY, M.D., S.B., D.N.B.

The epilepsies are very common amongst the Chinese, and are a fertile field for research. In a study of the neuropsychiatric conditions found in China (1) I found that there were at least 31,000 of these cases in that country. About 1 per cent of all neuropsychiatric cases in China can be classed with the epilepsies, and by far the greater number of these are of the idiopathic type. Sufficient work has not been done to justify any sweeping conclusions concerning this disease as it is found in the Chinese, but the analysis of the following case gives some interesting findings. The detailed interpretation of the anamnesis and catharsis will be left to the reader.

The patient was a finely cultured Chinese woman, twenty-six years of age, belonging to the upper class of society. She had had a high school education and a two-year college course in music. She was one of ten children, being the eldest of eight sisters, and having one older brother. Her father was assassinated when she was thirteen years old, but her mother was living and well, except for being rather neurotic. As an infant patient was marantic, but during her childhood only had measles. When sixteen had a rather severe attack of typhoid fever, and when twenty was badly infested with ascaris worms. She frequently suffered from migraine and neuralgia. Her menses were regular, lasted five days, but she did not "feel right." She did not care for meat, occasionally ate fish, ate no pastry, but rice and plain vegetables for the most part formed her diet. Seldom ate fruit or sweets. Drank mild alcoholics daily, and smoked at least two cigarettes daily. Bowels were regular, but she took no out-door exercise.

On January 7th she was referred with the diagnosis of "epilepsy," of hopeless prognosis. Her husband had had her examined by a number of general practitioners, and three "nerve" specialists. A European neurologist of considerable training had diagnosed her case as "epilepsy," and offered her no hope of recovery. He had put her on luminal t.i.d. and bromides at night. She had had no conscious epileptiform seizures, but had suffered from nocturnal attacks, which had left her lackadaisical the following day. She

had never bitten her tongue, nor had she suffered from ecchymosis of the eyes. Her husband described the attacks as being "a tenseness of the body," and opisthotonos, and occasionally involuntary micturition, with some times "slobbering." The husband said they had not had children, although they had been married three years, because they knew "epilepsy" was inherited. The patient had been having the attacks at irregular intervals from one to three times every week, in spite of the heavy medication and beginning bromidism.

Physical examination when first seen showed a well built young woman, 5 feet 6 inches in height, and weighs 115 pounds. A pulse rate of 60, and a blood pressure of 104/70, with a hemoglobin of 72 per cent. The blood Wassermann was negative. Urine and feces showed no pathology. Skin was of poor texture, distinctly parchment-like, cold and clammy. Musculature was poor. Hair was dry. Tonsils were somewhat hypertrophic and there was some tenderness over McBurney's point. Spleen appeared to be slightly enlarged, but otherwise no distinct pathology was to be found. The nervous system appeared normal. There was a slight leukorrhea which patient had had all her life and for which she had had occasional treatment.

It was decided that patient needed better physical turgor, and that psychoanalysis would undoubtedly bring out some interesting facts and might clear up the neurotic conflict, the symptoms of which were the "epileptic" seizures. Accordingly patient was put on two quarts of milk and three cakes of yeast daily besides her regular diet. She was given total exposure to artificial sun daily, working up to a period of half an hour on front and back of body. Twice a week she was given a Turkish bath and complete body massage. Analysis was begun promptly and an hour every other day was spent with her.

Physically, it is interesting to note that within a month she had gained twenty pounds, her skin had resumed its normal texture, her hemoglobin went up to 93 per cent, and her appetite was excellent, and the tenderness in the lower right quadrant had disappeared, while the leukorrhea was almost cleared up.

The first two hours spent with the patient were necessary to break down the natural shyness of the patient towards the male physician, but as soon as this was overcome the anamnesis freely proceeded.

The patient cogitated a question during the third hour, which she said had been troubling her: "Why am I indifferent to my husband?" She then went on to say, "I can't even look at kissing."

During the fourth hour it developed that when she was twenty-one years old she was very much in love with a boy cousin, who insisted he was passionately in love with her. "He said he was going to kill himself if I did not marry him, as he could not live without me." She refused him for family reasons, and three weeks later he was married to another girl. This experience shattered her faith in men, and she felt likewise towards her husband.

Free association with the word "kill," brought out the shock she received when she was thirteen years old. Her father was assassinated, and she felt her family was hoodooed. She has always been impressed with the fact that she was a female, and especially so after her father's death. During the next few hours she illuminated on her mother's admonition: "You are a girl, you can't do this."

Innumerable as are the triumphal arches erected by Imperial decree in honor of female virtue, examination of the inscriptions engraved upon them indicate that the motives for the award are as follows:

(1) Suicide, if committed for attachment to her parents or husband, or from fear of disgrace.

(2) For having lived as a widow, refusing marriage to her fiftieth year. She may have been married or simply betrothed; in either case the refusal to enter upon a second engagement being considered a highly meritorious act.

(3) Filial devotion, such as remaining unmarried throughout life in order to serve her parents; cutting a piece of flesh from her own body to be used as nourishment for a near relative, etc.

One of the greatest ancient Chinese classics the "I-Chang" states that the celestial principle becomes the male, and the terrestrial the female. Chu Fu-tze, the great commentator, appended this remark: "It is most manifest that heaven and earth are one and the same principle with father and mother." Although a woman, from a Chinese standpoint, is regarded as a human being, she is of a lower state than man, and can never attain to full equality with man. As death and all evils have their origin in the Yin principle, and life and prosperity come from the subjection of it to the control of the Yang, it is regarded as a law of nature that woman should be kept under the power of man and not allowed any will of her own. Only as the mother of a son can a woman escape from her degradation, and become in any degree equal to her husband, but even then only in household affairs. Woman is bound to the same laws of existence even in the other world. She belongs to the same husband and is

dependent for her happiness upon the sacrifices offered by her descendants.

The Chinese classics have paramount influence on the organization of Chinese society, and what has been built up in several thousand years will not be changed by the advent of Occidental teaching.

It is said that Wand Shiang Chih Shen, author of the *Three Character Classic*, so popular as a textbook in the native schools, obtained his idea from a girls' primer originated by his mother, a highly educated lady, native of Nanking. Other productions of her pen are still in circulation. Pan Chao, sister of the great historian, Pao Ku, has rendered her name famous as the author of "*Nui Cheng*," the favorite textbook employed in the education of girls during the past 1800 years or more. Pan Chao is also known in history as a model mother. Soon after the birth of her only son, she resumed her studies in order that she might be prepared to take charge of his education. As soon as he was old enough she spent many hours a day with him, carefully teaching him the duties of every-day life, the wisdom of the ancient sages, with the poetry, philosophy and classic histories of the age in which they lived. She possessed the art of making all study agreeable, and never allowed the boy to leave a lesson until he was perfect master of the style and thought, and conscious of having conquered a difficulty. After her husband's death she passed many years in mourning, but continued the same life of "virtue, temperance and modesty," never neglecting home duties nor wasting her time in immoderate grief. She was thus an example of "purity and truth" to the whole nation.

A few stanzas at random from the famous and often quoted "*Nui Cheng*," mentioned above, gives an insight into the Chinese attitude towards women:

"Let your laugh be never boisterous

Nor converse in noisy way,

Lest your neighbors all about you hear whatever you may say;

Then be dignified in walking, and be orderly in gait,

Never lean against a door-post, but when standing stand up straight.

"When the wheel of life's at seven,

You should study woman's way,

Leave your bed when day is breaking, early thus begin the day.

Comb your tresses smooth and shiny, keep yourself both clean and neat,

Bind your 'Lillies' tight and tidy, never go upon the street.

"When the wheel has turned to thirteen,
You propriety should prize;
When your presence people enter you politely should arise;
Toward your aunts, your father's sisters and his younger brother's wives,
You should not neglect your manners from the nearness of your lives.

"A girl should prize her virtue,
And of goodness never tire,
For, a jade that's pure and flawless, who does not with joy admire?
Anciently a girl was guarded, from her virtue would not part,
Pure as diamond was her body, firm as iron was her heart.

"Girls have three on whom dependent.
All their lives they must expect,
While at home to follow father, who a husband will select,
With her husband live in concord from the day that she is wed,
And her son's directions follow if her husband should be dead.

"First of all woman's virtues,
Is a chaste and honest heart,
Of which modesty and goodness and decorum form a part.
If in motion, or if resting, a becoming way is chief,
You should guard against an error as you guard against a thief.

"At your throat your clothes should button,
It should teach you as a guide,
That never should, while walking, turn your head from side to side,
And the layers of your clothing have a lesson for you too,
They should decorate your body as the clouds adorn Mt. Wu.

"Then a woman's upper garment,
And her lower should teach again,
That, though living with her husband, she is on a different plane,
She should follow and be humble that it ne'er be said by men,
That 'the morning there is published by the crowing of the hen.'"

The "cultured" type of Chinese are extremely prudish, and it is extremely rare to see Chinese women above the laboring class exposing themselves even to a limited degree. Chinese women always wear high necked and long sleeved dresses, and ever in past history have done so. Only now do a few of the most radical women educated abroad, assume modest Paris costumes, and this very infrequently. Our patient stated that she never even undressed before her sisters, let alone her husband. She had always been ashamed of nudes or partial nudes, even in statuary.

There is nothing in Chinese art or history, either ancient or modern that is emulative of bodily perfection. In fact all Chinese paintings and statuary present a neutral figure, without any of the usual female configurations that are always brought into relief in Occidental art. The female nude is never depicted; and this has always been the case as far as records show. This undoubtedly has greatly influenced the ideals of the Chinese.

While the male in China has license to expose himself as he desires, the female is admonished to attend herself always in private. The native costume, even for the poorest women, has always been most complete, allowing very little of her body to be exposed. The little Chinese boy has his trousers so constructed that until he is four or five years old his genitals are exposed for his convenience, while the little girl seldom if ever is found to be so exposed. Only the slave girl goes barefoot, while it is still almost a universal practice throughout China to begin binding the feet of the baby girl so that she may have beautiful "lilies." Another deforming practice that is very general, and which is the rule with the wealthier classes, is to bind the growing breasts of the young girl so that they do not develop. Functioning mammae are seldom, if ever seen amongst the non-laboring women. Those that can afford it, suckle their young to wet-nurses. The poor women of course consider themselves more or less as animals, and their breasts being a means of earning a livelihood are left unhampered; and amongst this class of women it is a common sight to see them publicly nursing the young. Suckling is therefore always associated with the menial state and so never becomes "culture."

More later will be said about woman's place in the Celestial scheme of things.

During the ninth hour the patient stated that she did not care to dance with her husband, although she did like dancing. The previous two nights she had the following dreams:

Dream 1.—"Attended a wedding. Saw the bride first in a room with a pink suit on, but in black shoes and stockings. She looked thin and pale. Then we were in a little room waiting for the ceremony. I saw the bridegroom standing, who was a girl too in another suit of pink satin. Then the bride walked in all by herself and I noticed she had a blue suit on instead. All the guests walked in after her, singing a song. The room was packed and I felt that I couldn't breathe, so I walked out."

The patient explained that the afternoon previous to this dream

she had been visiting a girl friend who was very soon to be a bride, and she had talked with her about the marriage ceremony. The girl had expressed herself as not desiring to go through the mysterious nuptials; and as will be later brought out, our patient had had none too pleasant an experience herself on this occasion. This dream presents considerable potentiality.

It is not within the scope of this article to describe a Chinese wedding, but it is of interest to note several incongruities, which occurred in the above dream and have some analytical bearing. The bride is supposed to be robed in red and very fancy slippers and head-gear. Blue is the commonest of colors, only worn by the coolie class.

For centuries Chinese girls have been given in marriage by their parents, through the discreet intermediations of a middleman and with the orthodox number of feasts and consultations of fortune tellers, and have seen their husbands only after the ceremony. No more likely than the moon disappearing at the command of the baying dog has been the possibility of even a demur from the bride. True, she has always had the recourse of an *ex-post facto* protest by way of suicide, a recourse many Chinese women have taken, but the law of the parent has been divine. The bride has done as she was bidden; has been arrayed in the dazzling red bridal costume, a gorgeous robe, with capes and dangles elaborately embroidered in colors but with gold dragons predominating; on her head a crown-like superstructure of silver balls on top of each spire; over the ears hung long pendants of silver which reach nearly to her waist; her face and lips vividly painted. Three sedan chairs bring her to the home of the bridegroom; one red, and two green. The groom's mother riding in the red one to the bride's home, where the bride is locked in it, while the two mothers take the green ones. The bride stands up all day and bows respectfully while family friends who have come for the feasting come up to inspect and comment audibly on her physical properties and the bridegroom's good or ill fortune. The feasting over, she kowtows to her parents-in-law. After the day's ceremony and feasting the bridegroom goes to her, seeing her perhaps for the first time; and there follows another ceremony on the nuptial bed, the bride and groom eating together, etc.

The second dream was as follows:

Dream 2.—“I went to the bank to fetch my husband home. Had two friends with us, so we suggested going out to spend the evening.

My friend said she couldn't because she had to go to the hospital to see her brother who is undergoing an operation for his arm. She was weeping hard and I felt so miserable too."

Patient explained that she was sure that this dream had a meaning for her. That she was "undergoing an operation."

Following this hour the patient had one of her old nocturnal epileptiform "fits." This was the first attack she had had since the beginning of the analysis. It was now two weeks since she had had any medication. Her husband stated this seizure was very severe, but it was interesting to note that she did not have the usual lassitude the next day as had always been the case following an attack.

On coming to the office the next day she told of being out on a dinner party the previous day. They had been the guests of the family physician, an elderly gentleman, she had known for the past six years. He had seven children, and his wife had lost her life during the birth of the last child. "Also he was very slow," and she was always bored by his card playing. They had spent the evening playing cards.

The afternoon previous to this party she had spent with a girl friend. They had a four hour talk. The girl was four months pregnant and did not wish to be. Patient went on to state: "Last night I was not able to go to sleep right away, probably I was enjoying too much thinking of what I'd like to do. For the present cold weather, I have not much desire to do anything. When next spring comes, I want to go out horse-back riding every morning. I'd like to have company, either a boy or a girl, as long as he or she can ride well. We shall go away from this busy section and out into some quiet place among trees, brooks and hills. Then at noon, we shall return. Then I shall take a very short nap. Again we two will start out motoring. I want some one to teach me more about driving. After a couple of hours, we will come back home. I can spend my evenings home or go out for a good time. Then if I should get tired of such an easy life, I will plan a trip around the world. I shall go by way of Suez Canal and I must stop at the different ports for a considerable time. Probably I'll stay a longer time in France, Italy and at last England. If then I am satisfied with my visit to the Continent, I shall take the biggest steamer crossing the Atlantic."

This phantasying in which the patient engaged indicated that she was fretting in her environment and wished to enlarge her interests.

She desired a life of leisure, but an active life; not lacking in luxury. The facts in her case were that she was apparently rich, but was bound by conventions and not allowed to follow her own impulses. What she desired was diametrically opposite to the practices of Chinese. Chinese women are not supposed to take part in "man-nish" sports nor to have the wanderlust; they must stay at home and tend their household and indulge in petty gossip.

The dream she had had previous to her attack was:

Dream 3.—"I went to see a girl friend of mine. She loves her cat so much and even plays with her in bed. I asked her how she ever allowed such a thing. She patted the cat a few more times, and said that she really loves her. Later on, I saw that the animal gave birth to a half dozen baby cats. They all wiggled around and ran after the mother. I shivered even to see the very sight, and said they were the most terrible looking things."

She has awakened following this seizure, and on going back to sleep had the following dream:

Dream 4.—"I was on my way somewhere and while passing the street, I saw a big crowd. I ordered my car to go there. I saw three women, each carrying a baby in her arms, and kneeling down. One was weeping, and stretching forth her sickly looking child she asked earnestly, 'Will no. one lend me three dollars to keep the child alive?' Nobody gave a cent, so I walked out and gave each woman two dollars and said, 'I am perfectly willing to give you this, so don't bother about returning me the money.' I had on a rose-colored evening dress with sparkling beads all over. I was very conscious of it, that I felt the crowd criticizing about the way I walked. After passing the scene to some distance a few chased after me and said 'Oh, you are fooled'."

Patient's appointment was from 11:30 to 12:30 noon. She left the office and went to the bank to meet her husband. While waiting for him about 1:30 p.m., she was reading a newspaper, and without warning she fell over in her chair in an epileptiform seizure. The analyst called to see her immediately and found that she was rather exhausted and showed an ecchymosis of the right eye. This was the first time she had had a seizure during the day, and the first time she had ever injured herself. She remained listlessly in bed for the next two days. Her reply to questioning was: "Can't think."

Following these two days in bed she felt much better. Her appetite improved. Her family required that she be accompanied whenever she left the house. This she resented. Her mother insisted patient was possessed by a demon and should repent from her evil ways.

Rooted in the native Chinese religions, the belief in the existence of evil spirits which can grievously afflict mankind is general throughout China. It is a country, as some one has said, where four hundred and fifty million people live in daily terror of four hundred and fifty billion ghosts. Certain diseases seem to the Chinese more peculiarly due to evil spirits than others. Such are the different forms of insanity. The more violent the patients are, the more intensely they seem to be possessed. For this reason they are often subjected by their own people to very cruel treatment.¹

The great teachers of China did not do much except in an indirect way, to encourage popular superstitions. But faint references—and those chiefly to ceremonial matters—are to be found in the Classics, nor does popular belief credit Confucius, Mencius, Lao-tzu, and others with more than inferential approval of the superstitions current in their day.

These ideas have been passed on from generation to generation. The principle of filial reverence for age has probably contributed more than anything else to imbue the minds of the Chinese people with a respect for anything, from a porcelain bowl to an aphorism, proverb, or demon, which savors of antiquity; and folklore shares with ethics the benefits of the national bias. As regards details, the folklore of China is much the same as that of Europe or America, with here and there some unexpected contradictions. Many of these superstitions give a glimpse into the subconscious, whether they are found in an American or a Chinese; but it is none the less interesting to find that they often exist in almost identical shape in places so far apart.

Lucky days are chosen for almost every event of importance in Chinese life; beginning an education, starting a journey, opening shop at New Year time, marriages, funerals, changing houses, repairing or building houses, will not only be begun on a lucky day, but in a lucky year. It seems that the day of a person's birth and the day of his death are the only events which the Chinese make no pretense at controlling.

Odd numbers are more lucky than even ones; for example, an odd number of days must elapse between a death and a funeral, and

every seventh day is observed by the women of the deceased as the time for weeping till seven times is reached, and the mourning in many cases is then ended.

The first and the fifteenth are the recognized days for worship in the temple and in the home. The seventh moon of each year is the most idolatrous of the twelve, when the spirits of the family ancestors are supposed to return and share the feast of meat and wine. The pagoda of each city, which is said to be built in the shape of a Chinese pencil and intended to govern the literary welfare of the city, has always an odd number of stories.

To some analysts the pagoda might be said to represent the phallus as the memorial is only erected to a man, while an elaborate arch is constructed if the memory of a woman is to be preserved. The motives in Chinese architecture would easily justify an extended discussion. Sufficient to say, that pagodas are found all over China, and seldom is a city found without one or more of these symbolic structures.

The analysis had been discontinued for the week following the severe seizures, and was now resumed. Her first statement on coming to the office was: "This thing cannot go on." She felt that her husband and she would have to separate. She had received no benefit from her married life, and could see nothing but uncertainty ahead.

Patient stated that the sexual act had always been disgusting to her. She had her first epileptiform seizure the first night of her honeymoon. They left on a steamer for a southern port, and although her husband attempted coitus the first night he had a premature ejaculation, and later on during the night she had her first epileptiform attack. She continued to have these "fits" as before noted. During the two and a half years they were married, they had attempted introitus three times, but she apparently had vaginismus and her husband had ejaculatory precox. Examination of the husband showed an adhered prepuce and pain on erection, while examination of the patient's vagina showed no pathology except slight nonspecific leukorrhea, and a large sized speculum was admitted with difficulty.

During the next hour the patient stated the following: "Often times I can picture myself kissing or hugging, but when it comes to reality I find it impossible to do. Why can I absolutely forget everything when I am at a movie? I find the love-making in those pictures so undescribably thrilling and I can feel it. When it comes to my own turn I don't find any thrill at all. I always have a kiss sweeter

in imagination than in reality. Why is it that when people make remarks that since our marriage, my husband has grown much stouter and myself thinner, I have sudden gloom for fear others may think that my husband is getting too much of the married life whereas I am suffering from it? Why do I feel so pessimistic all the time? Why do I find myself very forgetful? I am coming to realize that after having learned or heard so much about love, I expect to see it actually or can hold it for a while, instead of thinking it is simply shown in our everyday life so as to really enjoy loving others and be loved in return. Also, I may be demanding more than love can give. Is love really blind or is it an extra eye? I am not convinced in either of the statements. Can it be true that if one has real true love for the other, he or she can absolutely forget and forgive all the faults of the other party or vice versa? Can he or she find fault or all the goodness which does not exist in the other person?"

The next two nights she had the following dream:

Dream 5.—"I was asked by a girl cousin of mine to attend the Women's Club meeting. I went there and met another boy cousin of mine. He asked me if I would play Mah Jongg with him first. So we got four others and played the game instead."

Free association indicated the patient did not desire a homosexual existence.

Dream 6.—"I saw an enormous sized fish, flying down from heaven. However, the fish in many ways looked more like a dragon. I was in a large open air space, and when the fish came down, it wound around my body. It wound tighter and tighter and I felt I could hardly breathe. I wanted to get rid of the thing, but some one told me just to be patient for another few minutes for then the animal would have to return to his hole. So at least for half of the night I felt tightly bound up by the fish."

Before going into the associations with this significant dream it is interesting to note some of the Chinese beliefs about dragons.

The Chinese dragon is apparently an allegorical creature of poly-genetic nature with the body and limbs of a crocodile, the head of a lion and the horns of a deer. He is supposed to be a benevolent beast, altogether quite different in attributes from his Western prototype. He has preternatural powers, but they are benign. A

Chinese author's description is as follows: "It carries on its forehead horns resembling the antlers of a stag. It has the head of a camel, the eyes of a hare, the ears of a bull, the neck of a snake, the belly of a frog, scales like a fish, talons like an eagle, and paws like a tiger." Near its mouth is generally represented a ball surrounded by flames and clouds. This ball is commonly called a "pearl"; some have described it as the sun, and others as an emblem of thunder. The dragon is thought to be able to make itself large or small, and to rise or fall as it wishes.

The symbolic meaning of the dragon in the Chinese mind is difficult to determine. Native archaeologists have assigned to it the rôle of admonisher against greed and avarice. In the ancient "Book of Changes," the greatest Chinese classic, written ages before the time of Confucius, the dragon is the symbol of the sage and the king. The character for dragon means "that which rises and is lofty in location." It is used of mountains, and of national or individual prosperity.

The process by which the early Chinese arrived at this symbol for national or individual power was partly through their fondness for astronomical observations and partly by divination. They saw the dragon represented in the brilliant constellations of the eastern sky where every orb of heaven appears to rise.

The geomancer calls all high land "dragon," and all low land "water," as the dragon rules the high land and water the low land. The dragon follows the course of the water, originating where the water has its beginning, and remaining permanently where two streams meet. The dragon causes man's elevation, longevity and riches, and its influence varies according as it has more of water, earth, air, or fire. The dragon is thought to typify Spring, rain, and flood, and to have the power of removing the spirit of death and of preserving life.

The patient stated that she felt that the fish or dragon represented in her dream was a symbol of her native superstitions which bound her tightly in her environment. Chinese society required that she should raise a family and submit to her husband's necessity. But she felt that the analyst had cleared the situation, and that this "some one" had told her "to be patient" and she would finally be freed.

Three days later on coming to the office the patient looked very much better and was more cheerful than previously. She had taken a new interest in life and had been out to two or three parties. She

stated that she hadn't "thought" about her condition during the past three days, and felt that her salvation depended on keeping herself busy with social and philanthropic affairs. She also felt that she should, and would make her adjustment to married life.

Her attitude here showed a glint of insight and a turn for the better. This was the twenty-sixth hour of the analysis, and she had been free from her attacks for the last two weeks.

Five days later patient reported that she now felt as well physically and mentally as she had ever felt before her marriage. She stated that she was sure these attacks had been brought on as a protective mechanism against the necessity for her to make the conjugal adjustment. She did not feel any more that coitus as an act, nor the nude, were disgusting, although she still felt that she did not really love her husband and that the "mess" of ejaculatory precox was still repulsive. She was sure drugs did not help her condition, and would never help her out of her conflict. She asked about sex gratification and the pleasures of coitus. She had never experienced an orgasm, and had never discussed sex matters with anybody else. She felt it was unwise to consider divorce, and was willing to attempt adjustment to her husband if he went half way. This showed full insight into her condition, and it was explained to her that if she cultivated her erotic zones the adjustment would be easier. Personally induced orgasm would assist her materially.

The husband was consulted about himself, but nothing about his wife was divulged except that coitus had never promised her any pleasure. He was counseled to "court" her, and to "make haste slowly." He was advised to have his glans freed of adhesions; which would cure him of his "impotence." He was instructed to never force himself on his wife but become her "lover." All this he promised to do, and was in every way coöperative.

An old Manchu Viceroy, Chang Chih-Tung, once made an interesting comparison between Occidental and Oriental marriages. He said that "in the West, married life starts as a kettle of boiling water from which the flame has been removed. The courting and pre-nuptial lovemaking starts marriage off at a white heat, but gradually the heat cools. In China, on the other hand, marriage starts like a kettle of cold water with a flame under it. Gradually it warms, and the beauty of the system is that the water stays heated. Marriage is the beginning, not the consummation of the love affair.

"The fundamental idea behind Chinese marriage is broader and deeper than your own. In America, the individual considers himself

alone. In China, it is the family that is considered beyond anything else."

Thus we see that in China the family is the only thing that counts. Marriage is, primarily, to continue the family, and to continue in it only such strains as the family heads consider worthy to endure. There is no such thing as courtship. Instead, the cold-blooded bickerings of a hired go-between. Love at the time of marriage is all but impossible, since usually husband and wife see each other for the first time on their wedding day.

The Chinese woman, with very few modern exceptions, is virtually enslaved from her birth to the end of her days, subject to what are known as the three obediences: First, there is obedience to her father; then after marriage, obedience to her husband; and later, when her only real function has been fulfilled—the bearing of male children—obedience to her sons. And there is one more yoke, she must bear, her complete subjugation to her mother-in-law.

Three days after her last visit, and on the same day that her husband was talked to, patient came to the office very "down hearted." She said she often felt "shut in," and really did not desire to make the conjugal adjustment. She was sure her family did not care for her, as they were pestering her to change her manner of living. She said it was up to her husband to make the adjustment; she "did not love him, only cared." The patient and her husband had been living with her family, and it was emphatically advised that they set up their own household without delay, and thus get out of her unfavorable environment. She was assured that her husband loved her and would do everything in his power to clear up matters.

She now stated that she felt the analysis had done all it could for her, and that she could "figure it out" without recurrence of her symptoms. This was agreed upon and she was assured that she could call the analyst at any time if she needed assistance.

A week later she telephoned asking for an appointment, and gave as an excuse that one of her eyes was inflamed and she wished advice. On coming to the office she related the following: Two nights previous she had been to a movie and had seen "The Last Days of Pompeii"; that night she dreamt she was living over the play, and she had one of her old attacks, but much milder than formerly. She then dreamt she told the analyst about it. The next day she felt well, the usual lassitude that had formerly followed an attack not occurring.

That afternoon under compulsion by her mother she went with

her to a prayer meeting which was being conducted by a Chinese evangelist. The speaker was a man, but the audience was all ladies. He told them about "Love," but spoke mostly about sexual love, and made a public confession that he could not himself even shake hands with a woman without experiencing passionate feelings. Patient stated that she thought "it was a shameful thing for him to talk about," and that he had no right to do so. She said she was sure she would not have any more attacks if her husband assured her that they would never again attempt coitus. She felt that she "had missed something others have," but there was no use to fret over it and that she would not allow the world to know her misfortune. She gave her consent for her husband to have concubines if he wished for his sexual gratification and progeny, as is the custom in China.

The husband was again consulted and agreed entirely to her requests. He said he had sublimated his desires in his work as manager of a large bank, and since he loved her he would not take concubines. If she never cared for his affections, he would not force them upon her, and they would "live on as brother and sister."

Shortly after this the couple moved to their own household, and markedly changed in their attitude to each other. They appeared in perfect accord.

The psychotherapy was discontinued just over a year ago, and during this time the patient has experienced no epileptiform seizures. Her friends frequently commented on how well she looks, and she has taken great interest in club affairs and social service work. To all outward appearance they are a "happy married couple."

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IS CONSCIOUSNESS CURATIVE?

By S. DANIEL HOUSE, PH.D.

It may be just as well at this point to discuss explicitly an assumption that is everywhere implicit in psychoanalytic thinking, to wit, the curative nature of consciousness. I am not aware of the existence in the whole wide range of analytic literature of the asking and the answering of the explicit question: Why should consciousness be curative?

At first glance at the history of thought we are justified in believing quite the reverse in fact: that consciousness is a pain, a travail, a burden, a malady. Thinking as critical analysis, as reflection, as concentrated probing of memories and behaviors and experiences, is a task so difficult as to be quite beyond the capacity of commonplace minds, an enterprise full of peril even for the most audacious minds. The tragedy of thought expresses almost perfectly what thinking comes to when pursued as relentless reflection. The history of philosophy is the history of pessimism (often disguising itself as absolute idealism or even as crudest materialism). The malady of thought is a phenomenon well known to those minds capable of thinking sincerely.

If it be reasonably true that thinking, as contradistinguished from day-dreaming and self-indulgent reverie and mystic imagining and infantile wish-fulfilment, is a comparatively late development in the evolution of life, we ought to be on our guard against any easy assumption of thinking's magic efficacy as a therapeutic agency. Thinking is not "natural" to man in the simple sense that he loves to think as he spontaneously enjoys eating, drinking, sexing, showing off. Measured by philosophic criterion, man is anything but a thinking animal. The fierce compulsive driving power of instinct has ruled his life from the beginning like a force beyond his control. Habit is in fact a sort of second nature to him. Impulse eternally threatens the foundations of his human universe. Out of the maddening chaos of his badly controlled existence he seeks with a kind of desperate futility to construct those checks and balances of a reasonable and reflective nature which he somehow hopes will ease off the tensions and distractions and contradictions of his life.

Thought is a half-intelligible obscure footnote on life.

If it be true indeed that man seeks to escape the burden of thought, the tension and the travail of reflection; if it be true that man feels naturally at home in a state of mind that slides by insensible gradations into a peaceful hypnoidal sleep; if he can only be stirred from this sleepy-mindedness by the shock and bite and sting and murder of reality, are we not in the presence of a creature whose primary organic need it is to shun the skeptic insecurity of thought?

It is easier to say what consciousness is not than to define precisely what it is. Of course I reject the empty-headed behavioristic assumption that consciousness does not exist because it cannot be fetched into the laboratory for tangible experimental study. The silly logic of this position is finally revealed by attempting a similar approach to the reality called death. No living person has ever experienced death. Is there any person still alive among us who will deny the reality of death? The subtlety of consciousness resides in the fact that it represents the most unique condition of the human organism imaginable and, because of that biologic circumstance, contributes wonderfully to man's peculiar ability to survey his own past as if it were an objective historical record of events, to fashion concepts by means of which he can move about among experiences with a certain logical ease, to be capable of insights that are more closely allied to poetic inspiration, flashes of genius, sudden appreciations, intuitions, and levels of meaning, than a naïve scientific methodology can either probe or envisage.

In a negative sense, we know what consciousness is. Or, worded less awkwardly, we know in what kinds of behavior and of experience consciousness plays a minor rôle. The extreme case for the minimal presence of consciousness is (most of us will wisely agree) death. If we attempted a flexibly graded series running the whole gamut from zero consciousness to the theoretic extreme of 100 per cent consciousness, we should have an ascending arrangement something like this: death; organic lesion causing a temporary unconsciousness; unconsciousness under the influence of an anesthetic; perfect normal sleep (especially in childhood); a drugged state; traumatic shock resulting in memory lapses and varying degrees of unconsciousness; automatism in behavior (as in somnambulism); the mechanization of response as in daily routine (though the original effort at adjustment and comprehension was a conscious experience, involving tension and attention and memory); habit formation, at least as regards a con-

siderable department of life below the philosophic level of responsiveness; the learning process as "blind" trial-and-error experimenting with alternatives; the learning process as that more complicated trial and error procedure in which clear cut concepts, reasonable hypotheses, sagacious selection of options, insights and perceived goals are the subject matter of learning; thinking as suspended judgment; thinking as philosophic discourse; thinking in its most complicated and difficult sense of a psychoanalytic survey of one's inner imperfections and disharmonies with a view to a drastic reëducation of one's ideas and ways of living!

Consciousness, humanly conceived, may emerge from an emotional or an intellectual upset. In the former case we have those unforgettable memories that underlie compulsions, obsessions, anxieties, phobias, morbidities. In the latter case we have those unbearable contradictions with which logic and metaphysic and philosophy try to cope, for the greater tranquillity of the mind. These upsets are especially characterized by a disproportionate tension and attention. Consciousness is the organic registration of disturbance and the psychologic registration of conflict. To deny a high psychologic importance to consciousness is wilfully to underestimate the human significance of those events in life which are most meaningful to us as human beings, as personalities.

What do the psychoanalysts mean by their assumption of the curative power of consciousness? Their clinical experience has brought home to them the astonishing fact that experiences too painful to be accepted by the moral personality are finally absorbed into the value system of the patient under the guidance of a candid analysis of his moral dilemmas and the building up of new concepts of approval of his shameful and painful experiences. The patient, tormented by contradiction and conflict, devoid of a system of concepts and categories for the canalizing of perturbing experience, must undergo a reëducation of his habits of believing and thinking and acting. Only the psychoanalytic technique promises this transvaluation of values, this recreating of the individual. When the patient is able to survey his own life's troubled course with a psychoanalytic evaluation of events, he may be said to be cured. Psychologically speaking, his cure consists in a *conscious* reorientation, reintegration, revision of habits and values.

The uncritical assumption informing this analytic technique is faith in the mind's capacity for accepting with equanimity the very

unsweet truths about its imperfections, evasions, dishonesties, vulgarities. Since everything we know about the human mind points in the direction of its illimitable capacity for self-delusion, why should we too eagerly believe that we can psychoanalyze the mind into the happy acceptance of disillusionment? If the desperate desire of the mind of man is to escape the burden of thinking, the torture of honest reflection, the distress of logical analysis, the genuine pain of doubt, the positively unendurable load of critical self-knowledge (since his self is the cowardly and frightened and shameful and imperfect thing it is), why should we commit the beautiful absurdity of believing in the power of consciousness to put man at his ease, to cure him of his personality inadequacies?

In sober truth, as a result of the vast harm perpetrated by the crude surgeons of the soul who call themselves orthodox psychoanalysts, it has become a matter of the first importance, practically and theoretically, to inquire into the mind's capacity for *enduring* the exploratory operations which it must undergo, at whatever costs to personal harmony, the analyst, in his infinitely dogmatic certainty, decides to inflict upon a mind already suffering tortures beyond its reasonable endurance.

If the practicing experts could summon the philosophic courage to report upon the cases which they have mismanaged or misunderstood (an analyst is a man for a' that!), the new and very promising science of reëducation would profit enormously by their clean confessional.

To the extent that the psychoanalytic technique quits being religion and magic and metaphysic and humbly consents to become humanism and education and psychology, will the brilliant doctrines and ideas of the psychoanalysts have a better chance for contributing their more than normal quota of wisdom to the general enlightenment. The three creative pioneers of the new psychology and the new medicine and the new education, Freud, Adler, Jung, have generously conceived of analytic technique as primarily a study in the reëducation of human nature by means of an emotional and intellectual transformation of habits and values and goals. This is dynamic psychology at its best. It is the psychologizing of psychoanalysis that promises best for the future of mental hygiene, the most valuable by-product of analytic technique.

Psychoanalysis, as a therapeutic agency, has some wonderful merits. Certainly. And also some flagrant defects. Undoubtedly.

The philosophic question is: How much *realization* is a given

mind capable of? Not until this problem is candidly confronted and honestly reported upon shall we be in a position as analysts and educators and philosophers to fashion a science and art of reëducation sufficiently flexible and sensitive and wise to do more good than harm to the baffled minds of men.

What is the psychology of the analytic technique? The explanation I suggest has the merit of a certain originality and to that extent must be looked upon as tentative and perilous. Inasmuch as a brilliant psychoanalyst, endowed with flexiblemindedness, has found this explanation significant, makes me go ahead with it as a thing of importance. What factors are involved in this therapeutic procedure called "being psychoanalyzed"?

As I see it, two fundamental problems are to be solved: the problem of the release of tension, and the problem of the redistribution of attention.

The tension manifests itself not only in an organic state that is popularly characterized as nervousness, but also in the more subtle forms of disquiet, like anxiety, watchfulness, phobia, irritability, suspiciousness, moodiness, etc. Interlaced with the problem of disconcerting tension is the enormously complicated problem of attention taking the pathologic form of fixation, repetition, obsession, reminiscence, rigidity.

What specifically is the patient doing that will relieve him of his load of tension and of fixated attention? Let us recall a few very familiar facts. Everyone knows that confessional is somehow a relief; hence, it has been thought of popularly as good for the soul. Everyone knows that talking things over is somehow a relief, almost a pleasure. To confide in another person seems to be as necessary and meaningful as if it were a truly biologic fulfilment. To use a more technical term, catharsis is a perfectly human indulgence that has therapeutic meaning. To unburden one's heart is somehow curative.

Why are these things so? The answer, as I construe it, is not very difficult, though it is quite elaborate. Reduced to the most general terms, the psychoanalytic procedure is curative (when it is) because of four factors constantly at play in the analytic performance: dramatic objectification, analytic dismemberment, release of tension, realization. A discussion of these four remarkable processes in the reëducation of a psychoneurotic will help to make clear some of the mystery and subtlety of Freudian analysis.

What is meant by dramatic objectification? Expressed most simply, it is a series of rehearsals of experience quite dramatic, in the nature of the case, in which one gradually comes to shift one's rôle from that of victim and villain to that of master and hero. The points to note in this connection are the importance of theatricalism in human behavior and the psychologic significance of repetition in giving an originally subjective and highly emotional experience the status of objectivity. As to theatricalism. Every humblest clod, given the least encouragement, guaranteed a congenial audience (one person may be quite sufficient), loves exhibitionism: to talk about self, to parade the melodramatic egotistic episodes of the personal life, to show off with appropriate modesty, to magnify the ego, to play a part!

This theme of the theatricalism resident in human nature is deserving of an amount of study it has not yet even begun to receive. Psychologically, this tendency in human beings to take themselves melodramatically, to oscillate drunkenly between villainy and virtue, to coax a primitive delight from self-degradation, to suck joy from self-glorification, to seek always to extract emotional profit from experience, is part and parcel of the hideously fascinating business of living. Perhaps, underlying it all, is that disquieting sense of imperfection, of inferiority, of ungodliness which haunts the minds of melodramatic mortals. The sick compensation for this omnipresent sense of botched inadequacy takes the form of ego-glorification (even in the most humble, the most modest earthworms).

So much for the dramatic element. Objectification is the general term for the process whereby the patient in communicating again and again his troubled state finally occupies the position of a person who is writing an historical record, a report implicating his innermost self, yet, because of its projection through the medium of language into a factual record becomes for him a quite objective reality. This objectivity, adequately attained, implies *repetition* as a psychological device for squeezing the emotion out of an experience and leaving it in a state of detached dryness, so to speak; the learning of a *new language* for the specific absorption and comprehension of emotionally perturbing experience; the conversion of a personally felt episode into an *historical record* that has the characteristics of a critically written autobiography.

Repetition as such is a psychological method for making a behavior commonplace. Hence its therapeutic potency in the emotional

rehearsals of psychoneurotics. Language as such is the most remarkable device invented by the troubled mind of man to give a local habitation and a name to an otherwise vaguely diffused and therefore terrifyingly uncontrolled experience. The therapeutic power of language resides in its two-fold capacity for canalizing experience and for making it amenable to management because of its specificity. The restlessness and anxiety attendant upon an experience which has not been provided with suitable and specific garments of expression are laid to rest so soon as the mind can win a confidence in its ability to locate the experience, to name it, to study it as a tangible reality, to separate it out from other episodes; in short, to grasp it as a specific manageable fact. When personal behavior, however saturated with emotion in origin, becomes through repetition and habituation and linguistic definiteness a part of an historical record, it may be said to be under control of the comprehending ego, to be a reasonable reality no longer to be evaded or bullied by. This whole process I refer to as *dramatic objectification*.

What can we say about analytic dismemberment? The question cuts deep into the problem of the relation between the emotional and intellectual factors in personality, especially as they are related to the problem of integration. What is the specific attribute of an experience we call emotional? Something happens: the mind is unprepared: the invading stimulus finds no specific response: but somehow it must be received by the organism: what takes place? Organic disturbance indicating what we abstractly call fear or surprise or delight. Psychological upset as revealed in a state of doubt, worry, anxiety, impotence, personality-maladjustment. The invading episode "floods" the nervous system. The neurological and psychological reactions are excessive. What would it mean to say that the organism had been prepared for the reception of the stimulus? Simply this: habits and mental sets and preconceptions and judgments had been previously formed as a mode of receiving and controlling previous stimuli of a comparable significance under conditions more diffuse and emotional. We may generalize and say that an episode is emotional to the extent that the personality is unequipped in habits, language, judgments, for its specific organization. Emotional experience tends to be characterized by this absence of specificity.

The task imposed upon analytic technique is to help the patient convert a vague diffuse emotional state into a rather specific intel-

lectual fact. What I call analytic dismemberment is a picturesque phrase for the complicated process of getting the patient to cut up his vast emotional situation into pieces and fragments, each one of which by being specifically labeled and linguistically set apart then gets the status of a fact, an object, a small reality within the intellectual grasp of the patient who now perceives the sick absurdity of tying into a complicated emotional pattern a string of specific behaviors which can be rationally understood and controlled only by being surveyed as separate manageable facts.

The behaviorists are wonderfully right in stressing the central significance of language. The psychoanalyst, to the extent that he is a capable psychologist, is assisting the emotionally perturbed and anxiety-ridden patient to build up a system of language habits that succeed by their very specificity and objectivity in draining the original emotional situation of its excessiveness. Of course, in addition to the healing surgery of language, there are the supplementary requirements of a certain sagacity in the patient, a capacity for a considerable amount of personality reconstruction, an intellectual hospitality to a new philosophy of values. Thus we finally are dealing with habits and *values*.

The essence of a psychoneurotic reaction is its excessiveness: it lacks discrimination. It might be called a wholesale reaction to a specific situation. It carries too much of the past with it. Reminiscence is involved and repetition-compulsion. Psychoneurotic behavior is exceedingly egocentric and emotional.

The essence of what may by contrast be termed a normal reaction is the presence of discrimination. It is a relevant, limited, and specific adaptation or response to a specific situation. The past is implicated only in the sense that memory and choice and habit are relevant. Normal behavior tends to be less personal, much less emotional, not so fraught with meanings to the entire personality, as the typical behavior of your psychoneurotic.

The analytic technique, to the extent that it is concerned with the problem of the dismemberment of episodes caught in a vast network of diffuse emotionalism, has as its goal the substitution of specific reactions for wholesale ones.

What is the relation to this patient process of the so-called release of tension? If we sufficiently appreciate the fact that psychoneurotic behavior of whatever sort may be nicely defined as a special problem in tensions, we are prepared to view psychoanalysis as a method of

relieving tensions. Mere talking one's heart out (to a sympathetic person, particularly if he be endowed with "magic" properties) is of itself a marvelous drainer-off of pent-up affects and tensions.

The learning of an appropriate new language is a highly important method of absorbing vague emotion into categories and concepts and symbols that then perform the therapeutic service of holding within themselves the excesses of mere feeling and anxiety. A kind of transference takes place from *the patient as victim* of emotional perturbation to *the (reëducated) patient as controller* of intellectual and what might be called symbolic malaise.

Fortunately for the health and sanity of the human mind, conceptual control—which means comprehension—of emotional situations is of itself a guarantee of poise and well being. For example: death as an emotional reality evokes an excessive, that is, a psychoneurotic reaction: it frightens and paralyzes. Death, intellectualized, conceptualized, given the status either of an item in the natural history of behavior or raised to the plane of a philosophic insight, becomes a relatively normal event both in the history of the universe and in the autobiographical history of that fragment of the universe labeled Man. The large significance of the intellectual factor in achieving normality, in escaping the crushing burden of psychoneurotic malaise, has not been sufficiently appreciated by the Freudian theoreticians.

What is tension? A state of indecision due to an as yet unsolved conflict between inhibition and expression. Your typical psychoneurotic lives in a state of inner torment because he is always planning to do what he can never summon the affirmative decision to do or definitely to leave undone. Almost all his pathetically ludicrous problems arise from his indecision which in turn is merely the psychologic counterpart of his unresolved tensions. Thus, if the analytic technique is to be efficacious, it must dissipate these tensions.

In many cases it succeeds beautifully in so doing. If the patient is coöperative, if he possesses sagacity, if his sense of humor is still alive, if his insight is reasonably lucid, he can be assisted enormously in the process of substituting words for feelings, new ways of thinking for old, an interest in other selves than his own, a practical appreciation of the difference between a normal and a psychoneurotic reaction to certain perturbing events in his life. He can be given new habits and new values, almost, I was going to say, a new personality. His tensions will be resolved in the nonmagical sense of being subjected to analysis, intellectualization, dramatic objectification, and,

most important of all, they will be eased off *by a redistribution of the objects of attention*. Variety of interest, flexibility in thinking, an absorption in life, the cultivation of more humor, will be so many psychological vehicles for carrying off and systematically redistributing his original funds of hysterically concentrated tension. The analyst will also become an important object of attention and to a large extent of the transference of tensions.

I agree with Dr. Alfred Adler and his school of individual psychologists that an attitude of cordiality and comradeship on the part of the physician (or educator), coupled with a constant eagerness to evoke in the patient moods of self-confidence and attitudes of courage, is of the greatest therapeutic value in all these cases of "problem children" (of whatever age up to seventy). In the orthodox analytic technique there are modes of procedure that defeat these highly desirable ends: the patient's self-respect is tampered with, his confidence undermined, his courage thwarted. No wonder the analysis often becomes so horribly entangled and bungled that the patient, outraged and bullied in relation to his most sensitive feelings and thoughts, comes away actually much worse off than he was at the beginning. There is a delicacy in the handling of psychoneurotics which is frequently enough absent from the procedure of analysts. Dogmatism, magic authoritarianism, smart-Aleck interpretation, bullying, irritating silence, windy wordiness, the slinging around of Freudian jargon that means nothing in particular, are some of the unsweet facts that reduce the therapeutic potency of the psychoanalytic procedure.

Now that we have discussed at considerable length the factors of dramatic objectification, analytic dismemberment, release of tension, let us linger a little over the final element of the analytic cure, namely, realization. To me, in the capacity of humble philosopher, the concept of realization is one of the most illuminating ideas in the evolution of human thought. In another connection I have briefly worked out the importance of the concept of realization in literature and in life.* Here I wish merely to indicate how it relates itself to the analytic technique and the ultimate cure of minds.

Realization is a very abstract term intended to represent the processes of the mind whereby a person comes gradually to appreciate facts in a new setting, episodes in a new interpretation, meanings in a new context. Knowledge in the factual sense is not realization. Information is not insight. Knowledge is not wisdom. There are

* Vide: The Psychoanalytic Review, Oct. 1926.

such subtle realities, highly intellectual in their very nature, as insight and intuition and wisdom. The most intangible of mental categories is that of realization. What more precisely is realization?

Let me first state what it is not. It is not credulity, naïvete, delusion. It is not reverence, timidity, respect, acquiescence. Into the concept of realization there enter such constituents as critical-mindedness, disillusion, imagination, irony, compassion, courage. The capacity for realization is most unequally distributed among minds. If we were to rely upon the evidences of human history for our inference (and why not?), we should certainly say that the majority of people, that is, the mass of mediocrities that clutter up the living universe, are so low in the scale of capacity for realization that we might almost conclude that they were simply without endowment in that particular.

No one can explain the long unspeakable existence of war as the most congenial of the crazy pastimes of common men unless he assumes their sheer incapacity for what I call realization. They know not what they do. It is always so. They lack a certain combination of mental powers which, if present, would make impossible the never ceasing repetition of a behavior that promises nothing but misery, mutilation, and murder for their own unseeing kind. This blindness in human nature is what I mean by the absence of the capacity for realization. Imagination, compassion, criticalmindedness, irony: who among the sons of men are greatly endowed with these liberating qualities of mind and heart?

Thinking at its best is a study in disillusion. Thought is most itself when it reveals limitations and imperfections. Do you wonder that life has produced so few great thinkers? Who sincerely loves to discover imperfections, especially if they have a personal coloration? If there is one revelation more than any other which the mind will do everything in its pathologic power to escape confronting with open eyes, candidly, serenely, humbly, it is the revelation of personal imperfection. Narcissism and egotism rule the mind like sick compulsions beyond the healing remedy of reason or humility.

Think of Socrates, Copernicus, Schopenhauer, Darwin, Ibsen, Strindberg, Shaw, Freud, and ask yourself why these remarkable gadflies have enshrined themselves in the history of thought as wonderful tormentors of the torpid human mind? To trouble the comfort and complacency of the mind is to commit the one sin for which a sleepy headed humanity will not forgive you. The ancient biologic struggle

of life versus death; of curiosity versus contentment; of adventure versus stagnation; of thinking versus believing; of originality versus routine.

Realization is the mind's talented power of comprehending the relevancy of disillusion among a mankind that worships illusion, of criticalmindedness in a world that loves credulity, of compassion where obtuseness is the general rule of life, of irony where conceit and security mislead the mass of men. Realization is intellectual insight made courageous by compassion and human by imagination. The adequate mind comes through an evolution that runs its course from consoling illusion through skeptic disillusion to compassionate realization.

If we apply this conception more concretely to the surgical crudities perpetrated by the average analyst, we shall not be surprised to find that his procedure is capable of an illimitable mischief. He is so obsessed by the need of restoring the unconscious materials of the mind to conscious clarity, he is so involved in the translation of resistances into transferences and finally into self-poised convictions, that he fails to reckon with the nature of the consciousness he had so naïvely relied upon to carry, without too much stress and strain, the considerable load of revelation and bafflement originally deposited in the unconscious layers of the patient's mind.

Imagine the torture of a mind made critically conscious of tendencies and behaviors and desires evaluated throughout all the sensitive and plastic years (when idealism and pretense rule the life of self-esteem), for example, incestuous attachment, homosexual involvement, various types of nastiness that infect sexual desire, ego-inadequacy, possibly irremediable inferiority, marital disharmony that will not be magically cured, the twisted maladjustments of personality that simply defy the healing art no matter how wisely administered. The psychoanalyst is using a method of exploring the mind that has unhappily within it the power to wreck that mind. The wreckage need not be manifest in the breakdown called insanity (such cases exist though scrupulously shielded from public knowledge), it may exist more innocently in an increase of mental confusion, a sense of bafflement, the painful reorientation of one's life with consequences that are unspeakably wretched, habits of self-analysis that finally out-morbid morbidity, sheer anxiety and woe. The perils of the psychoanalytic technique are quite as real as its admittedly positive merits.

The haunting question for every honest analyst to wrestle with is

the nature of consciousness, its power of absorbing new pains, new ideas, new realizations. In what sense are we certain that consciousness is curative? In what sense are we reasonably certain that consciousness, far from being curative, tends to be morbid? Admitting that truth can sometimes make us free, is it not even more important for the psychologist and educator and analyst to remember that truth, in thus granting a new lease of liberation, in making us *free*, may also strangely succeed in making us *mad*?

The unconscious mind of the patient as construed by the conscious mind of the physician is then accepted by the consciousness of the patient as a true description of his own unconscious! Delightful legerdemain. Freud would convince us that the unconscious is incredibly conscious and the conscious incredibly unconscious! Charming Freudian wit.

Since the problem of a sane analytic technique is so fundamental and all-important, one word more may not be superfluous. As we survey a troubled mind we become aware of the existence in the patient's mind of what I shall call a living context of experience wholly undifferentiated. It is this loose totality of reaction that confronts the probing analyst right off. The mind of the patient is a mass of (I was going to say a mess of) *irrational associations*. Events and objects and persons are all inextricably interwoven, held together in this weird flux of experience by the bond of some remembered fear or shame or frustration. The patient in such a case simply cannot help feeling himself a *victim*. There is at the patient's disposal no rationalist logic which he can summon for self-analysis and self-amelioration. He cannot adequately *realize* what is truly transpiring in his perturbed mind because his human nature is caught in contradictions which he (who is "he" in this situation?) cannot transcend. However brilliant a mind may be, it cannot be as self-observant, as self-critical, as it needs must be if it would be adequately wise about the complicated goings-on within it. Hence the indispensable sage analyst.

The analytic therapy is a study, psychologically, in the process of dismemberment of emotional wholes and totalities that function too explosively and compulsively in the typical responses of the psychoneurotic. Every smallest provocative stimulus sets off inevitably a vast battery of responsiveness. This excess in response is precisely the center of derangement in the reaction system of your psychoneurotic. He behaves like a victim and he knows it—to his pain and

chagrin. *He* can't help *himself*. In the long course of analytic dismemberment, emotionality gradually evaporates out of the subjective situation, a something approximating objectivity taking its place. Language adds its healing power of specificity.

Analysis proceeds to the breaking up of the original pulsating and entangled lump of experience into fragments. These relatively objective fragments of experience take on the status of facts which can be handled by the patient whose reëducation consists precisely in the ability to perform this necessary task of confronting the separate realities of his painful past with a view to coördinating and reintegrating them into a livable pattern.

The analytic cure ultimately means control and insight.

Psychologically speaking, the Unconscious really signifies, in the last analysis, lack of insight.

Dramatic objectification is the technique by means of which the patient emerges from the status of victim to that of victor: he literally acts out, in melodramatic recital and confessional, the perturbed scenes of his life until he feels relieved of the tension of their subjective sincerity, in the process gradually finding himself an actor unburdened by his part, able to voice it as in a play, without excessive personal participation. He can speak his piece quite objectively, dispassionately.

As a therapeutic consequence of this wonderful relief of tension, the patient finds at his disposal a fund of energy capable of being directed toward *new objects of attention*. This reorientation of the hitherto fettered and fixated attention toward a variety of new and therefore engaging objects and events is the quintessence of that flexible-mindedness which is the core of mental health, that is, of sanity.

Psychoanalysis is a brilliant device for draining off passion and perturbation into objective recital of events originally excessively egocentric, now become part of an historic record, a manageable autobiography, by the exploratory techniques of catharsis, analytic dismemberment, the healing power of language substituting specificity for vagueness, and, as a climax, the redintegrative power of realization. Mental health means mental adequacy, which in turn hinges upon the capacity for *realization*.

To the orthodox psychoanalyst, an element in his analysis more important and more difficult to grapple with than any other is the process he terms transference. He usually distinguishes two aspects,

negative and positive transference. It is expected that the patient will inevitably convert the analyst into an object of alternating love and hate as embodiments of his deep lying resistances. I am interested in pointing out a characteristic of this neurotic relation between patient and analyst that is usually ignored, not even perceived or credited with importance. Letting someone else solve our problems is one of the most human things to do. The history of man is the story of his varied dependence upon forces outside himself: God, fate, heredity, environment, society, parent, priest, luck, nature, destiny, the inexorable. The most penetrating fact in human history, conceived psychiatrically, is dependence. This insatiable dependence upon outside forces and persons springs from man's deep sense of inadequacy. He simply knows and feels himself incapable of solving his problems, too numerous and perplexing for his very limited mind and make-up.

What the psychoanalysts picturesquely refer to as positive and negative transference is quite clearly a study in emotional dependence, a theme that is splendidly illuminated by Adlerian psychology. As I see it, the patient, in the course of the exposé of his dark and troubled inner life, unequal to the quite difficult task of confronting his imperfections and bunglings calmly and courageously, does the next best thing by attempting to load his troubled state upon the analyst whom he then proceeds to make a scapegoat of, seeking by this tactic to find someone at last whom he can hold responsible for his woes. The patient transfers his unresolved hates and loves to the analyst in a bond of neurotic dependence (which it is the analyst's unsweet task to cut, as one might the umbilical cord, before delivering the patient as fit to live his own autonomous life).

An interesting difference between the so-called normal person and the so-called psychoneurotic may be visualized as the difference between the grown-up child and the overgrown child. The analyst is frequented by men and women whose intelligence from an intellectualistic point of view may be, and often is, remarkable, but whose emotional development is childish and immature. Freud bears witness to this fact in his ceaseless harping on "infantile fixations." Adler reaffirms this same truth by stressing the period of earliest childhood as the perilous time of fear, lack of confidence, dependence upon the mother, timidity, a sense of inferiority, self-indulgent habitude. Jung comes to the same conclusion when he emphasizes the therapeutic need of accepting the burdens of maturity as part of the cure of souls.

Transference is a way of referring to the psychoneurotic's desire

to have someone else solve his life's major problems, namely, those of ego and sex fulfillment. If the analyst refuses to be his love object, he shows more resistances, behaves more negativistically, plays the part of spoiled child, may even go into tantrums, manifests hysterical symptoms, will not be appeased until he is once more subtly soothed into the hope of a satisfying dependence upon the beloved analyst.

If his sex desire or his ego is frustrated or humiliated or wounded by the analyst's attitude or behavior or remarks, his transference is marked by hate. This see-saw of the emotions of our overgrown child is characterized by the Freudian name of "ambivalence." Hate and love, the Siamese twins of the emotional life, haunt the behavior of the psychoneurotic. The analyst, in the nature of the case, becomes the object of these alternating moods.

What I perceive in this process is a very ancient device of human nature to find a scapegoat for its pent-up inadequacies. When the analyst responds favorably, he is an adored scapegoat. When he responds unfavorably, he is a despised scapegoat. In either event, a child incapable of self-dependence is desperately seeking a protector and dependable guide through the dark forest of the emotional life. This view of transference supplements the orthodox conception of the Freudians which gets itself too deeply involved in the Oedipus complex (which may be in origin, not the son's guilty desire for the mother but the emotionally starved mother's passionate attachment to the son), incestuous fixations, infantile sexuality, the ambivalence of the emotions, resistances, the weird tenacity of unconscious memories, etc.

Though it is more precise (more accurate in a statistical conception of behavior) to speak of psychoneurotic reactions or behavior patterns, than of psychoneurotic personalities, we shall not go far wrong for general psychiatric purposes if we speak of the psychoneurotic as though his clear-cut type existed without scientific doubt. At all events, the mind of the psychoneurotic may be comprehended more vividly if, as psychologists, we attempt to analyze out the specific constituents resident in that kind of mental system.

The root reality is fear. Even when the experience has been sexual, the statement is still wonderfully true that the basic determinant of psychoneurotic reaction is fear. Allied with fear goes shame. If the fear has been the by-product of a painful experience without sexual complication, shame has infected the ego, the sense of self-confidence, the feeling of adequacy. Fear vitally wounds the

personality as a whole. We might call this kind of fear, *egoistic fear*. The fear that accompanies a sexual episode might be called *sexual fear*. The fundamental fact is fear. No matter how real and causal the sex component appears to be in psychoneurotic behavior, nestling in the heart of the sexual episode is wide-eyed fear.

The mind of the psychoneurotic is haunted by fear and shame. Hence the tormenting need of escape. In attempts at escape from these oppressive tensions and unhappy attentions engendered by fear and shame, the psychoneurotic develops those pathetically ludicrous patterns of behavior, circuitous, evasive, duplicitous, habits of beating about the bush, that consume time and energy so lavishly as to leave him with little available vitality for the pursuit of any other of the normal goals of life. This roundabout behavior is precisely what ails the mind of the psychoneurotic. (No wonder some analyses spin out for a year or two or three, the patient finding it congenial to circumnavigate the globe in order to make a safe journey from the city of New York to Niagara Falls).

The unceasing effort at escape is rendered all the more maddening by another pathologic event: every fact, episode, experience which the psychoneurotic casually bumps into becomes emotionally tainted with his original fear or shame, provided he can even remotely imagine a faint point of connection between the otherwise disconnected situations. Thus, beginning in sensitive childhood with a fear of being drowned while aboard a ferry boat, he may carry over this excessive emotional reaction to a specific event, *transfer* it to a multitude of objects and experiences that have but one intangible bond in common: their projected possibility of bringing calamity in the form of accident and therefore of death. Fear is that excessive emotional response which by a kind of flooding of the nervous system, more particularly the sympathetic centers, somehow creates that sensitiveness, a kind of keyed-up expectancy, an alacrity that makes possible an almost instantaneous reaction to every kind of stimulus even remotely suggesting the original one.

What wonder that this state of insecurity which haunts the mind of the psychoneurotic like a doom should become the source of his characteristic indecision? If there are two psychologic characteristics of psychoneurotic deportment more universally in evidence than any others, they surely are *insecurity and indecision*. My suggestion is that these two are very highly correlated, positively so. What else can we expect of a mind haunted by insecurity, literally tortured by fear, than a series of see-saw behaviors periodically rocked by indecision?

Fear—shame—escape—roundabout behavior—transfer effect—insecurity—indecision—compensation: here you have the psychological series that constitutes the mind of the psychoneurotic.

Since fear usually attaches to specific objects and episodes and persons, the psychoneurotic has as his major task in life not only the running away from reality, but the equally arduous task of building up a fantastic world in which his divided and perturbed mind may find peace, a reasonable equilibrium, a point of rest for his restlessness. By the strange and marvelous device of overcompensation, the mind of the psychoneurotic, at incredible cost, actually invents ways out of neurotic conflict and dilemma. He saves his mind from the unendurable pain of realizing personal limitations by overvaluing the very capabilities and qualities he lacks. The physical weakling admires pugilists, the dry-as-dust scholar worships the great lover, the sensualist may adore Christ, the homely-looking female falls in love with stage beauties and in delicious reverie imagines herself a ravishing courtesan.

Your typical psychoneurotic spends half his energy in flight from reality and the other half in flight into unreality. No wonder that life in its daily normal varied aspects interests him less and less, his one consuming desire being to enclose himself in a warm little universe where once more, as in his cradle in infancy, he may securely lie down to rest, to rest. The lullaby of the psychoneurotic!

Out of the twisted intertwining of fear and shame with their distressing offshoots of evasion and concealment springs an attitude toward life and toward oneself that may be characterized as a state of morbid anxiety. Remorse, conscience pangs, self-consciousness, a vague sense of ill-being, all belong in the prevailing mental outlook of the psychoneurotic. He fears though his clear reason denies the grounds of fear. He is ashamed though his intellect finds nothing really worthy of so much shame. He experiences anxiety continuously, yet he wonders why it is so. He acknowledges the habit of indecision at the same time that he offers acute rationalizations for its plausible presence. He leans heavily upon alibi and rationalization. He protests too much. On the basis of his rational analysis of himself, one wonders why in the first place he ever thought it necessary to consult an analyst at all. His predicament is precisely this sharp division between the facts of his life that breed neurotic malaise and the rationalizations that pretend to deny the ramifications and excessive implications of those facts. Anxiety is the report upon the unceasing interaction of his fears and frustrations.

GUILT AND INFERIORITY-FEELING AS CREATOR OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

BY THEODORE SCHROEDER

"Nobody becomes religious without having a bad conscience."

—ANATOLE FRANCE.

The purpose of this essay is to portray the mental processes by which the internal aspect of the conflict of impulse, and a resultant feeling of guilt, of inferiority, develops into the essence of religiosity. This will be done mainly in the words of another, as quoted from an anonymous book. "An attempt at an answer to: What is Religion?" is its title. Evidently the anonymous author is a highly cultured modernist clergyman in a good orthodox conservative Christian church. All italics are mine.

WHAT CAN RELIGION DO?

He begins by stating and answering the question: "What can it [religion] do for me?" He answers: "To-day man's end is not praise and worship of the Creator, but creation of himself. . . . To see, then, to the making is the best way of glorifying the Maker." Next he goes on to show why religion should not be considered a matter of thinking—of dogma; nor of feeling; nor orderly ritual; nor organization; nor priestcraft; nor law, or moral discipline. On the contrary religion is "a matter of the whole man." He asks: "*If religion be the art of consciously relating man with God* why do we invariably start out with the unknown factor?" He insists that love of facts demands that "the real beginning [of religion] for us is MAN."

If man is the beginning, so also is he the end of religion. This is how he rationalizes his need that it shall be so. "Galileo and Copernicus have put us on a planet, and Newton has knit us to the farthest star. Lamarck and Darwin and others have bound us willy nilly to all living things; and now, lo, 'the dead universe is alive and palpitant throughout.' Descartes taught us to begin with the self and Kant apprised us of the limits of our own powers, and Wundt has shown the body to be all athrill with soul. Max Müller, and how many others before him and with him and since, and finally the

Chicago Congress of Religions as a spectacular propaganda, have made us world-citizens religiously, so that nothing human is now undivine in us." (p. 17-18.) Obviously then, what religion can do for one is to help one to discover one's own divinity. In this sense, religiosity means "the ability to answer to the human craving for survival and for perfection" and religion "is both preservative and creative." Out of our need we create "religious" experience as a means of self-exaltation, by means of a delusional conscious relation or identification with the superhuman, with "God."

WHY ANY RESORT TO RELIGION?

"Clearly, because there are human needs frequent enough, persistent enough, and general enough, which cannot be satisfied, or silenced long, as cries of body and soul, without resort to religion." My clergyman defines religion as "certain activities that help their Subject, by access to some *unknown Source of supply*, conceived as their Object." But these activities "are engaged in usually from *sheer desperation*, or by steady effort of the will. One has experienced such benefit when forced in the past to resort to religion, that one freely forces oneself to resort to it in hope of similar benefit." (p. 23.)

In attempting to explain the need for religion, our cleric tells us of being in unfathomed depths of sleep, then partly aroused by agreeable sensuous experiences and "absurdly delicious dreams." Do these contain unconscious sexual factors? Perhaps my essays on the erotogenesis of religious experience may predispose to an affirmative answer.

"Suddenly I am aroused. Why am I here? I remember. I failed. What is the use of waking? To try again? To fail again; and failure was my fault—at least so largely. And I knew better, I was warned—in fact, I had experience."

"Self-depreciation, remorse, despair. I leap out of my bed. To fly."

"Whither? The facts will dog me. They cannot be put off the scent."

"Ah, I will go to my familiar friend. He will help me. No, for how could I meet him. He had advised me. He had forgiven me before. How face him? I am at the end of my means, and of my wits. No one can help me. I won't be scorned or pitied by my

acquaintances; and strangers don't know—yet seem to know. My self-scorn somehow betrays me, advertises my failure.”

“But how can I endure solitude? I must come to myself; or get away from myself; wake up and find the self-contempt groundless, all a mistake—or lapse into some sort of sleep.” (p. 24.)

Of course, this suggests the periods of depression which are always a symptom of a subjective conflict between irreconcilable impulses. Many, probably most, of these subjective conflicts are found to have their roots in the sex-impulse. Other suggestions of similar import to the above quotations are found in the book. I will quote a few more.

“The need for battle in us will find a new foe. In our own vital desire we shall find our own devil.” (p. 41.) The same thought is negatively implied in this: “Blessed the men and women who really do not understand from personal experience the necessity for enthusiastic overdemand on the part of the setter-forth of the ideal.” (p. 78.) The enthusiasm of the religious zealot is, of course, only a measure of the painfulness of his depression, his feeling of inadequacy, of inferiority and shame, which his religious activity is designed to mask or to neutralize. “To the religious, weakness [that is a feeling of inferiority in worldly matters] is strength [for ‘spiritual’ compensation] since out of need comes the coerced access to the source of [the superhuman or divine energetic] supply. . . . For natural help, the strong rejoices in his strength. For supernatural help, the weak who know the potential impetus thereof, must contrariwise glory in his infirmity.” (p. 90.) “*Only through protracted sense of failure, is success made delirious delight.*” (p. 50.) So the intensity of the religious joy becomes the exact measure of the painfulness of the feeling of inferiority or shame which is being masked thereby.

The two aspects of the inferiority-superiority conflict further exhibit themselves predominantly in these two ways. One is the desire for withdrawal from the world, by means of an absorption into God or other supernatural religious “object.” Another escape from the painful concrete reality is the consequent and relatively inefficient efforts toward the socialization of *religious subjectivity*. Recently such compromise between irreconcilable impulses has produced “religious humanism.” Such efforts to socialize the “religious impulse” implies an ignoring and depreciating of the scientific aim and method which deals only with nature's processes. In sociology this

means the psychologic processes that are involved in human relations. One cannot have scientific sociology, so long as we read the rationalization of our "religious" subjectivism into human relations.¹

CREATING THE PHANTASMAL GOD

"May not after all, a God that man conceives as PURE SPIRIT, *as himself projected onward and upward*, as a source beneath and about the primary consciousness; a God whom to realize for himself effectively, man must freely exploit all nature, and history, and art, and dramatic passion; a God who *may be or not* the cosmic power; who though personifiable to satisfy the heart, is also impersonal to satisfy the mind; a God who should turn out to be *the supreme intellectual and passionate FICTION* of men. May not such a God become also for man, the supreme factor? To man his own act is ever the chief fact. And fact is but his own act, as it reappears to him in mind and heart." (p. 68-9.) So then, many must view all, even their God, as a mere phantasmal construct, created in answer to the personal feeling of inadequacy. The phantasmal God is so placed in a position of offering an equal degree of certitude with our concept of the material aspects of the universe. If we apply evolutionary psychology to our theories of the knowing process, a different result is attained.

"What if sickness, or sorrow, or reverses, or a sense of personal failure shall slay outright the joy of living, and all attained, shall prove vanity and vexation of spirit? Premature old age? Discomfiture? Incurable melancholy? What then?" Religious phantasms!

"Suicide is nowadays the answer of thousands and thousands, all over the world. Yes, but most of us are uneasy at heart. Suicide is for us vital folk a confession of defeat we are ashamed of; a cowardice sensationally advertised. And flights from the world to hermitages and nunneries and monkeries seem little better." Here we have the continuing emotional maladjustment to realities, glorified and moralized.

"The blood in us bubbles for aggression, for expression, for executive control, for mastery of spirit, . . . We understand that there have been (so the rumor runs, or used to run, not so long

¹ Religion of Humanism. Truth Seeker, N. Y., March 6, 1927.

Religion, not theology, is the enemy? Unity (Chicago), 1928.

Religious Humanism. Truth Seeker, N. Y., Aug. 6, 1927.

ago) men and women in all ages *who have overcome* (so far as they were concerned) sin, sickness, sorrow, shame, failure, and death. How? Ah, shall the busy man know? . . . There may be a soul to save, to keep safe at all events? And if so why not insure?" (pp. 12-13.) So many rationalize the inferiority feeling so as to insure a promised neutralizer, such as is to be found in a much needed though delusional identification with the superhuman. In its most effective form, this is accomplished through the mystic thrill.

Evidently for some, mystical religion is an autogenic insurance policy, created by personal need, out of the materials of feeling and fancy. It works after the manner of autosuggestion, to create a delusion of vital contact with, and to extract nourishment from some delusional infinite reservoir of power. All this delusional creation of feeling and phantasy is used to neutralize a painful and depressing feeling of inadequacy. What then does all this amount to? Is it anything except an exhibition of irreconcilable urges, expressed in terms of a delusional, hysterical pain and its equally delusional, religious relief? But it is not quite so conceived nor formulated by its victims. Let us read on.

EXPERIENCING DELUSIONAL POWER

"What is religion? Clearly certain mental, emotional, moral and physical activities that serve to increase, rejuvenate, invigor, sanctify, encourage, ennoble their Subject—whether a man, a family, a tribe, a nation or a race. These activities have for their Object some *unknown source of power, health, light, life, glory, love.*" (p. 15.)

Let us contemplate the quality of the impulse, which is indispensable to such a concept of religion. Then we may say that every attribute of religion is the acquisition of an assurance against a feeling of inadequacy, inferiority, shame, guilt, or depression, whatever you wish to call it. The explanation that the new assurance of efficiency is derived from an objective "infinite source of power" and of "love" is equally necessary to rationalize and maintain the new delusional consciousness of power, grandeur and exaltation, a temporary, intermittent, neutralizer for another delusionally conditioned feeling of inadequacy—of near to nothingness. Being unknown at its psychosexual source, the feeling of inadequacy could not be neutralized, by referring a new accretion of confidence to mere bodily sources. This would be especially so, if the victim were inadequately or only half-conscious of a sexual source for that new feeling

of power. One of the psychogenetic problems suggested is, whether or not fluctuations, or ebb and flow of endosexual stimulation is involved in both the depression and the compensating "divine" exaltation. The ecstatic one, usually but not always, answers: No! He or she urgently needs a contrary explanation, one that permits at least a *seeming* identification with the assumed superhuman or absolute, before even the appearance or delusion of relief sets in, against the prior depression.

"How is it, if self-consciousness be the highest achievement of evolution, man is always striving, conspiring to transcend it, to attain to unconsciousness [of the ordinary or painful objective realities] of a positive sort [in favor of some consciousness of the "superhuman," the "divine"]? (p. 81.) Is it not because for such, consciousness has become a morbid pain?

RELIGIOUS GLORIFICATION OF MORBIDITY

"Review the course of Religious History. How has not ecstasy and its attainment always been its supreme object, and most usually its original impetus!" (p. 81.) If we are living in harmony with an adequate consciousness of nature's process, then normal sexual indulgence supplies every ecstatic need. If there is something abnormal about the affects centering about sex, or if there is a great fear and shame concerning our sexual nature, then the need which is really of sexual origin and essence, must and will be registered in consciousness, not as need for wholesome sexual attitudes on life, but as due to some inborn craving for supersexual, superhuman or superphysical identification or help. In the opinion of many genetic psychologists, sex still determines the character and supplies the dynamics, for the delusional experience of the "absolute." Always some erotic abnormality appears at the root of "divine" delusions.

"Now, frankly, if we owe Mohammed to epilepsy and St. Paul to catalepsy, we owe epilepsy and catalepsy no small debt." (p. 82.) This attitude suggests strongly the need for treating the problem of religious psychology as a problem of mental hygiene.

"To lose consciousness is truly to be rid of the consciousness of evil." (p. 27.) When this is treated as highly desirable, it suggests a morbid effort to escape the realities, of guilt and supposed "evil" in ourselves.

"No wonder all currents set in the direction, sooner or later, of ecstasy, and the supernatural, and the life into which we die or rather

are born, with the death of self-consciousness." (p. 87.) A wish-fulfilling phantasy is here created, obviously to neutralize a painful feeling of inadequacy.

"Our hallowed times and places must be held holy. We cannot brook insult, however unmeant, to our symbol-Gods, our hero-Gods, our art sanctuaries, our divine trysting places and times. At the melting of our divine drama, there must be no giggle, no sneer, no hiss. And without social agreement, how is this possible? . . . When I need faith in the unseen, silence for the still small voice, humble self-effacement toward the unveiling glory, what discouragement in all this irreverence and barbarous indecency." (p. 89.) This "barbarous indecency" consists in forcing attention upon some realities that are painful in contrast with the delusional grandiose neutralizer for our feeling of inadequacy. We resent the distraction from or the endangerment of our delusional neutralizer, mask or smoke-screen, with the same intensity that we suffer during our fits of depression. Religious intolerance finds its moral justification by rationalizing and glorifying its own morbidity.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

I believe that with primitive peoples, the first *major* problems of their conscious curiosity and contemplations must have arisen within themselves, and therefore was probably centered in sex.² However, in this respect they lived out their impulses. I also believe that the first great thwarting of their impulsive nature that entered consciousness arose from the difficulties encountered in the effort to wrest a livelihood from nature and to secure protection against the elements. We might therefore expect that early metaphysical theories and propitiatory ceremonies would deal almost as much with nutrition and self-preservation, as with sex and race-preservation. However, the causes were very different. In either case satisfaction was assumed to be dependent upon some superhuman intelligence, or superphysical power. It was by the aid of such powers that humanity sought to overcome its difficulties, and to lessen its feeling of inadequacy. The sexual urge, its compelling consciousness of a power quite beyond our conscious control, and with its ecstatic climaxes, supplied the seemingly incontrovertible evidence of a superhuman power and

² Phallic worship to a secularized sex. *Journal of Sexology and Psychoanalysis*, Vol. 1 (No. 1), 73-87, Jan., 1923; included in: Stanley (Lee, Alexander), *The Story of Phallicism*. Pascal Covici, Chicago, 1927.

source of relief, originating beyond ourselves. Very much later this superhuman power came to be formulated and rationalized as some *infinite* source of power, perhaps also endowed with infinite wisdom.

Thus it came to be felt that these mental constructs of superhuman energies and intelligencies must be acknowledged and appeased. In modern times the psychogenetics of the feeling of inadequacy is believed by specialists to hinge mostly around the sex function. This fact of observation, finds a logical explanation in the greater obstacles to a normal biologic and emotional life, as these center about sexual self-expression, and suppression. Our food-hunger is more regularly and naturally appeased. Even in our day many "educated" Christians, by reason of their own erotogenetic feeling of inadequacy, are still impelled to seek a neutralizing ecstatic exaltation, utilized and rationalized with an archaic metaphysics, to explain the origin, behavior and destiny of things and humans. So far our quite general inadequate psychosexual maturing precludes many persons from finding an emotionally satisfying and psychologically mature solution for the sex problems. If the youthful emotional problems which center around sex, remain unsolved, the feeling of inadequacy will remain and will often become intensified. This intensified feeling of inadequacy, and originating in the sexual impulse, I believe to be the essence of the emotional need for religion.

For all such needy persons the archaic mode of thinking through and for our feelings supplies metaphysical creeds and phantasmal gods that are accepted as welcome props. This is so, because the phantasmal content of the religious formulation, with its obsessing grandiose delusional suggestions, helps to temporarily neutralize our feelings of inadequacy and our depressions. This is so, because its ecstatic and phantasmal obsessions temporarily, yet quite completely, occupy the field of consciousness to the exclusion of the actual humiliating causes of distress. In other words: The psychosexual ecstasy, with a phantasmal religious rationalization, will supply to some a pleasing but always delusional escape from the distressing realities of this present earth-life. The tenacity with which such persons cling to their phantasmal creeds, is an exact measure of the emotional intensity of the guilty inferiority feeling. The need for supernatural support, which that inferiority feeling imposes, is the psychological essence of the demand for religion. It is also the essence of morbid humility, which the afflicted ones exalt to a divinely approved religious virtue. Where the feeling-necessity is great, an argument against the resultant religious beliefs, even though based

upon a careful observation of nature and its ways, is quite futile. The resentment will be as great, as the underlying feeling of inadequacy (of guilt and shame) is intense. As well might one expect to remove a morbid compulsion, or an insane hallucination, solely by an appeal to common sense. Hence the old line of discussion, as to the conflict between genesis and evolution, is so far useless, when it is applied to Protestant psychoneurotics like the Hon. William Jennings Bryan, or to such favored Catholics as the Pope and Cardinals, or to any *enthusiastic* Christian. They are able to use their reason, and scientific data only in so far as it justified the preconceptions, self-created and utilized to satisfy their habitual cravings for an escape from the feeling of inadequacy. Where primitive peoples had the mysticism of a healthy-minded but very childish psychology, and primitive human ignorance, we now often find the highly cultured mysticism of psychoerotic morbidity.

When a high degree of intelligence is actually coördinated with the psychologic imperative that makes for religiosity, we find such results as those quoted hereinabove. Here then is a quite complete elimination of all the old crude religious theories and theologies, such an elimination as might easily lead to "religious humanism." Our clergymen, in the present case, seem quite clearly to face and to see the fact that all theologies are delusional creations of the human mind. And yet he has such an extraordinary need for the extravagant valuation of the mystic thrill that he cannot give it up, or appraise it for what it is worth. He seems even to realize measurably the sexual sources and nature of it all; even its morbidity, as in Mohammed and St. Paul; and yet he must glorify the mystic experience, even in the face of an awareness of its morbidity. Here then we have a portrayal of religiosity at its very best intellectual level. Even there we cannot well escape the conviction, that the fundamental issue is one of mental hygiene, rather than of education in its conventional sense.

SPECIAL REVIEWS

FREUD'S ZUKUNFT EINER ILLUSION *

BY DR. DORIAN FEIGENBAUM

Freud's "Die Zukunft Einer Illusion" is a small book of ninety-one pages divided into ten chapters. It does not pretend to be a scientific treatise either in context or in style. In spite of its compactness—about twenty thousand words—the discussion is rather leisurely and informal, touching upon a number of subjects which all converge upon the central idea of the illusory character of religion. To enliven the discussion, a dialogue with a fictitious adversary is developed on several occasions, reminding one of the Socratic technique first employed by Freud in the book which preceded this one. This method, so favored by the author in his recent writings, may not be regarded as really new with him, being only a formal dramatization of his old, characteristic method of constantly raising doubts and bringing up counter-arguments and objections to his own thesis.

In general, the book impresses one as a mellow product of a mid-summer's rest in the country. The presentation is always lucid and elegant, and pervaded by a warm, sympathetic earnestness.

I think we can best follow Freud's thesis by glancing at each chapter separately, and noting the contribution of each one.

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The first chapter is an idealistic review of culture and its institutions. Freud interprets human culture as (a) all the knowledge acquired by mankind to overcome the forces of nature, and (b) the institutions for the distribution of man's goods and the regulation of human relations. Man cannot live in isolation, yet he feels the pressure of his consummate culture. Hence, culture must be defended against individuals. A minority has been clever enough to impose cultural advantages upon a resisting majority. The masses are inert and without vision. They must be compelled by influential leaders to abandon immediate urges and to feel ambition for socially desirable successes. To the objection that these characteristics of the majority are consequences of a deficient culture, Freud replies

* Prof. Sigm. Freud, *Die Zukunft Einer Illusion*. Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, Leipzig, Wien, Zürich, 1927, pp. 91. English Translation, *The Future of an Illusion*. Pub. in Internat. Psycho-Analytical Library, No. 15.

that until the present time no culture has been obtainable which did not have to fight the inert and self-indulgent masses.

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In the next chapter, Freud, in summary, analyzes *self-denial*, in case an instinct cannot be satisfied, *prohibition*, which is the instance for the denial, and *deprivation*, a condition resulting from prohibition. He then presents the main instincts which have been found by psychoanalysis, namely: incest, cannibalism and murder. One type of man, the neurotic, has failed to stifle these instincts and has become nonsocial. Cannibalism only seems to be entirely abandoned. The strength of incest desires is evident through prohibition. Concerning the murder instinct, under special circumstances our present day culture resorts to it and even lauds it. However, Freud refutes the statement that there is not a noticeable progress in the human psyche, as in science and civilization. On the contrary, we have evidence of assimilation of cultural dogmas in the development of a Super-ego in individuals as in groups. But the development of this Super-ego is relative to different groups. There are still large numbers of people enslaved by the limitations of culture, and therefore, latent adversaries of all cultural growth. Freud thinks that a culture which does not answer the needs of such a large group cannot hope to install itself in the future, and, moreover, does not deserve to. Freud also discusses the degree of the assimilation of culture, creation, and art, as achievements satisfying to human narcissism, and arrives at the most important item of the psychical inventory of culture, *i.e.*, its religious imaginings, later termed *illusions*.

The special value of religious imaginings Freud sees mainly in the commandment: "Thou shalt not kill." The chief function of culture is to defend man against the overpowering and destructive elements of nature. A constantly anxious state of anticipation naturally results in severe injury to inherent human narcissism and evokes need for consultation. In man's endeavor to cope with his struggle against nature, culture undertakes for him a part of the defense efforts. Culture tries first to humanize nature by projecting man's own emotions and passions into a personal God, thereby placating the impersonal and terrifying manifestations of nature. This projection is a continuation of the old father-anxiety, and the humanization of nature follows an infantile and philogenetic pattern. The gods, says Freud, are thus supposed to have a threefold office: (a) to control the terrors of nature, (b) to compensate for sufferings, (c) to resign man to death. Later a displacement occurs. The belief is formed that dogmas of culture are themselves creations of super-

forces, the Moira, which from their own heights rule over the gods. Freud summarizes thus: Religion, a treasure of imaginings, "is born through the needs of a human helplessness, created out of the reminiscences of a dependent individual childhood and the childhood of humanity." *"So wird ein Schatz von Vorstellungen geschaffen, geboren aus dem Bedürfnis, die menschliche Hilflosigkeit erträglich zu machen, erbaut aus dem Material der Erinnerungen an die Hilflosigkeit der eigenen und der Kindheit des Menschengeschlechts."* The idea of a chosen people, so prevalent all over the world, is a concomitant to the belief that penance can beget reward. In closing this chapter, Freud states that although these religious imaginings do not all conform to the experiences of everyday life, yet they are regarded as the most precious possessions of civilization, without which man considers himself unable to go on. Freud asks: What is their intrinsic worth in the light of modern psychology?

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We next hear the adversary propounding some arguments: (a) it is not sufficiently clear that civilization has invented religious imaginings, and that it has shown how to distribute indulgences; (b) it is doubtful whether humanization of nature was accomplished to withstand helplessness and panic. Besides, it is easily understood that primitive man projected his inner experiences into the outer world; (c) in "Totem and Taboo" the origin of religion is ascribed to the father-complex, and now to the helplessness and panic of mankind. To these doubts Freud makes answer, repeating that, similar to other developments of culture, religion was built up to defend mankind against nature. He is not opposed to the theory of self-projection. He merely associates the genesis of this peculiarity of human thinking with the pattern of child-father relation. Concerning the origin of religion, Freud emphatically defends himself against the supposition that the origin of religion was treated in "Totem and Taboo." True, he touched there upon the problem of the origin of totemism, and evoked an explanation of primordial animal worship, the prohibition upon the killing of the totem-animal, and yet, on occasions, to sacrifice and eat it communally. Whether totemism can be regarded as a religion or not, the first ethical limitations, namely, of incest and murder, are based on totemism. Freud concludes that both the ideas of father-complex and need for protection are responsible for the establishment of religion. Finally, the ambivalent fear-and-hate relation of child to father is stressed as a pattern for the ambivalency which seems to be deep-rooted in all systems of religion.

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Religious imaginings are formulae, reporting facts and occurrences of an outer and inner reality; something which one has never found out for one's self, but which demands acceptance. This demand is supposed to be based upon the following points: (a) our grandfathers believed in these formulae, (b) evidence indicates they have been written down since early times, (c) lastly, to question their authenticity is absolutely forbidden. Freud advances two attempts to evade the problem altogether. The first is to say (a) religion is above reason, an argument which finally degenerates through the church fathers into "credo quia adsurdum est"; the second is (b) the philosophy "as if"—fictitious viewpoints as if believable but not plausible, and chosen only for practical purposes. Freud again asks: What is the great strength of religion, and its holding power even in the light of reason?

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The answer to this question is given: Religious thoughts are illusions, fulfillments of the oldest and most vital desires of humanity. The secret of their strength is the strength of these desires. "*Illusionen, Erfüllungen der ältesten, stärksten, dringendsten Wünsche der Menschheit: das Geheimnis ihrer Stärke ist die Stärke dieser Wünsche.*" Is illusion necessarily in opposition to reality like delusions? No, it is not. Is realization possible? We cannot deny it. Columbus thought that he discovered a short route to India; a simple village girl dreams that a prince will come and marry her. Both cases are motivated by the desire for fulfillment and hence ought to be called illusions. "We cannot prove them and we cannot refute them," says Freud. "*So wie sie unbeweisbar sind, sind sie auch unwiderlegbar.*" Why, then, not believe in religion, since it is traditionally so strong and since it offers so much consolation, etc.? Freud laughingly says, "*So wie niemand zum Glauben gezeugen werden kann, so auch niemand zum Unglauben.*" "As no one can be forced to believe, so no one can be forced to disbelieve." However, one must not get the notion that this is correct thinking. It appears to him as strange that in matters of belief people exhibit such insincerity and intellectual shamming, especially in the epithets, "Oh, he is so very devout," or when speaking of God. At the end of this chapter, the distinction is made between an attempt to evaluate the truth of religion, and the psychological necessity of recognizing religion as an illusion. Knowing at what periods of the world's history religious systems were created, and by whom, he finds it hard to believe that just such a God and just such benevolent forces as we should desire should exist. Even harder to believe is the fact that

our fettered, ignorant and primitive forefathers should have been so lucky as to have discovered a solution for human woes and problems.

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A series of arguments are presented by the adversary: Should not other cultural institutions be called illusions? Is scientific thinking preferable to illusory thinking? Archeological investigations are commendable, but you would not excavate where human habitations would be endangered. You cannot mock religion. Freud answers thus: "This treatise is perfectly harmless. The believer will not desert because of it. I have not said anything that others have not said before me—better men—and in more complete, more powerful, and more effective manner." Freud adds some arguments to the criticism of his predecessors. "The only one this publication can hurt is myself." But—"wenn jemand schon in jungen Jahren sich über das Missfallen seiner Zeitgenossen hinausgesetzt hat, was soll es ihm im Greisenalter anhaben, wenn er sicher ist, bald jeder Gunst und Missgunst entrückt zu werden?" Will it bring harm to the movement of psychoanalysis? "Psychoanalysis has had to withstand many attacks in the past, it will withstand one more." In defense of his book Freud says, "Truly, religion has been of great service to humanity. In its long career it has had time to show what it can accomplish. However, it is doubtful whether mankind was happier at times of greatest religious fervor. Certainly, their morality was not higher. At all times immorality has found no less support in religion than morality." "*Die Unsittlichkeit hat zu allen Zeiten an der Religion keine mindere Stütze gefunden als die Sittlichkeit.*" The question arises whether we do not overestimate religion, and whether we do well to base our culture upon it. Freud develops the idea that the influence of religion is decreasing: it is less believable; critical examination has destroyed its authenticity; natural sciences have disclosed underlying errors; investigations of comparative religion have revealed a striking similarity between our beliefs and those of primitive people. However, religion still has the power to control the masses. From the intelligent minority there is no danger in religion. But from the great, unenlightened majority there might be a possible danger, should their doubts grow still further and a great disillusionment follow. Hence a decision is necessary; either further suppression of liberal thought or revision of the existing relation between culture and religion.

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This chapter contains an analysis of the taboo of murder. To the religious argument of transgression against God's commandment, he

opposes the socio-ethical motivation and pleads for this latter. However, a doubt arises. Is not the origin of this taboo somewhat different? Freud says it is. Purely rational arguments are ineffective even to-day when emotional instincts and passions come into play. And who knows, perhaps even to-day people would murder one another without inhibition, were it not for the indelible memory of mankind's first murder of the primitive father. Since that primitive father has been God's image, religion is right in claiming that the commandment "thou shalt not kill" is of divine origin. Thus we see that religion holds some deep, prehistoric reminiscences, of course, in disguised form. A culture based upon religion is analogous to the condition of infantile neurosis, and as such may be expected to disappear. Why not expedite its inevitable disappearance? Freud develops the analogy of religion as a universal human compulsion neurosis, which, similar to the infantile neurosis, originated in the Oedipus complex. Religion shows, besides, a system of wish-fulfillment illusions with negation of reality, in a manner similar to the hallucinatory confusion states in amentia. Only the universality of the religious neurosis exempts the individual from the necessity of forming an individual neurosis.

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In the last two chapters Freud answers further objections of the adversary. In doing so he reiterates his belief in the supremacy of reason (" *Primat des Intellekts* "), and points out the deintellectualizing effect of religious education. He states that he is an optimist, not an illusionist, and his optimism, even if illusory, is not half as incorrigible as the fanaticism of the religious delusions. "*—man kann sich oft nicht abhalten zu sagen, was man meint, und entschuldigt sich damit, dass man es nicht für mehr ausgibt, als es wert ist.*" Freud's god is Logos. "*Unser Gott LOGOS wird von diesen Wünschen verwirklichen, was die Natur ausser uns gestattet, aber sehr allmählich, erst in unabsehbarer Zukunft und für neue Menschenkinder.*" "*—auf die Dauer kann der Vernunft und der Erfahrung nichts widerstehen.*" This god, Logos, does not proclaim his power so loudly, yet his voice is bound to be heard.

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It is evident that this latest book of Freud's is neither a contribution to psychoanalysis, nor to the theory of the neuroses, to dynamic metapsychology, nor to fundamental psychology. Is it then to be considered a contribution to the philosophy of religion? Or is it a contribution to the comparative and ethnologic study of religious movements and cults? Certainly it is none of these. Where, then,

lies its importance? I think it is important for numerous reasons, only two of which would be of interest here. Though not easily apparent, some revolutionary thoughts are contained in this book. The important word in the title is not the word "future" but the word "illusion." Freud does not use this word as a literary expression, but as a technical, *psychopathological term*. This means that Freud definitely regards religion as a manifestation belonging in the class of *phantasms*, which are nextdoor neighbors to hallucinations. In other words, religious thinking is a falsified and individualized interpretation of the perceptions of outer reality. When Freud uses the term religion he does not refer to deistic, philosophical systems. He means the social and cultural institution represented by everyday religious practice. He attempts no philosophical argument but merely makes a reclassification of our organized knowledge, which results in relegating the study of popular religion to the laboratory of the *psychopathologist*. Thus Freud is entirely true to his principle of avoiding a discussion of philosophy, leaving it, as he says, to the philosophers. Thus in this, his latest book on religion, Freud extends the frontiers of his earlier "Psychopathology of Everyday Life" and fills in the outline for a new chapter on "The Religion of Everyday."

The second reason why this book seems to me notable is its contribution to Freudiana. It is a unique personal testament of the author, revealing a warm and earnest solicitude for the human race. His fatherly feelings and great concern sometimes cause him to give vent to emotional expressions rather unusual to him. Throughout the entire book, Freud seems to direct his precepts to the leaders of education, admonishing them to progress by means of a larger and better preparation for life. Looked upon in perspective, this piece of Freudiana seems likely to prove valuable for the advancement of the psychoanalytic movement. The term religious is still synonymous with ethical, and irreligious with unethical in the minds of the majority. But now it is necessary to recognize a separation between these terms. The reader who had been prone to attribute cynicism, pessimism and nonmorality to Freud's teachings will now be compelled to recognize the high ethical caliber of his views. In Freud's tender regard for the human race and firm belief in its inherent possibility for progress as evidenced in this book against religion the reader with insight will find ethical concepts of the highest quality, which he will have to call "religious"—paradoxical as that may seem.

THE APPLICATION OF PSYCHOANALYTIC PRINCIPLES IN INTERPRETING THE PSYCHOSES *

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Psychoanalysis, both in theory and practice, has confined itself largely to the field of neuroses. It was there that Freud first formulated its principles and there too it has found its most successful therapeutic application. The attempts at broadening the scope of the psychopathological significance of these principles to comprise definitely psychotic phenomena were few and far between. Whether or not this can be explained on the basis of the rather sharp differentiation both in theory and practice between psychoneuroses and psychoses in Germany one is not prepared to say. It remains a fact, however, that outside of a few more or less theoretical and isolated considerations (Freud, Abraham, etc.) the psychoanalytic school has had little to do with the study of the mechanisms and therapeutic possibilities in the field of the psychoses. Schilder can, therefore, be considered as the first one to attempt a systematic interpretation of the psychoses on a psychoanalytic basis. The author designates this attempt as a sketch, and when one has gone through the immensity of ideas, assumptions, terms, and real and apparent solutions of problems in this book, one must admit that it is a sketch which at times remains purely schematic. This, however, is not the only difficulty that one encounters in attempting to follow the author's main thesis. Psychoanalysis has created a terminology all of its own, a great portion of which was contributed by the author. To one who is not thoroughly familiar with the whole psychoanalytic literature and that of Schilder in particular, this is liable to act as a constant source of misunderstanding and confusion. Finally all this is presented in a naturally somewhat careless, even if brilliant, style grafted upon an unusually complex German. It was on these grounds that a more detailed review than is usual was believed justifiable, with

* Paul Schilder: *Entwurf zu einer Psychiatrie auf Psychoanalytischer Grundlage*. Internationale Psychoanalytische Bibliothek XVII. English translation, *Introduction to a Psychoanalytic Psychiatry*, published as Monograph No. 50 of the Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series. See adv. p. VII.

the realization, however, that at best such a review will only serve to indicate some of the main trends in the book.

Schilder starts out with Freud's statement (in "Neurosis and Psychosis") that the difference between psychoneuroses and psychoses lies in the fact that a neurosis takes place on the basis of a conflict between the ego and its id, whereas in a psychosis we have an underlying conflict partly between the ego and its ideal ego, partly between the ego and the outside world. On the basis of this latter statement Schilder builds up his dynamic concept of psychiatry. What do *ego*, *ideal ego*, and *outside world* mean? Originally psychoanalysts recognized ego instincts and sexual instincts. Ego instincts were those that made for self-preservation and the adaptation of the individual to his environment, thus occasionally coming into conflict with the sexual instincts which demanded at times conditions that were not sanctioned by the ego. In this form, however, the, fundamentally true, concept could not be considered sufficiently comprehensive, and the ego instincts as well as the sexual instincts had to be further elaborated and their interrelations more definitely stated.

An instinct (Trieb) has as its prerequisite an object and so the recognition of primary instincts necessitates the definition of the objects of these instincts, in fact of objects and reality in general. Psychoanalytically one regards reality as a projection; in other words, object perceptions are projected sensations. Whether or not a stage in the life of the embryo exists, when sensations alone without any form of perceptions are possible, remains open to question. Psychologically we cannot conceive of such a stage. We may, however, theorize on it and then on the basis of it build up the concept of a primary narcissism. By this we would mean that the sensations, not being as yet projected outwards and therefore not admitting of an outside world, draw the libidinous instincts unto the body of the embryo. The organs of the body, as well as the body itself, are presumably the first objects the infant becomes aware of, and so this primary narcissism would very soon be split up into the partial narcissisms, that is, the autoeroticisms. On the basis of these with the building up of a body concept, secondary narcissism, that is, a libidinous occupation (Cathexis, Besetzung) of the whole body will be developed. With the recognition of objects and the objective world as such comes in the necessity of evaluation of this outside world, and an evaluation which is fundamentally concerned with the gratification of both the ego and sexual instincts. As the individual grows and develops, meets with successes or failure, and realizes his

shortcomings, that is, his inability at times to cope with environmental demands, he creates side by side with the general concept of his own body and abilities that of an ideal that would be master of the situation; that is, he creates an *ego ideal*. This ego ideal, therefore, is the desired ego, and desired not only from an ego-instinct point of view, but also sexually. At a stage when the libidinous energy is still narcissistically oriented, however, this ideal ego will become the object of both narcissistic and ego instincts desires. From a psychoanalytic point of view the term ego really stands for perception ego, whereas the ideal ego is, to a certain extent, the superimposed structure, at once the judge and ideal that is to be emulated. The structure of this ideal ego is a very complicated one and in different dimensions. Quite naturally the child will consider those who are felt to be masters of the situation at any particular time, as worthy to be emulated and to serve as an ideal to strive for, and so the father and mother will be the cornerstones of such a structure. These persons, however, are at the same time the ones that force the child to adapt itself to certain environmental (society) demands (cleanliness, etc.) and thus the quality of judge or repressor is added to that of ideal.

The process whereby the ideal ego is built up is essentially that of identification. In other words, things that are desired or emulated are taken into the personality of the individual and become part of him. At different stages of the development, different parts of the same person (father, etc.) may be desired or emulated and regarded as representing environmental demands. Thus outside of the fact that the ego ideal may consist of different models, it will also consist of different stages of the same model. In the ego ideal then we will have components of earlier and later developmental stages, *i.e.*, less and more highly differentiated ego ideals. Then again, different persons may represent one environmental demand to the individual, and thus give rise to impersonal ego ideals, whereas other models may give rise to very specific structures in it. Those of the most impersonal type, Schilder considers as nearer to the perception ego than the others, as they represent demands for adaptation to the most primitive environmental situations. The most highly differentiated, on the other hand, will be those nearest to the personality of the individual as they represent the most specific characteristics. Both these gradations are of importance in considering the mechanisms of the different regressions in the special types of psychoses.

Another fact of importance is that the idea of the outside world in the infant, that is, if we assume some recognition of objectivity in

the earliest stages, the idea of such objectivity would be a very imperfect one, and the differentiation between subject and object a rather vague and indifferent one. As the individual develops the split between subject and object becomes more and more definite, and the ability to completely identify oneself with objects more difficult, and so the more highly differentiated ego ideals are also those that correspond to a more complete recognition of objects as such. So it is that the child can consider the father as possessing magic powers because such magic powers would be the most efficient masters of the situation and can identify itself completely with this master of the situation, whereas in later life such identifications are impossible. The author discusses as a further fundamental principle the theory of repression. The repressing force is furnished by the ego ideals as can be surmised from the above. The ego ideals representing primarily the environmental demands repress such desires, in both sexual and ego instincts, as are incompatible with that environment (society, etc.). The different stages of the different ego ideals will repress different types of desires, and so the ego instincts are ranged, and so to speak, bundled by the different ego ideals and kept in submission by them. The fundamental principle underlying the mechanism of the psychoses is that of a rebellion of the ego instincts against this force of repression.

The author then goes through the principal disease entities and concepts in psychiatry, attempting to explain the symptomatology and development of each on this basis. First, he discusses the symptom-complex of self-observation which is the controlling feature of hypochondriasis, compulsion phenomena and depersonalization. In all of these, but in different degrees, we find the attempt of the ego to turn the tide of libido desire onto one's own body or personality (in hypochondria on some particular organ, in compulsory phenomena on some particular thought, in depersonalization on the whole body and psyche). This attempt of the ego is counteracted by the ego ideals, and as a result, the particular content (whether it be organ, thought, or whole personality) is objectivated, thus being turned out of the ego circle. In other words, the ego ideal which demands the flow of all libido energy outward has thus effected a compromise by objectivating a subjective content. Schilder regards these expressions of self-observation as essentially psychotic manifestations, although the first two may be present in neuroses too. In psychoses they are just expressions of the oncoming regression and are to be observed in a great many psychoses at the beginning or at the passing of the attack. This is the first expression of the attempt of the ego to get rid of his

ego ideal, that is, to get rid of an overstrict and demanding environment, to retract into himself, in other words to regress to a narcissistic level. The completion of such regression is seen in the schizophrenias. The course of this regression in its various stages is then followed through in connection with the different symptoms presented by the schizophrenias. The very next step in the regression is the further withdrawal of libido from the ego ideals (or the world) as seen in the *Weltuntergang* (end of the world) phenomenon. Here the patient attempts to get rid of the overstrict judge, but in the very attempt to do that there is an admission of the existence of such a judge. This then would lead towards the stupor which the author considers as the final stage of the regression to a narcissistic or even to a prenarcissistic stage.

The development of the actual psychosis with the different symptoms presented by different types of delusions, hallucinations, and even the speech and thought disturbances and dementia, is closely related to the peculiar phenomenon of reoccupation following the regression. In keeping with his statement that nothing acquired by the psyche is ever lost completely, the author develops his ideas on schizophrenia on the basis of a reoccupation of ego ideals following the regression. As to the genesis of schizophrenia, we have to assume two causes, a precipitating cause and a fixation level; the first causes a regression to the second. This second may be due to some experiences in early life, or it may be due to some constitutional anomaly (endocrine?), or both. In the schizophrenias this fixation point is at a narcissistic level. If the ego ideals were completely destroyed during the regression, then the libido would break through at the fixation point, and remain there in the form of a perversion. As it is, however, some recognition of the outside world still exists and remainders of ego ideals of different stages still cling to the psyche. Their power of repression, however, is greatly decreased, and in such a manner that the more differentiated ones have lost more of their power than the less differentiated ones. Following the complete regression then, the libido does not break through exactly at the fixation point but is, to a certain extent, curbed by the remaining ego ideals. Thus we see identifications with very early ego ideals coming up in the form of ideas of grandeur. Where ego ideals of a higher type have been reached in the reoccupation, there is still further recognition of the outside world, and then these ideas of grandeur are projected into the outside as hallucinations, and in the still higher stage, there is a development of ideas of persecution

which really represent the conflict between the ego ideals and the narcissistically directed libido.

With his theory of the "sphere" and those of repression and censure dependent upon it, the author then develops the meaning of symbols and peculiar neologisms and speech disturbances in the schizophrenias. These two he shows to be dependent upon the loosening of the repressing power of the ego ideals and the occurrence of compromises within the "sphere." In a similar fashion the other types of mental disease are discussed. The most important difference between manic-depressive psychoses and schizophrenias seems to depend upon the level of regression and the relation to the ego ideals. In the depression there is a regression to the more highly differentiated narcissistic levels, mostly to the sadistic (anal and oral) but there is a preservation of the ego ideals. In fact these seem to be reinforced with a resultant greater break between the perception ego and the ego ideal, so that the patient is dissatisfied with himself and yet the goal he has set is impossible to attain. The ego ideal there occurs in the form of the overstrict judge; the perception ego in the form of inadequacy, bodily weakness, moral inferiority, etc. In the manic stage there seems to be the same relation, but with a successful attempt on the side of the patient to identify himself completely with such an exaggerated ego ideal. The fact that the delusions of grandeur of the manic patient, as well as those of the G.P., are not of the magic type, but rather of the age of puberty type, points towards a less fundamental regression in these than occurs in schizophrenias.

The chief differences between the schizophrenias and organic psychoses such as general paralysis, Korsakoff psychoses and the coarser aphasia and agnosias, seem to depend upon the type of psychic components affected as related to the perception ego. The transition from the psychology of schizophrenia to that of the organic psychoses Schilder finds in the amentia (acute confusion). The most prominent feature in the amentia, *i.e.*, that of *perplexity*, may be observed in the schizophrenias too, but the mechanism there is different. The schizophrenic is perplexed at contents in the world which he has created himself. The numerous ego instincts of different stages of development loosened from the repressing and ranging, tear the individual to different sides and cause perplexity but it all takes place in a new world in one devoid of most of the ego ideals. In amentia, however, the patient recognizes, to a greater or less extent, the existence of a real world but is perplexed because of the

inability of orienting himself in this world. He realizes the existence of a background offered by a previously developed reality but cannot pick out the details. Thus then, the more differentiated ego ideals seem to be preserved but the less differentiated ones are more or less interfered with. In the organic psychoses we have a destruction of the still more impersonal, less highly differentiated components, in other words, those components which are still nearer to the perception ego. With that, of course, a certain degree of the more highly differentiated ego ideals are done away with too, and so we get a destruction proceeding from two directions, from the most highly differentiated points downward, and from the most primitive components upward, and thus it is that with the more primitive organic disturbances we also get the removal of some of the more highly differentiated ego ideals. Following the analysis of the disturbances in the course of G.P. some of the other organic mental disturbances are dealt with somewhat more briefly. Throughout the discussion of these the general principle adhered to is, that whether or not organic causes or changes exist, all disturbances of the psyche should admit of psychological approach.

A very interesting, even if not altogether convincing, analysis of epilepsy and the relation of the epileptic twilight state to that of the epileptic personality is also undertaken.

The book is brought to a conclusion by a very brief and not altogether optimistic discussion of the therapeutic application of the views advanced.

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Whatever one's attitude to the universal applicability of psychoanalysis may be, one could not but welcome the appearance of this book. The very definite stand the author takes, which cannot help but give the treatise a more or less dogmatic coloring, will nevertheless aid materially in carrying out the purpose intended. To psychoanalysts it will serve as a definite starting point from which to approach the psychoses; to critical investigators of the theory it will afford a clear statement of what psychoanalysis has to offer in this field of psychopathology. To all interested in neuropsychiatry, it will mean another link in an earnest attempt to bridge the gap between the extremes of both sides—an attempt which the author has represented ever since he has taken up his place in the psychoanalytic movement.

ABSTRACTS

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ABSTRACTED BY CLARA WILLARD

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1. FREUD, S. Notes on the Theory and Practice of Dream Interpretation.
2. HORNEY, K. The Genesis of the Female Castration Complex.
3. ABRAHAM, K. Contribution to the Theory of the Anal Character.

1. *Notes on the Theory and Practice of Dream Interpretation.*—Dr. Sigmund Freud here adds a few remarks to his text on the interpretation of dreams.

1. In the interpretation of dreams any one of several technical procedures may be adopted: the patient may be led to give his associations to elements in the dream as they occur in chronological sequence; or he may be required to give what occurs to him in regard to particular striking features; or questions may be asked concerning the events of the previous day, which come to mind in connection with the dream; or, finally, if the dreamer knows something about the technique of analysis, all guidance may be dispensed with and the dreamer may be permitted to choose for himself the associations with which he wishes to begin. Freud does not see that any one of these methods has any great advantage over the others.

2. He considers the degree of resistance a factor of great importance. One noteworthy feature of very great resistance is that the associations begin to broaden out laterally, instead of becoming deeper. If the resistance is very great it is almost impossible to make definite interpretations and the most that can be done is to suggest some symbolic interpretation which has a show of probability. Only when the resistance is brought within certain bounds is it possible to work to advantage with the patient. There are dreams which are signs of resistance, though this feature may not be at once obvious; they consist of a working over of the latent dream thought, much as in the successfully elaborated works of artistic imagination. They are not interpretable, the content merely serving as guide to more significant material.

3. A distinction is made between dreams from above and dreams from below; the latter being the result of a repressed wish which presses

through from the unconscious; the former having a value similar to that of waking thoughts or purposes reinforced by matter from the unconscious. In these dreams from above the analysis usually disregards the material from the unconscious and ranges the dream thoughts with those of the waking life.

4. In some cases there is a splitting of the train of waking thoughts from that of the dream thoughts, so that the dreams constitute a sort of self-consistent, continued narrative, like imaginative creations.

5. The interpretation of dreams falls into two phases—the translation and the judgment concerning the material. In carrying out the first process care should be taken not to permit the thought of the effect the interpretation might have on the judgment to influence the interpretation itself, just as in reading a chapter of Livy the translation must first be made before it is possible to decide whether the subject matter is history or legend. Too great respect for the “unconscious” is often the source of prejudiced judgments and error. A recovery dream is not always a sign that a neurosis is disappearing; it is more often only a wish to be well for the purpose of avoiding a painful situation in the treatment—an effort to follow the line of least resistance; just as the soldier suffering from war neurosis gets well and returns to duty when the military physician understands how to make being sick unpleasant.

6. The ambivalent attitude is a source of difficulties in the interpretation. The occurrence of hostile thoughts is not evidence that an attachment has been permanently overcome, nor is the dream of hostile character evidence in this direction; from this ambivalent attitude two dreams in the same night may reveal opposite feelings. The fundamental isolation of a certain attitude is the only proof of an advance in the analysis, and the real condition of the conflict can only be inferred from the entire behavior, inclusive of the waking life.

7. The influence on the dreams of suggestion on the part of the physician is discussed. Opponents of psychoanalysis frequently cite this factor as one which casts doubt on its value. As the treatment constitutes one of the impressions of the waking life, it naturally follows that it would have an influence on the manifest content of the dream. The latent thoughts also, in so far as they consist of preconscious material, among which may be the reactions of the patient to the suggestions, words, and actions of the analyst, are susceptible to the influence of suggestion. But the basic mechanism of the dream formation, the real dream work, is not susceptible to influences from without. Every dream, besides all the other factors, contains an element from the unconscious, which is the real cause of the dream, and this is not suggested. The skeptic may say that this element appears in the dream because the analyst expects it to be there, but the analyst has good reason to think otherwise. While it may sometimes happen that during the analysis dreams which have reference to past situations in the patient's life make their appearance only after

interpretations of his symptoms have been made, yet there is ample evidence that the unconscious wishes are not suggested, as, for example, the fact that the repressed material makes its appearance gradually, and that the patients recollect dreams dating from before the analysis, which lead to the same discoveries as the dreams during treatment.

8. It is observed in some instances that the dreams during the analysis bring more repressed material to light than do the dreams when no psychoanalysis is in progress. There must therefore be a reason for such results—an unconscious influence which is fitted to further the aims of psychoanalysis in sleep. This influence, Freud believes, belongs to the parent complex. The patient's docile attitude toward the parents is repeated in the transference. Freud has never disputed the part played by the "suggestion" in this sense, but finds that the value of the dreams in other directions is not invalidated thereby.

9. Dreams which occur in traumatic neuroses and repeat the traumatic situation are probably the only exceptions to the rule that the dream is a wish fulfillment. Punishment dreams seem to be an exception, but closer study shows that none of the latent dream thoughts are taken up in the manifest dream content, but that the dream is a reaction formation containing a full negation and contradiction due to an intervention of the censorship, set into activity by the emerging of an unacceptable wish. The process is really a modification of the one by which a single element of a latent thought is represented, in the manifest content, by the exact opposite, being in the case of the dream a device for avoiding the disturbance of the sleep.

10. In his final section Freud notes that the ego can assume various images in a dream. This is due to secondary elaborations in the attempt to represent the various sides of the dreamer's personality. Freud regards the view that every person appearing in the dream represents the dreamer as unfounded and mere speculation. It is unnecessary to go further, he believes, than to assume that in the dream as elsewhere the ego can take other forms than that of an observing, criticizing, censoring force (the ego ideal).

2. *The Genesis of the Female Castration Complex.*—Horney asks whether that dissatisfaction with the female rôle which results from "penis envy" is really the alpha and omega of the castration complex in women, and arrives at the conclusion that, while this "envy" conditions forms in which the castration complex manifests itself in them, the repudiation of their womanhood is not exclusively based on it, asserting that "penis envy" by no means precludes a wholly womanly love attachment to the father, and only when this relation comes to grief over the Oedipus complex is there revulsion from the female sexual rôle.

3. *Contribution to the Theory of the Anal Character.*—Abstracted in the *PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW*, Vol. XII, pages 477-480.

(Vol. IX, No. 2)

1. HERMANN, IMRE. Marginal Preference as a Primary Process.
2. FREUD, SIGMUND. The Infantile Genital Organization.
3. SACHS, HANNS. The Genesis of the Perversions.
4. BRUN, R. The Theory of Natural Selection and the Pleasure Principle.

1. *Marginal Preferences as a Primary Process.*—Hermann found by experiment that in young children there is a tendency to choose from a series of similar objects placed before them, that which is at one of the extremities of the row. At about the age of six this tendency is replaced by an inclination to choose an object from the middle of the series (Mittelwahltendenz). The manner of choice in earlier years was found to be connected with a certain difficulty of regarding the series of objects as a single entity, as a whole or complex. To explain the more primitive behavior, Hermann assumes an "immediate stimulus" whereby the motions in picking out the object are prompted by the stimulus without the intervention of a central "productive" process, and without the construction of the so-called higher object forms. The experiment also showed the observer that in the earlier years the active hand helps the choice, the right hand seeking the right marginal place and the left the left one. In more advanced age this "organ readiness" is no longer effective. It may be assumed, Hermann says, that in primitive behavior the hand is not merely directed but that it influences the characteristic decision in the act.

The facts discovered in children were corroborated by G. Révész in interesting experiments with animals.

Having established these facts, Hermann reviews the field of psychology in order to determine whether this phenomenon is general, and he believes he has discovered a manner of functioning which is universal for primitive mentality and one which throws much light on the primitive mind.

The reflex arc may be imagined with the members: sensation—association—concept—innervation—reaction. Then in the primitive processes is found a more immediate reaction upon the sensation, the two peripheral processes being the ones which are prominent. It is thus possible to distinguish two positions in the psychic processes, the marginal, which is emphasized in the marginal preferences and is closely connected with the organ, and the inner position, which is centrally localized. The former is characteristic of more primitive thinking.

A development of this sort is not only discernible in the individual, but in the progress of science as well. If we think of dynamic processes as inner positions and static ideas as marginal we can easily understand why ideas of force were later adopted to replace static concepts. Especially is this obvious in psychology, where the soul was long referred to

as a thing. The whole trend in science, says Hermann, is to proceed from the consideration of mere unities (complexes, Gestaltqualitäten), characteristic of the marginal choice to a preference for inner content in the form of an active or efficient force.

By the theory of marginal choice we are led to assume two forms of psychic unity, one more primitive and one which belongs to later development. Every form, every image, every sign approaches the primitive form as long as it is regarded as an agglomerate of sense impressions and it becomes a unity belonging to the higher development as soon as the unity is regarded in a dynamic aspect as efficient.

Applying this principle to the concept of the ego, it becomes apparent that the pure external world as opposed to a pure ego are extreme marginal positions which developed thought abandons and replaces by the concept of the so-called "deep thought," where the realities of the external world and the deepest strivings of the ego meet.

It had long been suspected that the peripheral movements of emotional expression (Wundt, Darwin) were developed from some more central unifying process, but until Freud no one had the courage to approach the sexual content as significant. In connection with the marginal preference in physiological sense the choice of especially "ticklish" places on the surface, head, eyes, etc., as the seat of emotional expression is noted. Proceeding still further in the same direction, Hermann ventures to suggest a biological application of the principle (at the same time acknowledging that it may seem fantastic), positing a marginal preference in the projection of stimulation to the surfaces of the body (Head's zones) and in the antagonistic innervation (*e.g.*, of the vessels of the heart).

Mendel's laws (as they imply the "all or nothing," the "either or," that is, the principle of absolute presence or absence) are cited as examples of marginal preference. Examples illustrative of marginal preference in neurotics are given, among them the emotional extremes in which nervous persons live. Other instances are phenomena in aphasia and perseverations.

Defining the pleasure principle as that element whose function it is to reduce stimulus to a minimum or to keep the stimulation constant, Hermann seeks to determine the relation of marginal preferences to this principle. It is not the office of the pleasure principle to choose among several objects the one which promises the greatest possible pleasure, nor does the marginal preference always follow the easiest path, so that the two principles do not coincide. It may be said that the marginal preference generally, in a more or less abstract way, is related to the economic principle and that the marginal preference is usually, though not always, made in accordance with the line of least resistance or in the easiest way, so that the pleasure principle and that of marginal preference are closely

connected; they do not, however, stand in the relation of the general to the particular and it is probable that they are wholly different provinces and only secondarily associated. It is also possible that marginal preference is held to in primitive behavior because it usually works in accordance with the pleasure principle and that therefore marginal preference is one factor contributing to the ascendancy of the pleasure principle in primitive mentality.

To illustrate the operation of this principle in a biogenetic sense examples are given where in the individual sphere, in the form of optical illusions, more primitive forms of vision have persisted which show marginal preference. In this sense stroboscopic vision is analyzed. In regard to thought and motility from this point of view, Hermann says that thought and action are connected and are not independent parallels; that they have a single common principle—their purpose. In accordance with the theory of marginal preference as connected with biogenetic development the significant latent content of thought would at primary levels be immediately connected with actions as peripheral processes and later the process which we regard as thought would come into play. For this reason the affects—that is, the more primitive formations would be constantly connected with motor acts (or their reminiscences) and even pure thought would never be entirely free from accessory motor phenomena—though this, on account of the evanescence, might escape us.

It is noted that in artists the development of thought has not proceeded in the ordinary manner. Certain peripheral impressions proceed to adaptation to reality without the intervention of the central thought processes and the peripheral processes thus preserve an ascendancy. This process may be clearly followed in children's drawings where the thought work seems to be carried on in direct connection with the motility.

2. *The Infantile Genital Organization*.—Abstracted in the *PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW*, Vol. XIV, page 466.

3. *The Genesis of Perversions*.—In this paper Sachs discusses the relation of perversions to the Oedipus complex, starting from Freud's principle that the perversion is an overdeveloped instinct component which persists independently, instead of being subordinated to the genital primacy in the ontogenetic development. Sachs emphasizes that our understanding of perversion is very imperfect so long as we do not take this relation sufficiently into account; the partial instinctive component does not develop directly into a perversion, but passes through the Oedipus complex as does a ray of light through a lens—refracted perhaps but always to be measured by the angle of incidence. This partial component rarely persists in the exact form in which it belonged to the earlier sex organization, that is, the auto-erotic, narcissistic, objectless form, but undergoes an elaboration at a higher level. From one point of view the neuroses are negatives of the perversions, that is to say, in the

neurotic the phantasies not in keeping with the developmental stage are repressed and become pathogenic, producing symptom formations, while in the pervert these same phantasies produce the conscious pleasure goals. This condition of things opens the question of the relation of perversions to the unconscious. To understand this relation the contrast must be kept in mind that in the neurosis the repressed phantasy forces a way through to consciousness in a form which is foreign and hostile to the ego, while in the perversion the element is conscious, in agreement with the ego, and in a wider sense pleasurable. There are, however, perversions which resemble neuroses, namely, where the pleasure is converted into anxiety because certain bounds are overstepped and conditions arise which are not acceptable to the personality.

Sachs is of the opinion that the craving for drugs and alcohol is a sort of compromise between a perversion and a compulsion neurosis, being like a perversion in so far as the goal of definite gratification is reached, though this gratification is only a substitute for the pleasure aimed at.

Commenting on the case analyzed by Freud, "A Child Is Beaten" (see *PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW*, Vol. XI, page 464), the writer calls attention to the constancy of the phantasy of being beaten throughout the life history. It makes its appearance in the earliest infantile behavior and persists throughout the various development of consciousness; upon it the perverse pleasure is fixed. In the author's experience it is the same with all perversions. The development may proceed to puberty and beyond, the scenes and the personnel of the phantasy may change, but a certain element or group of elements survives the variations as the "carrier" of the pleasure. The other elements which are discarded and entirely repressed in the further development cede their pleasure content to the survivors, and these become their representatives in consciousness, in exactly the same manner as the neurotic symptom is the representative of the phantasy. This condition of things is especially obvious in fetishism.

The strange and often grotesque character of many perversions is explained by the circumstance that certain isolated elements are the bearers of the perversions—mere fragments of the infantile experiences and phantasies, the connection of which with the original organization has become entirely obliterated.

The abandonment of the infantile object choice (that is to say, the solution of the Oedipus complex, and the castration complex which stands in some contrast to it) is the most difficult task of development. In these crises the libido may cling to some group of ideas outside the genital group normally belonging to adult development; the partial component continues in force after the Oedipus conflict has been passed through, in

part because this component has been useful in obtaining the victory in the conflict.

This mechanism clearly explains the transition from perversion to neurosis if the fact be kept in mind that the processes of repression, corresponding to those of development and genital organization, are progressive, so that it may happen that a complex which has been useful in the process of repression may itself become the repressed. If circumstances arise which favor its return, it may again come to the surface, either in the form of a neurosis (if there is abstinence), or as a perversion. The question is also answered by this explanation why there are neurotics among perverts; it is because some element has been taken up into the ego and has been accepted as offering pleasure in the perversion, while some other elements of the complex, too strong for successful repression and yet unacceptable, assert themselves in the form of a symptom.

4. *The Theory of Natural Selection and the Pleasure Principle.*—In this article Brun gives views suggested by Erich Wasmann's monograph on the care of commensals by ants. According to Darwin's theory of natural selection, the phylogenetic development of the instincts, instinctive behavior, and the psychoplastic peculiarities of the various species follow the principle of utility, or, as psychoanalysis would say, the reality principle; the pleasure principle would then have no real share in these processes, at least in the sense of a formative factor.

This view seems to be contradicted by the fact that the exercise of instinctive activity, indeed, even the preparation for instinctive acts, is connected with pleasure, nay, more, that this pleasure seems to be the objective purpose of the act no less than the subjective purpose, to be, in fact, the real driving element. The defenders of natural selection may say that "nature" has provided this means to attain her purpose, but the introduction of this teleological fiction is not a solution of the problem, for "nature," to which one here has recourse, is just that which is to be explained.

Father Wasmann's recent observations on ants, Brun says, have important bearing on this question. Like other social groups, ants have a host of unbidden guests, "sponges" and parasites. The larvae of some sorts of these guests are cared for by the ants though these strangers bring about great harm to the ant colonies, the workers devoting their energies to feeding their guests to the neglect of their own species. As result, the female ants degenerate into those miserable wingless creatures called pseudogynes, incapable either of working or breeding. These strangers secrete a certain oily exudate which acts on the ants as a sort of intoxicant and gives them great pleasure. Thus it may be seen that from this symphily the guests draw biological advantage; the ants only pleasure. The American biologist, W. M. Wheeler, has made similar observations. He found that ants derive pleasure and

stimulation from the secretion of the larvae for which they care, their own larvae as well as the larvae of their guests. Wasmann does not agree with Wheeler that there is a real "trophallaxis" or exchange of nourishment, but the discovery is nevertheless most important in that it shows the primacy of the pleasure principle in the formation of ant colonies and permits the peculiar form of "sublimation" in the neuters to be explained in accordance with this principle. In the light of the facts discovered by Wheeler the phenomena of symphily are explicable as a biological parallel for the well known clinical phenomena of distortion.

These observations lead to the establishment beyond all doubt of the fact that there is a specific tendency to symphily on the part of the ants, and also of the astonishing fact that not only do the parasites become accustomed to the ants, but *vice versa*, the ants to the parasites; that is to say, there is a cleronomically developed capacity to care for another species, even at the sacrifice of their own, which cannot, therefore, be explained by the theory of natural selection. Indeed, it might be said that this tendency has been developed to thwart natural selection and for the sole reason that it brings pleasure.

To explain this phenomenon it is not necessary, in Brun's opinion, to resort to Wasmann's "service of an external species," which is in direct contradiction to Darwin's theory, nor to an oversoul in nature. It is only necessary to make a partial revision of the theory of natural selection and ascribe a certain importance to the pleasure principle as a phylogenetic factor which is effective as long as the species in question survives. If the libidinal selection works against the natural selection the species affected must finally become extinct, though the process may be slow.

In conclusion Brun says that the idea of utility in the form in which it is accepted in the old theory of natural selection springs from an autistic-anthropomorphic manner of thinking, out of keeping with our present insight into the course of vital events, and that it must be abandoned if biology is to keep pace with the advances of our knowledge. The new views to which we are brought by Wasmann's studies, he notes, are entirely consonant with the results of psychoanalytic research.

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1. *Cold, Disease and Birth*.—As this number of the *Zeitschrift* is a special one in honor of Ferenczi's fiftieth birthday Jones considers this article particularly appropriate, for, he says, it is to Ferenczi more than to anyone else that we owe our dawning realization of how subtle are the interrelations between physical and psychical disorders. A translation of the article appears in *Papers on Psychoanalysis*, 3d Edition (William Wood & Co.), page 595. In brief, Jones notes: "The class of infective disease here referred to is that acquired by the respiratory route. This kind of disease is acquired by simply breathing infected air, and the chance of its happening is immensely increased by inadequate ventilation in the presence of infection. Nothing, therefore, could better favor the chance of acquiring the infection than the prevailing belief, or superstition, that such diseases have an etiology of exactly the opposite kind, *i.e.*, that they are due to the malignant influence of cold air, or what is popularly known as draughts. Naturally the advent of bacteriology was bound to exercise a powerful modifying influence on these beliefs, but so implanted were they in the human mind that recourse to some rationalization proved necessary. So it was maintained that cold air, though not the specific cause of these diseases acted by lowering the resistance to ubiquitous infective agents. . . . Can psychology throw any light on the origin and meaning of these errors? We know that formal errors in logic are due not to the intellectual deficiency but to the operation of emotional factors. . . . The assistance to be expected from psychoanalysis will naturally be sought by determining what contributions could have been made to the belief in question by the unconscious. We have to consider what ideas in the unconscious correspond with the elements of the statement "cold air causes disease." The unconscious equivalents of the last-mentioned idea are familiar to us from numerous psychoanalyses. The idea is injury, and this injury, like all other injuries, signifies castration. From the latest researches we have learned that the idea of castration has a much wider connotation in the unconscious, particularly in its genetic aspects, than used to be thought. In addition to ideas directly concerned with the loss of the penis (threats, fears of retaliatory punishment, etc.) there are three other important sources from which this complex is fed. They are: removal

of feces, identified with the penis (Jones), weaning from the nipple (Staercke), and the loss of the mother's body at birth (Alexander). It is to Ferenczi's imagination that we owe our first proper appreciation of the psychical significance that the act of birth must have for the infant, and he has traced the consequence of this on the later development of the individual. From his work, and of course from Freud's, we have come to realize how great must be the suffering and resentment experienced by the infant on being expelled from paradise, and how strong is the perennial desire to return there. After the painful act of birth has been gone through, the most prominent demonstration of the castration it has just undergone—in being deprived of the nest it formerly owned as part of its total self—is certainly the sensation of cold air. The uncomfortable stimulation produced by this change in temperature betokens the revolution in its state of being, and on its (unwilling) response to it its very life depends. Small wonder that the dominant impression thus received on the threshold of life remains forever after connected with the ideas of discomfort, insecurity, danger, or even bodily harm."

2. *On Hysterical Uterine Phenomena.*—In this paper Dr. Eisler sets forth certain effects which hysteria might have on the mucous membrane and muscles of the uterus. Gynecologists call amenorrhea and dysmenorrhea "nervous," where there is no biological failure of development to which it can be referred. Eisler believes that amenorrhea may be a manifestation of the wish to be a man, *i.e.*, a conversion symptom expressive of this wish in accordance with which the organ refuses to perform its function. A special complication of menstrual disturbances is the "vicarious menstruation" where the bleeding makes its appearance in the mucous membrane of some other part of the body than the uterus. Cases of bleeding of the nose, lungs, stomach (hysterical epistaxis, hemoptysis, hematemeses) have been reported in which the phenomenon appeared with monthly regularity and lasted the usual period for menstruation. Even more distant organs as the larynx, thyroid, eyes, or ears may become the substitutes for the suppressed menstruation. French gynecologists more particularly have described this form of hysteria and have given it the name of "éctopie menstruelle." So far as the writer is aware no case of this sort has been thoroughly analyzed and this would be necessary before definite conclusions could be arrived at. Without doubt, however, he adds, these are examples of the displacement of the function from the genital to other erogenous zones. Illustrative of the psychic factors which may influence the uterine functions is cited a case in which there was almost constant bleeding as protection against the husband, a returned prisoner.

In regard to the muscular system insufficiency of data does not permit very definite conclusions as to how far psychic influences are

effective. Eisler cites two cases of spontaneous miscarriage for which no sufficient organic factors could be discovered. In both cases Eisler believes that a psychic factor, desire for revenge on the husband for neglect, a motive which is likely to lead to hysterical phenomena in women of the Medea type, had influenced the uterine musculature. Another illustration in this direction is a case in which labor was greatly prolonged, lasting four and one-half days. An analysis of the patient undertaken afterward revealed a strong anal erotism and, following the familiar equation child = feces, Eisler was convinced that the case was one in which the repressed anal erotism was a pronounced factor in the unusual labor.

3. *The Various Developments Undergone by Narcissism in Men and Women*.—Abstracted in *PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW*, Vol. XIV, page 463.

4. *Organ Libido and Talent*.—Ferenczi has stated that the problem of artistic talent which hitherto has been approached only from the psychological standpoint, has recently received considerable illumination, on the organic side, from hysteria. The "hysterical materialization phenomena" reveal a plasticity in the organ, a preparedness for art, and Freud, himself, calls hysteria a distortion of art. Hermann finds the connection of the problem of artistic talent with the bodily phenomena in hysteria a happy inspiration which promises a consistent understanding of the various manifestations of genius. In hysteria certain organs become erogenous, to the extent of becoming "genitalized." In artists and poets, the hand or the oral zone becomes erogenous in a progress to sublimation. On this fact of the libido tonus Herman endeavors to construct a theory of the psychogenesis of artistic talents, following the principles of marginal preference which he has explained in another articles abstracted in the *PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW*, Vol. XV, page 324. Views of psychoanalysts which have preceded him in this field and empirical material are cited in justification of his view.

Hermann thinks that where talent is inherited it is the libidinal organ component, the emphasis on certain organs, which is transmitted.

This theory furnishes a quite obvious explanation of certain manifestations of talent, but a somewhat deeper study of the underlying principles is necessary before it can be applied generally and the broad statement made that all manifestations of talent rest upon a regional cathexis. Studying their application in the case of poets, Hermann found a seer-complex (belief in the gift of prophecy) in a large number of examples, which, in cases analyzed, could be referred to experiences in early childhood. This complex is developed in scientists and inventors also (sense of knowing beforehand). In these instances he sees ground for assuming a local organic condition also. In further explanation of the origin of talent in poets he pursues the train of thought suggested by Ferenczi*

* Hollos and Ferenczi. *Psychoanalysis and the Psychic Disorders of General Paresis*. *PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW*, Vol. XII, Jan. 1925, p. 88.

who assumes that where parts of the body are injured a stream of libido from other organs sets in. When the ego resists this localized increase of libido by means of repression the result may be a hysterical neurosis, or where the ego identifies itself fully with the injury a narcissistic patho-neurosis or a simple narcissistic disturbance. The brain betrays its rôle as the narcissistic organ par excellence in many ways, and Hermann believes he is saying nothing new in affirming that intensive pain wherever it occurs is an injury to the ego and that hence, whenever there is a pain an accumulation of brain-libido might be expected. "Could not this libido be accumulated in the brain," he asks, "and when sublimated used for creative mental work?"

From the study of great poets and thinkers, Hume, Darwin, Fechner, Cardano, and others, it is clearly manifest that thought is used as a defense against pain. Cardano said that in the intervals when he was without pain, he sought to prepare himself for it by "thinking" pain until the tears came. This connection, which, Hermann says, may be, designated genetic, between pain, heightened libido cathexis of the brain and "deep thought" is not without analogy and support from other sources. In a former work (see *PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW*, Vol. XIII, pages 248-251) he called attention to the fact that the higher perceptual forms of the psyche (rhythm, etc.) have their origin in a repressed displeasure due to the threatened return of the compulsion to repetition which had once been overcome.

In following, introspectively and speculatively, this possible genetic relation between pain and creative thought he adds that one is obliged to assume a special kind of defense against pain, where all the ego-interest is withdrawn from the pain and another mental activity is pursued with an impulsive force greatly increased by the energy inflow thus gained. This energy is elaborated and the result is thought, reflection, construction of phantasies, but here, in contrast to what happens in ordinary thinking and phantasy weaving, there is a deeper clinging to reality through inner forces which are compensation for the pain, and lead to "deep thought." For this a peculiar disposition is necessary, a trend in masochistic direction—which does not surrender entirely to the pain, but yet does not entirely repress it. If this manner of circumventing pain is established early in life we have before us the conditions for genius. This theory of genius as a defense against pain Hermann finds confirmed in another field as it furnishes explanation for the occupation stereotypies of productive minds. Many of these habits are to be regarded as due to slight but constant stimulation of the organ which is responsible for the talent; as drinking in poets, gambling, restlessness of the hands, in poets with artistic inclination (Petöfi); in virtuosi and others are found symbolic indications of the complex which determines the talent, that is the seer complex (walking to and fro while composing);

and the libido cathexis of the brain is found to be increased by slight pain or unpleasant sensations (cold foot bath, cold room, strong odors).

5. *From the Pathoneuroses to the Pathology of the Neuroses.*—The materialistic-somatic method in psychiatry, the writer notes, has been superseded by psychoanalysis, which neither attributes psychic phenomena directly to anatomical sources, nor ventures on transcendental speculation. Freud expresses the view that the instincts constitute the link between the somatic and the psychic and assumes that it is the aim of psychoanalysis to find a meeting point of organic and mental processes, to be discovered only by approaching the subject from both points of view, the "utraqustic" point of view as it is called by Ferenczi. Such a meeting point is approached in hysteria, an entity, the phenomenal form of which presents interconnected somatic and psychic features, the instinctive impulses having well-determined effects on the beating of the heart, on the irritability of the sympathetic system, etc. Ferenczi, in his work on "The Pathoneuroses," comes to the conclusion that a bodily disease or injury may have as result a regression to narcissism or to one of its neurotic variants in which the libido is driven back to the ego or to the injured organ and there centered. For the production of this disturbance there are special conditions necessary, namely a constitutional narcissism together with an injury to some part of the body with which the whole ego can be identified (face, genitals, etc.). Ferenczi thinks it not improbable that at the injured or diseased parts of the body, not only chemotactic cells accumulate to accomplish the reparatory work, but that also an increased quantity of libido streams to this place from the other organs, and that it may be that this increased libido investment participates in the process of restoration.

Hollós notes that from the special instance of the pathoneuroses a direct way leads to other disturbances of the ego upon organic pathological basis. As an instance is mentioned the work on paralysis undertaken by Hollós and Ferenczi (see *PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW*, Vol. XII, Jan. 1925, p. 88). In this work the writers endeavor to show that a pathopsychosis may ensue from a cerebral lesion, though here a different phase of the situation is presented than in the pathoneuroses; the organic injury is not directly perceived, nor is interest consciously centered upon it. Such diseases of the brain result from toxic processes and there is a constant struggle between toxic and anti-toxic agents. Hollós suggests that this struggle might be reflected in endopsychic perception in the form of the toxic psychoses. He believes that every injury, whatever be the nature, produces a change in the cathexis and that the autoerotic investment represents a secondary reactive and compensatory process. Similar phenomena of rhythmic struggle to reestablish the normal equilibrium occur in psychogenic diseases, and their significance is the same; in delirium the struggle is acute, in paranoia it is chronic. Prospect of

success in tracing the psychic changes to their somatic correlate Hollós sees only in this assumption of a redistribution of the libido, all attempt to connect directly the psychical and physical moments being from the start hopeless because the disparity of the elements is not taken into account.

In fever delirium there is besides the organic process also an activation of infantile fixations. No psychoneurosis, Hollós believes, can be developed without some disturbance in the brain, which he regards as toxic in nature. This intoxication is fostered by the neurosis itself, probably with the aid of the inner secretions. On the other hand a primary brain lesion (trauma, pathological change) may produce disturbances of the libido economy and as result activate various fixations belonging to earlier developmental phases.

Though wider research in the direction of Ferenczi's train of thought throws some light on the pathology of the psychoses, they at the same time confirm the nosological unity of the pathoneuroses. This disease as described by Ferenczi constitutes a sharply defined entity, the independence of which is not disturbed by the fact that in its mechanism general principles come to light which are capable of wider application.

6. *The Rôle of the School in the Libidinal Development of the Child.* Abstracted in *PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW*, Vol. XIV, page 473.

7. *The Significance of Psychoanalysis in the History of Thought.*—Kolnai points out that psychoanalysis has entirely changed our world outlook. He shows that it has rendered service to determinism, positivism, and rationalism in reducing to scientific formula what was hitherto mere speculation, and in dealing with phenomena without a preconceived system of values. On the other hand, through its theory of the unconscious and of the instincts, it has struck a blow at physiological materialism. The writer emphasizes the essential difference between the suggestive and hypnotic therapy with its blind faith and yielding to authority and the psychoanalytic therapy, the aim of which is to establish critical self-direction. Psychoanalysis does not aim to overcome isolated symptomatic disturbances (alcoholism, for instance), but taking the whole mental structure into consideration, inclusive of the infantile fixations and their deleterious reactions, it seeks to bring about changes that will place the personality in line with the highest individual development possible for it. In contrast with modern occult theories, such as Christian Science, etc., psychoanalysis does not insist on antecedent belief in the good result of certain procedures. It explains such belief as an example of the delusion of the "omnipotence of thought," in subordination to the pleasure principle. Psychoanalysis seeks to extend the field of conscious control, with due recognition of the unconscious, but without giving free rein to it. The psychoanalytic theory has furnished a comprehensive foundation for popular beliefs, and a scientific interpretation of ideas

which are emotionally determined. Considering the relation of psychoanalysis to ethical thought Kolnai says that psychoanalysis, by releasing repressions renders possible the conscious acceptance or rejection of instinctive impulses, a condition favorable to sublimation and the reality principle in place of the pleasure principle, as the dominant one in individual behavior.

Kolnai refers to the idea which has been suggested that psychoanalysis brings to bear the same critical function on the manner in which the individual soul is constructed as does Marxism on the social structure and that it is therefore to be regarded as a form of Marxism and as holding the same views. He enumerates the points of similarity between Marx's system and that of Freud: 1. The discovery of "animal" factors beneath the veil of ideology. 2. Recognition of the volitional element in various views. 3. A dialectic method represented by the solution of opposites. In view of the points of difference which he also sets forth, Kolnai regards these resemblances as negligible. The differences are: 1. The existence in Marx' system of a dogmatic, monistic economic theory, incapable of further development, contrasted with the many-sided scientific system of Freud. 2. Mere generalization of rational interests contrasted with researches into the deep mechanism of the soul. 3. The positing of predetermined evolutionary processes contrasted with speculations always within the scope of empirical verification. 4. The premise of the absorption of the whole of mankind in an impersonal proletariat contrasted with the assurance of individuals endowed with critique and power of self-control.

Psychoanalysis, he says, has more in common with the physiocratic individualistic social theory which directs attention less to the economic side of social spirit than to the fundamental principles underlying both the social and economic conditions—principles which are given their fullest value in psychoanalysis. He believes, therefore, that if a new order of things is now to be constructed on the ruins of the Marxian social revolution and a social reform is to take place in which all elements are to be given due weight, inclusive of a new freedom of spirit beyond the old mechanistic puritanistic liberalism, it is from psychoanalysis that the secrets concerning the libidinal satisfaction and rational freedom must be learned.

8. *Queen Mab*. Pfeifer regards Mercutio's phantasy in *Romeo and Juliet* as one of the most interesting in literature. The phantasy in part reads:

O! then, I see, Queen Mab hath been with you . . .
 She is the fairies' midwife, and she comes
 In shape no bigger than an agate-stone
 On the fore-finger of an alderman,
 Drawn with a team of little atomies

Athwart men's noses as they lie asleep;
 Her waggon-spokes made of long spinners' legs;
 The cover, of the wings of grasshoppers;
 The traces of the smallest spider's web;

And in this state she gallops night by night
 Through lovers' brains, and then they dream of love;
 O'er courtiers' knees, that dream on curtsies straight;
 O'er lawyers' fingers, who straight dream on fees;
 O'er ladies' lips, who straight on kisses dream; etc.

The phantasy which recalls the grotesque mingling of images when one is falling asleep, Pfeifer studies with the aid of dream analysis and ethnology and finds that Queen Mab owes her wish-fulfilling power to her origin from the mother imago and that the phantasy itself, in all probability, originates in the incest wishes of the poet. In the introductory picture the figure of the mother is projected into the supernatural. Every actual wish which is constantly reaching out for fulfillment is referred to the gracious fairy, to the good mother of childhood. It is the love of the mother alone which is able to still the longings of the child, to remove his fear and anxiety in the darkness of the night, but this beneficent image is destined to repression and in the defense against the incest wish it becomes transformed into an evil image—a witch, clothed with the night, the symbol of anxiety. In spite of the repression, however, the erotic wish of the poet breaks through, and the witch becomes metamorphosed into the fairy Mab, endowed with wish-fulfilling powers.

The writer notes that the motive for this wish-fulfilling power was also to be sought in the burning ambitions of the young Shakespeare who had but recently arrived at the great city and the rich court. He saw the fame and riches he longed for represented in the great Queen. As the reality of the day held but little promise of the fulfillment of his desires, the little Queen Mab, the tiny image of the great Queen, not larger than the

“agate-stone on the fore-finger of an alderman,”

the mother who had become a fairy, was the only one who could, in phantasy, grant happiness to her poet son.

9. *A Dream Analysis*.—The dream is thought worthy of attention from two points of view: because its analysis led to the clearing up of a neurosis, the meaning of which became obvious thereby, and because the application of the newly-gained insight led to a better social adjustment of a peculiar type of man. The dream and the associations reflect an exact reproduction of a decisive stage of the patient's infantile sexual development. He dreamed that the father made an approach to him per anum, but that he resisted because he felt that he would be castrated

thereby. Instead he resolved to castrate the father. This formula describes the full content of the negative Oedipus complex of the dreamer, and the analyst could subsume under it an amount of material in the patient's behavior which was previously not clear and discovered in the elaborations of the formula the definite task for therapeutic effort.

In the development of the homosexual libido of the patient Rado finds a parallel to a case described by Freud where an attachment to the father resulted in a phobia for wolves—the fear of being castrated by being devoured. In Freud's case a passive attitude is consistently observed; in the writer's only a partially passive or feminine attitude, as there was active protest against the castration. Notwithstanding his bisexual attitude and the various influences of the Oedipus complex the patient made a more or less successful heterosexual adjustment, but could not avoid the neurosis. A part of his homosexual libido had been sublimated and was used in social activities of which the beneficiaries were children. This sublimation was based on the same formula as the dream and for this reason it was unstable. The love of the children which he gains through his activities is a substitute for the father love he craves. The fact that he compels it is a confirmation of his strength to resist castration. The various phases revealed in the analysis in disconnected parts, that is the yearning to be loved by children (symbolically, the father rendered harmless by castration) and the active efforts to command that love and oppose submission all appear in the dream in condensed form.

10. *Sacred Money in Melanesia*.—At one time it was believed that the remarkable uniformity in the customs of races living at distances from one another could only be explained on the ground of descent from the same stem and a wandering out from the same place of abode. Historical ethnology has now abandoned this idea and in this article Róheim endeavors to trace the phylogenesis of the money interest, in keeping with the newer views, as a parallel to Ferenczi's "Ontogenesis of the interest in money" (see *PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW*, Vol. 3, page 469). In Melanesia money is called tabu and in other countries with like levels of civilization money is given names which indicate its sacred character. At first glance one might be inclined to say that tabu here is really a protective sign for the purpose of warning, a magic prohibition of theft, especially as in some places the custom prevails of hiding gold and protecting it with a sign. Such explanations are insufficient, however, as tabu is not only a prohibition but always carries the meaning of something sacred. The close connection between money and death rites and gifts to the dead furnishes the necessary clue to the real significance of money. The writer calls attention particularly to Rivers' work in this connection. Mariner in describing the death rites of a primitive people relates that the graves are defiled by the men at night and cleaned

by the women the next morning—a ceremony which was carried on for many successive days. Róheim draws a parallel between this primitive behavior and that of infants who yield excrement in return for the mother's milk, stating that the defecating on the grave of the leader of the tribe is to be regarded in the same light. This interpretation is confirmed by various elaborations of the cannibalistic phylogenetic rites and the infantile ontogenetic conduct.

Róheim concludes that the sacred character of money being taken into consideration it can only originate in the parent images; phylogenetically in the father, the chief of the tribe, who in dying yields his goods and wives, and is symbolically eaten and repaid in gifts from the survivors' own bodies; ontogenetically in the mother, who gives her body for nourishment and is repaid in the excrement. "As so we come by this long journey," he adds, "to what we could have discovered at home. On every coin is the picture of the king, the father of the country. He gives himself thus piece by piece to his subjects." Historically there are other substitutes for the father, namely, the gods who were the predecessors of the kings. "The gods were the first capitalists of the Greeks and the temples were their banks" (Curtius).

From the beginning two interpretations have been given the rites of offering and sacrifice, says Róheim in discussing their connection with money. The sober rationalistic explanation, as a barter of gift for gift, and the explanation of the rite as an oral communion. Having discovered the libidinal origin of sacrifices it is possible to do justice to both. According to the oral significance the child identified itself with the mother; the brothers of the original tribe with the dead father. On the other hand, in the sense of an exchange the child sacrifices its feces to the mother as a gift in order to continue to receive gifts; in the primitive tribe, gold is strewn on the grave; among the Kabi and Wakki the wonderworker is elevated to the rank of a thaumaturgist of the first order by giving up to the spirit of the rainbow the quartz crystals and receiving in return the magic cord (the umbilical cord?). Róheim believes therefore that the infantile root of the offering for gift is to be found in the infantile anal activities; the root of the offering in the sense of identification, in the oral activities.

11. *The Young Spiritualist*.—Szilágyi gives a psychological study of an abnormal personality whose acquaintance he cultivated for the purpose of getting at the origin of his peculiarities. This young man is a spiritualist and a misogynist. He regards sexuality as the greatest danger of the soul and believes that it might be possible to discover some other means of procreation than by sexual congress, which he looks upon as incest. He devotes all his spare time to spreading a propaganda for depilation of the body. In a factory where he worked he defended himself against a plot made by young women to rob him of his chastity and

wounded one of the young girls. Among spiritualists he is regarded as a medium and takes part regularly in the séances of Budapesth, in a trance state holding communication with spirits, whose messages he writes verbatim in shorthand in which he is an adept. At times it is evil spirits who communicate with him. The spirit messages he repeats with an affected manner like that observed in dementia precox.

One incident in his childhood had filled him with anxiety. He once saw his mother, bathing, with uncovered genitals. In her awkwardness she tipped over a candle and a fire was the result. The two incidents were connected in his memory, and the explanation of his complex concerning hair on the human body is explained. It was probably not by chance that he saw his mother but in satisfaction of his scopophilia, a component of the incest wish. From this incident his peculiar character trends can be explained; his tendency to self-punishment (castration represented by depilation of his own body); the sadism as retaliation for disillusionment symbolized in the effort to deprive others of hair; the horror of incest as reaction to the scopophilia; the retreat to the father belonging to the homosexual attitude. The fear of hair is fear of the mother, more generally fear of the female genitals. He entertains the belief that the absence of hair is superior, more cleanly, on the one hand because it pleases his own narcissism and on the other because it belittles the mother and places him in a better light with the father. All the pseudorationalistic, hygienic arguments for depilation are, in a last analysis, nothing but an unconscious flight from the mother connected with the homosexual fixation on the father with whom he identifies himself in the unconscious—all in turn connected with the masochistic trend for self-punishment.

His trance conditions serve to disguise his hallucinations. In these conditions he becomes united with God-the-father and is taken up into a higher sphere where he is free from the mother. According to his own description: he is a miserable sinner but in the trance he returns to a past condition when he was a woman, he attains a sphere where there are only angels without hair, in the midst of which he reigns as the Virgin Mary sexually united with the heavenly father.

Valentine, who in the recurring trance conditions lives this life in keeping with the pleasure principle, when he wakes from the trance, takes up the heavy burden of adjustment to reality with the most artless simplicity.

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1. RANK, OTTO. On the Understanding of the Development of the Libido During the Psychoanalytic Cure.
2. KLEINHOLZ, A. On the Genesis and the Dynamics of the Mania for Invention.
3. DEUTSCH, FELIX. Experimental Studies in Psychoanalysis.

1. *On the Understanding of the Development of the Libido During the Psychoanalytic Cure.*—In this article Rank endeavors to show the manner in which, in cases of "psychic impotency," the analytic treatment liberates the repressed infantile libido and then makes use of part of it to raise the level of the sexual life of the patient to the genital primacy, and to sublimate excess libido. The histories of three cases analyzed by the writer are given. Each of these presented developmental peculiarities in the sexual life which were responsible for the psychic impotency.

In the first case the disturbance was traceable to a homosexual attitude: it was one of those instances in which the neurotic constellation (compulsory type), without producing a definite neurosis, led to unhappiness in marriage, the mother conflict entering into the patient's relations with his wife.

A young man of twenty years was Rank's second case. He was suffering from hyperpotency connected with a too strong defense against homosexual urges.

The third patient, whose libido at the beginning of the analysis was sufficient for a certain degree of heterosexual activity, though it was below normal, withdrew entirely from these activities when, during the analysis, the feminine libido was mobilized.

A fourth instance is cited, in which, however, no analysis was undertaken, that of a so-called normal man, who was very successful both in love and life, but who betrayed his difficulties of adjustment by a hyperpotency and a general "Don Juan" attitude.

Summing up the pathological features common to all these cases, Rank finds them all due to the same cause, defects in the development of the libido manifested in some aspect of the Oedipus complex. These, he says, are all neuroses, the symptoms of which have set in after the establishment of the genital primacy and the adult libido centers, but in which the infantile anxiety nevertheless continues to play a part. The normal developmental resolution of the Oedipus attachment being dependent on the possibility of satisfactory adjustment in an adult object choice, Rank sets forth the conditions of such an adjustment. The fact must be taken into consideration, he says, that the attitude toward the object necessary for the normal resolution of the libido conflict presupposes quite definite qualities in this object, namely, the qualities which Freud has described for the various individual types as "the predefined conditions of love" for the type. The "conditions" depend on the ideal which has been formed and Rank notes that while this ideal is necessary for potency, it may in some instances lead to impotency.

A double analysis of a married couple enabled Rank to follow the difficulties of preserving the right equilibrium in "ideals" in the married relation. In the man the ideal had been constructed as a too strong

defense against an incestuous urge in the direction of the mother, with the consequent attitude of compensatory affinity for the father. In the woman there was a strong mother fixation. She married her husband immediately after the death of her mother, whom she had nursed through a long illness. Her husband then became a mother substitute, and she, in turn, became for him a father substitute. These attitudes were revealed in the analysis and the difficulties were finally adjusted by the reconstruction of the relations between the objects and the ego-ideals.

With Freud, Rank recognizes that the parent objects are the material from which the ideal is constructed, in the sense that to construct it they are molded together with the ego as the other primary object through the intermediation of the phantasy or daydream. The analysis of the typical phantasy formations, the family romance, the idea of salvation, etc., show plainly in how far the daydream may be regarded as a precipitate in the process of constructing the ideal. The pure wish phantasy renders the original libido object attainable, but in a highly idealized form, as emperor, empress, heroine, etc., leading in countless transitions to the heroines of fiction and poetic creation; the pure ideal, on the contrary, presupposes the unattainability of the object, and in this sense has the value of a repression. The aim of the wish phantasy is to hold fast to the object at any price, to reach concrete attainment; the formation of the ideal brings with it repression and the renunciation of the object. The wish phantasy, as a matter of fact, secures the possibility of constructing an ideal which is realizable by mitigating its ascetic character; the unattainable is brought within reach either by elevation of the self or by lowering the object (masturbation phantasies). Thus the phantasy in a sense restores the original identity in the ego between the repressed (abandoned) and the idealized object. The real mechanism of the formation of the ideal corresponds to a partial repression and the construction of a compensatory substitute, as Freud pointed out years ago was the case in fetichism. It may be added in the sense of his later treatise (*Das Ich und Das Es*) that in place of a cathexis of the repressed object there is also an investment of a part of the ego and in fact in the form of identification, whereby the narcissistic ideal, which in women plays a particularly important rôle, in part replaces the object which has been renounced. In Freud's sense the formation of the ideal renders possible the renunciation of the infantile object on the part of the ego and at the same time an identification with this object. It is always the "foredetermined characteristics," traceable to the original abandoned infantile object, which constitutes the allurements of the ideal object, so that in it there is an element with a trend toward renunciation going out from the old Oedipus situation, and corresponding possibilities of neurotic maladjustment.

Rank describes the manner in which the knowledge of these mecha-

nisms may be made use of in the treatment. Beginning with the transference to the analyst, which represents the first infantile mechanisms of transference from identification on, the analytic process may be described as a repetition of the original process in choosing the object. In the analysis, however, with the conscious help of the ego, effort is successfully directed to the construction of a new and more purposeful ideal and to an object choice in conformity with it. The neurotic patient must abandon the ideal he has already constructed, must take his position at the level of the original object choice, and going out therefrom arrive at the possibility of adaptation through acceptations of foredetermined conditions of love which are not only ego-syntonic, *i.e.*, consonant with the ego, but also realizable.

At the close of the treatment the narcissistic ideal repeated in connection with the transference must be detached from the analyst, as also the mother libido belonging to the still earlier developmental period and the libido belonging to both situations must be placed at the disposal of the patient for the real heterosexual transference, or if there is need, because of an excess of libido, a part should be directed toward sublimation.

The question so often raised as to the difference between "transference" and "love" admits from the standpoint of the libido of only one answer, says Rank, in concluding his article; the transference represents a purer, that is to say, a more concentrated form of love; what we call love in the usual sense of the term is a form of the original (mother) libido greatly diluted by the ideal formation; the transference resembles what is called "true love" in having greater intensity. For this reason those concentrated forms of love founded on the mother-bond are monogamous; while on the other hand the demands of the ego-ideal can, for the most part, be satisfied only by polygamy (Don Juanism).

In keeping with this mechanism there is, in the sexual and love life, a constant adaptation and readaptation from day to day. The physiological "conflict of the sexes" before and during the sexual act has its counterpart in the psychic sphere, *i.e.*, in love, in a ceaseless reciprocal balancing of interferences between the love objects and the ego-ideals, which in a last analysis must be referred to the circumstance that the partners are husband and wife only in consciousness; in the unconscious they always stand in the relation of mother and child. The biological union of opposites in the two sexes finds a psychological counterpart in the union of the two ideals, or in a reciprocal adaptation of these ideals—a task which is no less difficult and at the same time no less important than the adaptation of the ego to reality.

2. *On the Genesis and Dynamics of Inventor's Delusion.*—Abstracted in PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW, Vol. XIV, No. 4, page 432.

3. *Experimental Studies in Psychoanalysis.*—Quoting Freud's state-

ment that psychoanalysis is a science whose aim is to become established on an organic basis, Deutsch notes the ways in which there is possibility of reaching this goal, of which he sees three. The first way is in the direction of the experiments of Steinach and Lichtenstern. Changes having been produced in the glands of inner secretion, especially in the sexual glands, the results on the personality, the characteristics of which had previously been ascertained by psychoanalysis, were studied. It was possible to determine that changes in the libido and in the attitude toward the sexual object were in keeping with the organic changes evidenced in the sexual metabolism. The second possibility of reaching this goal lies in the direction of the work of Hollós and Ferenczi on the psychoanalysis of mental disturbances in general paralysis (see *PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW*, Vol. XII, 1925, page 88). The known changes in the central nervous system are correlated with the accompanying bodily symptoms and with the psychic and mental symptoms reduced to their true significance. A third possible way to approach the problem consists in bringing about, not organic, but psychic changes and studying the resulting organic and psychic changes. The writer communicates a small number of experiments of this sort. He placed patients in a hypnotic state to illustrate (by actually producing them) how symptoms are formed, and to show that experiences which cannot be controlled are in part converted into an organic manifestation. The organ made use of in conversion is determined by the predisposing conditions.

To a person in the hypnotic state, the writer suggested an impressive experience, for instance, to a physician who had a short time before failed in a histology examination, he suggested that it was necessary to describe the histology of the hair. When the patient failed on this question a second was given with the same result. Then total forgetfulness of the incident was suggested, but the post-hypnotic task was imposed on the medium to feel at a certain time what he had felt in the hypnosis. As the medium's feelings in connection with his failure to answer the questions could not be known to the hypnotist, their reproduction could not follow as the result of suggestion, and could only be regarded as endopsychic phenomena; in other words, the experience was implanted in the psyche for the purpose of observing the manner in which it was incorporated and the resulting effects. When the hypnotist produced a handkerchief, the signal agreed upon for the reproduction of the affect, the medium became uneasy, grasped his head and complained of a severe headache. Every time the signal was given the headache reappeared, and it disappeared again with removal of the signal. The medium could give no reason for the headache. To another medium a terrible storm was described during the hypnosis, and when the medium awoke, fear, manifested in the heart reaction, was felt at a given signal. Deutsch characterizes this phenomenon as a sort of 'deja senti' in analogy with the "deja vu."

Dr. Deutsch noted a tendency of repressed unconscious phantasies to give rise to organic sensations which persist as permanent sensations; also that when mediums were in a hypnotized state, and the affective disturbances took the form of a high degree of anxiety, the physical sensations were disregarded. In the post-hypnotic state the anxiety was much greater than when it was suggested during the hypnosis, but except when the signal was given the patients manifested no anxiety. In some cases, where the patients said they experienced no anxiety, a change in the heart beat was registered.

Another form given the experiments was that an affect belonging to a forgotten experience should be produced when a handkerchief was exhibited, and the experience itself should be recalled when the handkerchief was dropped. There were instances where the experience was recalled without affect, which the writer explains as due to the circumstance that the abreaction had once taken place. In other instances, where powerful infantile complexes were brought into play, the affect continued to appear as often as the signal was given, from which the conclusion was drawn by the writer that repressions were still effective.

In some instances the memories connected with a complex were recalled piecemeal and then fitted together. In this Deutsch sees an analogy with the manner in which the analysis is effective; for the symptoms of a neurotic patient never disappear simply because at the beginning of the analysis he is told that they are due to the Oedipus complex; it is only as the repressed material is gradually brought into consciousness in connection with the free associations that the good results make their appearance.

BOOK REVIEWS

EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Edward Herbert Cameron, Ph.D. The Century Co., New York and London. 1927. Pp. 467.

This work, designed as a textbook for the use of college classes in education, is by the professor of educational psychology in the University of Illinois. It defines psychology as "the science that describes conscious processes and their relationship to the behavior of man and other animals." Consciousness is viewed as a higher type of adaptive function than the nervous reflex, and "appears as one of the links in the chain leading from impression to reaction," the method used in the development of the subject is the eclectic one, and the author uses any facts or theories that seem to suit his purpose.

Starting with a brief chapter on "Body and Mind," which takes a glance at the nervous and endocrine systems and stresses the importance of detecting sensory defects, the author proceeds with a chapter on original nature, in which the original tendencies are classified into (1) innate tendencies to action, which include the reflexes and instincts; (2) innate tendencies of attitude, which include attention, feelings of agreeableness and disagreeableness and emotion, and (3) innate tendencies to learn, including habit formation and ideational learning. Logically the chapters on Nature and Nurture and the modifications of innate tendencies should follow here, but the author delays them until after his discussion of mental measurement and individual differences. He thus has a foundation of experimental work on which to base his discussion. The chapter on mental measurement steers clear of the uncritical acceptance of test results which mars so many of our later books on education. The nature of averages and the necessity of taking account of individual facts, the difficulty of knowing just what we are measuring and the significance of emotional factors in test performance are discussed. Different types of tests and their advantages and disadvantages are set forth. The conclusion is: "The net result of the investigation of quantitative individual differences in mental capacities is to show the necessity for flexible schemes of promotion and the arrangement of pupils into groups that are truly homogenous with respect to their capacities. After the pupils have been arranged in groups that have nearly equal abilities, however, the important qualitative differences still remain. . . . In cases of slowness of progress it must not be assumed that the difficulty cannot be remedied, until all available means of discovering its source and all possible means of overcoming it have been used." This is sound advice and sadly needed by a good many educators. The discussion of learning

in its different aspects, which occupies several chapters, follows the conventional lines, and gives place to a short chapter on the transfer of training, where the author shows himself unwilling to justify any subject of instruction on the ground that it gives general training.

The remainder of the book, or 168 pages, is devoted to a discussion of the psychology of the various school subjects and an appendix containing three tests of the so-called Illinois examination. Much practical material is presented, in a clear and interesting manner.

In general, the book seems admirably fitted to serve its purpose. It is free from dogmatism and presents a good many points of view without confusing the issue. That it is very simply written is a tribute to the author's wisdom and experience. Most books for prospective teachers in the normal schools and colleges of education are considerably over their heads.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHARACTER. With an Historical Survey of Temperament. By Dr. A. A. Roback. The International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method. 1927. Pp. 595. Price \$5.50.

This is an encyclopedic book and one for which the psychological world should be profoundly grateful to the author. With characteristic thoroughness Dr. Roback has brought together pretty nearly everything that has been said on the subject of temperament and character. From the very "dawn of characterology" down to the latest modern experimental researches he sets forth critically a vast amount of material of transcendent interest to the student of character and which it has hitherto been impossible to obtain without great expenditure of time and labor. The scope of the work, as well as the labor necessary to produce it, may be judged from the fact that the bibliography, originally intended for inclusion in the present volume, grew to such proportion that it was necessary to publish it as a separate (companion) volume.

Dr. Roback divides the "Psychology of Character" into four parts, the first part being historical, the second dealing with the classification of characters, the third devoted to "movements and methods" and the fourth, which contains the author's own contribution to the study of character being designated "constructive."

Historically there are two approaches to the subject, one literary and descriptive, the other seeking an explanation for differences of type. Our author follows the development of these two points of view through many devious by-ways, from the proverbs and occult sayings of folklore through the literary characterologists of many lands, down to contemporary views and the psychological experimentation of the present day. One group of workers has been interested in "character" from various standpoints; the other in temperament; the latter lends itself more easily to scientific

investigation. Starting with the humoral doctrine of Hippocrates, Dr. Roback examines the various theories of temperament and finds more agreement than appears at first sight. The present day attack, from the standpoint of morphology and endocrinology, he finds hopeful and believes that the way has been cleared for experimentation which may collect, in a not distant future, a body of data of incalculable value, not only theoretically but from the practical standpoint of human adjustments. On the other hand, the term "character" still denotes a very indefinite concept. In the final chapter of his historical section, the author is concerned with definitions. Temperament he takes to be "the sum total of one's affective qualities as they impress others, and neither intelligence nor volitional qualities enter into the temperamental make-up of a person." This latter point he thinks will be agreed upon by practically all students of the subject. Regarding the "twin concept" character, he finds at least three divergent views: (1) character understood as comprising all qualities in which human beings differ including intelligence; (2) character equivalent to personality minus the intelligence factor; and (3) character as a characteristic mode of human behavior. Dr. Roback would make personality the inclusive term; it is the sum total (in the sense of an integration) "of all our cogentive, affective, conative and even physical tendencies; . . . character is that part of the personality which remains after the cogentive, affective and physical qualities have been abstracted; it covers the volitional and inhibitory phases of behavior and yet it is dependent on intelligence to a large extent and is affected by temperament in some measure or at least bears some relation to it." The amplification of this definition he reserves until later chapters.

In the second part of the book, the various approaches to the subject are classified and treated as national conceptions, a point of view which enables us to grasp its development as modified by a particular culture and also has the advantage of being a comparatively simple scheme. The third part, dealing with movements and methods, begins with suggestions from psychiatry and ends with a recapitulatory chapter on sources and methods of studying character types. To the present reviewer this is the most valuable part of the work, as it brings together and places in proper perspective much widely scattered material. The psychoanalytic approach, the psychology of compensation, the contribution of the Struktur psychology to the understanding of personality, the claims of endocrinology, the "Behavioristic detour," the American experimental attack, biography and "psychography," all are treated lucidly and fairly. Dr. Roback makes short shrift of behaviorism as he accuses Watson of doing with the concept of character. He sums up his objections to the behavioristic treatment of the subject thus: (1) the average man and woman have a better understanding of the problem than Watson gives

them credit for, basing their judgments on more objective data than those alleged by him; and (2) the mere cataloging of an individual's behavior will give us little more insight into the personality of the subject than the description of the locations and positions of certain stones would reveal their mineralogical properties." He recognizes that the majority of the American school of behaviorism do not go so far as Watson and do assign a conspicuous place to character, defining it however as "characteristic behavior." More space is devoted to psychoanalysis, and a separate chapter to the mechanism of compensation, which he finds the most psychological of "all the mechanisms stressed by the Freudians and their kin" as well as the one that lends itself best to physiological explanation. Nevertheless he is not specially friendly to Adler, who reminds him of a man trying to mop up a huge platter, containing drops of various liquids with one wholesome crumb, shoving it about in all possible directions with his little finger." The psychoanalysts as a class seem to him to place an exaggerated emphasis upon the importance of experience in the formation of character. Indeed, he states emphatically that "since different people are affected differently by apparently similar stimuli, it would be reasonable to maintain that character in reality precedes and determines the nature of the effect, instead of being the resultant of the multitude of experiences to which man is subjected." The analyst's answer to this, of course, is that there are no "similar stimuli." Though the chapter on the psychoanalytic approach is well documented, there are remarks that make one wonder how familiar the author has made himself with the works of this school, such as "whoever has read a single book by an outstanding member of one of the three main schools has read all that the particular school has to offer."

In the chapter on the "Struktur psychology" he considers chiefly Spranger's *Lebensformen*, and finds himself willing to subscribe to Spranger's categories of personality—the six life-forms, economic, theoretical, artistic, religious, social, and political—"after supplying them with a genetic foundation and a dynamic character"; for the life-forms seem to him to have been deduced from the instincts.

In the chapter on the American Experimental Contribution, various of the tests and scales developed to measure character and personality traits are critically reviewed. He feels that the treatment of character by most of the American character testers is altogether too broad in scope, taking in all the non-intellectual elements, and thus not setting off that phase of personality which properly corresponds with character. Nevertheless he concludes that "the valuable technique of the American character experiments and tests should not be underestimated; for it opens up at least new possibilities in the matter of checking up impressions and ratings, and holds forth hope of expansion. The recapitulatory chapter

on sources and methods contains a chart upon which the various methods of studying personality are presented graphically.

After all this preparation the author turns to an exposition of his own views. He reminds us again that character is but one aspect of the personality, the others being intelligence, temperament, physique and other mental and physical qualities and searches for the psychological entities to which to "hitch it." He finds them in the instincts. Thus, he says, "one can meet the requirement of the man in the street and at the same time move safely on psychological territory without taking recourse to hazy categories. . . . An instinct after all, is a definite mechanism which operates visibly enough to convince us of its existence." His definition of character then is as follows: "An enduring psychophysical disposition to inhibit instinctive impulses in accordance with a regulatory principle"; and in this definition it is the last phrase that is of most importance. The man of highest character is he who inhibits his impulses for the sake of a visioned end, but this end, while not altruistic or ethical in the usual sense, must be in keeping with the principles of truth and justice. These principles, in Roback's view, are absolute and ultimate though he qualifies this statement by adding that he does not mean that truth is a function of the Universe and that perhaps these regulative principles are only relatively absolute; he is content to make them coequal and coexistent with humanity.

"The answering devotion to a cause, the unyielding spirit which adheres to the right in spite of threats and warnings, such is the texture of which character is made." The highest type of character is found only in men of the highest intelligence. The man of vision can take the long view and see what is for the ultimate good of humanity, and it is reason that guides him in his choice of actions. "The present is extended into the future and circumstances are transcended by the towering rock of ages—Reason." Women are denied character because, though their inhibitions may be strong, they are guided not by the dictates of reason but "by public opinion, convention, fashion and instinctive urges." They may reason well enough, but "their reasoning lacks consideration for others." It is certainly interesting to hear a man of Roback's knowledge and psychological insight repeating this.

A chart accompanies the text, which attempts to discover a character-index by rating the individual according to the inhibition of his instinctive tendencies by the regulating principles. These principles from the lowest to the highest are physical, legal, social, religious, aesthetic and ethical, and in order to produce the "consummate character" vision, which is an intellectual quality, must be joined to the ethicological principle. The instincts themselves are subdivided according to their objectives, as self-preservation into life, health, non-injury, liberty, peace of mind; acquisitiveness into objects, antiques, etc.; and information, and

so on. The chart is of course only suggestive but it leaves one a little bewildered by the multiplicity of the instincts and their differentiations.

It is impossible to do justice to Dr. Roback's presentation in the compass of a review. He anticipates objection after objection and disposes of it to his own satisfaction at least. He realizes that the contour of character is bound to be broken in some places and that even those of highest character are not free from inner conflicts, strivings and broodings. The principle of consistency is invoked as the basis of right conduct; *i.e.*, consistency in the sense of employing but one standard of action both for one's self and others; and this consistency has an inborn source. The capacity for the development of character is dependent upon the plasticity of the nervous system, plasticity meaning "organization in such a way as to allow the nerve currents to take different paths without serious disturbance." Environmental influences play a small part in shaping the man of highest character and even in the average case "heredity or innate qualities (inhibitability) are of greater weight than mere environment."

It would be easy to find instances where one does not agree with the author. What actually is the goal of human endeavor, whether progress within historical times has been toward higher levels, whether reason is the transcendent force he believes it to be—are of course moot points, to say nothing of the doctrine of instincts and of heredity. But for Dr. Roback these questions are settled. Absolute values exist, and man—a few men—are intelligent enough to perceive them and guide their actions by them. Instincts are demonstrable in considerable number, and are to be restrained and controlled in the service of the sanctions or regulatory principles. Since few nervous systems are so organized as to compass the highest degrees of inhibition, there exists a hierarchy of characters, comparable to the ranges known to exist in intelligence (though not entirely dependent upon intelligence). The capacity (and perhaps the urge?) to develop certain degrees of character is inborn and inheritable. This seems to be the gist of his teaching, and whether one agrees with the author or not, his discussion is exceedingly stimulating and thought-provoking. He has cleared the way at least, and provided a point of departure for further investigation.

RICHMOND.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CARE OF INFANT AND CHILD. By John B. Watson, Ph.D. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York. 1928. Pp. 187.

It is said by many pediatricians that half of the cases coming to their attention present behavior and emotional problems. Psychological disturbances in the adult are largely verbalized, a mode of expression not available, or available only to a slight degree in the infant or young. In children, they are largely manifested in socially unacceptable or obnoxious behavior patterns with emotional expressions that are socially useless and

impossible of integration into a congenial human setting. What makes their correction important is that they are the initial points of those habit series that may be potent throughout later life. Through ignorance or neglect, pediatricians have been wont to overlook the psychological phases of infant life, not, perhaps, altogether because of their training and tradition, but to no small degree because of the bewildering literature that exists on the subject. Psychoanalytic material dealing with child-life, especially, suffers from lack of formulation into clear and coherent attitudes. Pediatricians can hardly be blamed for shying away from sources where the very language employed is so forbidding. That is why they find it simpler to account for behavior anomalies on some mysterious "constitutional" basis.

Dr. Watson sets for himself the laudable task of writing a book on the psychological care of the child free of such facile and scientifically unfounded concepts as "constitutional" and "hereditary" determinism. He proposes to limit himself in explaining child development to those experimental facts that are the fruit of controlled researches in nursery and laboratory. The experiments were conducted largely by himself or under his supervision. Fortunately enough, the experiments performed were relatively few and the book is not encumbered with them. Most of the observations are based on child-life under uncontrolled (in the experimental sense) home conditions. That this need not vitiate the validity of the facts would seem evident, but, presumably, it is why the author feels that so little is known about the psychologic development of children.

The experiments (there are several photographs) really deal only with the "conditioning" and "unconditioning" of the earliest types of emotional responses—fear, rage and love. The familiar unsupportable thesis of the behaviorists is deduced that all future emotional reactions that will operate in the life of the individual are elaborations of these. One might also object to the uncritical analogies that the author occasionally employs, such as Moss' work on the attraction between male and female rats, to illustrate complex human sex attitudes. Perhaps, too, the author is too dogmatic in places, as when insisting on the absolute necessity of having a separate room for each child, or when he warns of the mouth and finger distortions that result from persistent thumb-sucking—the latter being not even generally true. Though the book is popular in intent it is felt that the author might have permitted himself fewer generalizations.

None of these lacks, however, impair seriously the value of the book. Neither the experimental data nor the behavioristic doctrines encroach on the substance of the book, composed largely of accurate and wide observations of the concrete lives of children and infants and the relation of parents. There is sensible advice offered on the control of fears,

rage and temper tantrums and on the possible bad social consequences of unalloyed parental love. Thumb-sucking, enuresis, masturbation and other forms of early unacceptable habits are discussed with good common-sense suggestions for their control. The teaching of sex to children is considered—a valuable part of the book. Aside from occasional lapses, the book is shot through with a critical temper characteristic of Dr. Watson. He insists upon the training of the child with pragmatic orientation toward the universe in which we live, regarding it a sound attitude to grow and live by. This small book is, on the whole, a valuable contribution to the literature of psychologic pediatrics.

KLEIN.

BRAIN AND MIND OR THE NERVOUS SYSTEM OF MAN. By R. J. A. Berry, M.D., F.R.C.S., F.R.S. Published by The Macmillan Co., New York. Pp. 558 + References, Appendix and Index.

This book is in the main an excellent presentation of the anatomy of the central nervous system by a skilled anatomist. The structure of this most important of tissues is set forth very fully and very satisfactorily and illustrated by a sufficiency of photographs, drawings and diagrams.

Finally, in the last few chapters the author discusses more particularly the brain as the physical instrument of the mind, certain mental phenomena such as sleep and dreams and the emotions, and then goes on to a discussion of the various forms of mental disorder. This is by all means on the whole the least satisfactory part of the book. In his general thesis he is committed to an explanation of mental phenomena in neurological terms, which means that in very many instances he merely translates one set of terms into the other without adding at all to the clarity of the situation. It is another example of "neurologizing tautology." However, the reviewer has every sympathy with his efforts to correlate structure and function but believes that while these two concepts will always continue to grow closer and closer together that they will never quite fuse. The author seems to be very much disturbed by the people who deprecate the mixing of ideas and brain cells and is insistent that it is just this attitude of mind which interferes with progress. He has very interestingly reanimated the very important work of Bolton upon the cerebral cortex and has much to say on this subject in relation to mental disease that is interesting. His scheme for the examination and diagnosis of mental states is again an exceedingly interesting scheme for sifting out certain more or less obvious types but the reviewer questions whether it would stand the test of a great number of cases that are more difficult of diagnosis because the patients seem to be at least more normally equipped. And finally the reviewer thinks that it is exceedingly unfortunate that the author should take occasion frequently to speak so disparagingly of psychoanalysis in all sorts of connections and in ways

which indicate that he really has not the ghost of an idea what psychoanalysis is all about. It is a prejudicial state of mind which one dislikes to see in an author of a book of such pretensions and on the whole of such sound values.

WHITE.

UNDERSTANDING HUMAN NATURE. By Alfred Adler. Translated by Walter Beran Wolfe. Greenberg, New York. 1927.

Just what prompted Dr. Adler to call his conception of human behavior Individual Psychology is hard to say, for in it the individual receives but scant recognition. The whole scheme of human existence is blocked in with large strokes and individuals are loosely fitted into its superstructure. In this scheme the "human soul," "psychic life" are spoken of in a seemingly substantive sense and generalizations about the individual and the community are bandied about freely, generalizations to which most anthropologists, philologists and psychologists would take exception.

It would seem that the psychological insight which informs the best of modern literature is superior to much that goes for current psychological formulations. The objective literary critic makes the valid point that no composite picture of bourgeois prejudices for example, focussed in a type, ever becomes a convincing flesh and blood figure, and rightly insists on the psychologic uniqueness of each person. One hopes to find this general attitude—namely that every individual is a unique fact of nature—among the more advanced psychologists of the day, even though one may not agree with the precise cast of their thought. One certainly has the right to expect it in a book whose "attempt is to acquaint the general public with the fundamentals of Individual Psychology." If the term "individual" here does not mean to point out the absolute uniqueness that characterizes each individual then precisely what does it mean? And if it is intended to indicate the unique psychologic equipment that each organism builds up then how is it possible to make the wholesale assertion, almost dogmatic in tone, that "In all these mechanisms of isolation (timidity, frigidity, anxiety, etc.) we find an undercurrent of ambition and vanity. These people attempt to raise themselves above others by accentuating their differences from society" ? (P. 234.) Without dissecting the postulates that are implied in such statements, even a superficial acquaintance with cultural history tells us otherwise. Similar statements abound in this book, and there is hardly a page where one will not stub his toe against some dogmatic generalization. Mr. Veblen would greet with a tolerant smile the statement that "industry," "energy" and "go-getting" are expressions to cloak an unusual degree of vanity, and every objective student of social psychology would be amazed at the simplicity of the formula which makes claim to the elucidation of such

complexly motivated human behavior. That precisely is the rub. There are all kinds of human beings with all kinds of behavior, acting from the most varied of motives. To reduce all these variables to the simplicity of Adler's formulations is to stultify the problem of understanding the behavior of concrete individuals in their relations to specific stimuli. It is indeed to escape this stultification that one is always on the verge of asking, "Understanding *Whose* Human Nature"? in reading the book. Some compensatory relief is afforded by the case material offered. But even the cases are sketchy with too little factual material to make them living or even convincing. Nor can we often agree with the author's interpretations of these cases, and though the book is intended for popular usage even the intelligent laity will see that other than the writer's interpretations could be derived with equal validity.

Adler's thesis is familiar to all who know his *Studie über Minderwertigkeit von Organen und über den Nervösen Charakter*. In the volume under review he has not departed from his earlier position. In its first part he takes up the origin of what he calls the "soul"—"a hereditary substance which functions both physically and psychically"; then its vicissitudes through family and social influences. The familiar will to power, organ inferiority and masculine protest mechanisms are discussed later, either as such or by implication. The patterns of behavior that develop are regarded as the resultants of certain inherent needs and strivings of the individual on the one hand and the social contexts in which these develop on the other. The author's assumption of "immanent social laws," his glib utilitarian attitude in regard to scientific and other types of activity, and his insistence on a fixed "human nature," certainly does not strengthen one's conviction of his philosophic comprehensiveness or scientific objectivity.

Understanding Human Nature derives its chief significance from the emphasis its author places upon the individual's social context. He recognizes in a general way that a human being as a psychological organism presents a unitary event in which stimulus and response are reciprocal phases. In stressing the social stimuli and social responses he is pointing to that current in the stream of clinical psychologies which has been perhaps the least adequately emphasized. It is in this emphasis that the chief value of the book lies. For those interested in the periphery of psychiatry and particularly for social workers the book should prove to be worth while. The translation is undistinguished and at times awkward.

KLEIN.

TRAITÉ DE PSYCHOLOGIE. By Georges Dwelshauvers. Pp. 672. Paris, Payot. 1928.

This sizeable book by a well known author who is a Professor in the Catholic Institute of Paris and in Stanlius College is a well digested

compilation of nearly all phases of psychology. It concentrates and throws light upon the more important results obtained from the researches of several types of psychological approach and attempts to evaluate many of the more obscure principles and theories.

The work has been presented in six parts: the first of which is concerned with methodology and discusses the methods of research employed, including not only historical ones but those recently devised by the Russian, French and American schools of psychology. The second part reviews mental synthesis and the various diverse aspects of mental life including the complex biologic and psychologic laws of habit, the problems of the unconscious and of the instincts and the operations of mental dynamics. The third part is an extensive account of the fundamental structural elements in psychic behavior where many pages are devoted to emotional or affective life principally from the standpoint of "orthodox" psychology. Polarities, dimensions, dispositions, inclinations and tendencies, are discussed and classified. In this chapter reflexes of all sorts, simple, conditioned and automatic and sensations with their properties, qualities and some of their abnormal expressions are reviewed at length.

The phenomena of images, mental associations, inhibitions, spatial synthesis with comparisons of early and recent theories concerning them are presented in part four which also includes a short survey of the theories of the "Concept of Time." The structure of memory, with its experimental data and its abnormal expressions as seen in lightning calculators, morbid mental states, and the manner in which it is influenced by various emotions is described in part five. Memory is also considered in its practical applications and expressions in concrete types, in pedagogical fields and testimony situations.

Selective attention, creative and unconscious imagination, the structure of verbal and written language from the viewpoints of anatomy, physiology and psychology with an account of the several forms of aphasia all constitute separate chapters. Agnosias and apraxias with their relations to the development of language are also mentioned.

The final part (six) is devoted to the problems of thought, the will and to the "superior sentiments" or the "faculties of the soul," passions and durable emotions as well as several other so-called personality, ego and character components including measurements of intelligence and the correlations of functions.

The book is rich in the number of psychological topics discussed and moreover one is impressed with the number of original researches by its author who has attempted to make a large unity out of many seemingly unrelated psychologic facts. The presentation is characterized by directness of approach and clarity of exposition, although one finds very little that is new or startling in the realm of orthodox psychology. The book

may be recommended to the student who desires a general review of psychology; and the bibliography and comments relating to individual chapters at the end of each part will aid in this function.

LEWIS.

NERVE TRACTS OF THE BRAIN AND CORD. By William Keiller, New York. 1927. The Macmillan Co. Pp. 456, figures 227.

This is a decidedly unusual book—not all good and not all bad. This reviewer, as well as others, finds fault with the arrangement. All the figures are in the back of the book, necessitating frequent reference to varied diagrams with consequent loss in continuity of thought. The separation of form and function in the parts dealing with “anatomy” and “anatomy and physiology” makes for much repetition.

The author is obviously a good teacher and a good anatomist of the Weigert school, who is familiar with both domestic and foreign neurologic literature. His work, however, bespeaks loss of contact with current-day thought in organic neurology. Otherwise, he would devote far more space than he does to the extrapyramidal disorders, to decerebrate rigidity, etc. The aphasia classification of Henry Head has evidently upset him, with the result that he has not digested the material for this section but devotes space both to this conception and to the “diagram-makers’” conception with no connection but juxtaposition. Emotionally, he belongs with the diagram-makers.

Certain statements are open to criticism, such as that the trigeminal nerve carries muscle sense for the face and tongue muscles; that the nucleus of the fasciculus solitarius is concerned with taste; that the function of the mesencephalic root of the trigeminus is unknown; that motor aphasia is an apraxia. The illustrations on the whole are poor although certain ones indicating degenerations following focal lesions are well chosen. Many of the illustrations will be recognized by anybody familiar with Déjerine, but the pen and ink copies by the author are rather crude.

In the third part, on applied neurology, there is a summing up of what has gone before but it is so voluminous that much repetition is unavoidable. It cannot be denied, however, that the author has chosen his cases from the literature with constant regard for their significance in presenting clearly the anatomy and physiology of the parts affected.

The book will appeal in parts to elementary students and in parts to advanced students. It is rather a mixture, and one cannot help feeling that the author single-handed, has evolved much from his own sections and from study of the literature but has not been able to put it in unified or coherent exposition.

The book is “dedicated to my students in neurology of the past twenty years . . .” We feel that the author waited fifteen years too long before writing the book.

SEVEN DAYS WHIPPING. By John Biggs, Jr. Published by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1928. Pp. 219. Price \$2.00.

This is the story of a judge, who, living a most orderly and well regulated life and in the performance of his judicial duties is daily handing out sentences to his fellow men without any apparent appreciation of the deeper underlying motives which prompted their acts, is confronted with a set of circumstances which lead him suddenly to shoot the son of the man he has sentenced. It goes to show that none of us is free from those primitive impulses which play so large a part in our lives, and which may, without warning, break loose and with all the force of thousands of years of repression plunge us into the commission of acts which we are too often prone to condemn in others. It is an exceedingly interesting psychological study, which describes step by step the various mental processes which lead up to the commission of the crime.

A. W. BARBOUR.

EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE PSYCHOANALYSE. By Dr. Med. Harald Schultz-Hencke. Gustav Fischer, Jena. 1927. Pp. 387.

This large monograph is a nicely arranged presentation of the psychoanalytic doctrines. At the outset several schemes are offered in outline form to illustrate the early factors in the development of the child. For example, Scheme I shows the early love experiences and their mental importance with the general mechanisms of primary childish wishes, and Scheme II indicates the stages and degrees of the oral, epidermal, anal, urethral, genital, manual, etc., cravings and patterns. In elaboration of these various schemes many traits and events of childhood are discussed including the extent displacement and fate of the primary childish wishes, predevelopment the distresses of love life, the establishment of objective fear, the trauma, environmental prohibitions, the criminalistic impulse and the growth of morals. The drainage or turning aside takes place through several channels, among which are play and work, phantastic and constructive thinking, sorrow and hope, and identifications and ideal formations. However, through displacement, failures in drainage may occur and present themselves in the form of distortions of the object love, in fixations with regression to phantasy and perversions, or appear as "angst" with feelings of guilt and needs for punishments, or still more profoundly as frank depressions with or without neurasthenoid complications.

It is emphasized that in the breaking through of the displacement, the wish or desire usually comes forth as some sort of fear reaction; appearing as (1) a limited or generalized bodily impulse, (2) as impotence—ejaculatio precox—vaginismus, etc., (3) as symbolic speech or (4) in general ways. The meaning of the psychosis is also discussed to a

limited extent and an interesting table is given to illustrate the relative effect of desires and impulses in terms of angst—feelings of Guilt and Depression.

The second section of the book is devoted almost entirely to therapeutic considerations, the aim, the means, and the technical details constituting important topics. The patient must be encouraged to relinquish the angst and guilt mechanisms, and in order to accomplish this not only the principal focus of fixation must be discovered, but the entire libido and ego instinctive life must be reorganized and adjusted. The transference phenomenon with its multitude of expressions is described in some detail as is also the final reconstructive period.

Among the many "overcompensations" for deficiencies in "love constructions" made understandable through analysis are covetousness, scientific pondering, avarice, arbitrariness, willfulness, "tyranny through exorbitant demands," swindling and Don Juanism. The methods of analysis and the attitude of the analyst in the analytic situation are matters of importance and have received fairly adequate attention here. Special sections are given to the educational values of the psychoanalytic attitude, to the relative values of psychoanalysis and hypnosis and to the special indications for psychoanalysis. Among these indications for the analytic type of therapy the author emphasizes:

1. Angst.
2. Feelings of guilt.
3. Motor anomalies.
4. Anomalous functions of organs.
5. Pains.
6. Compulsion states and obsessions.
7. Depressions.
8. Loss of objective.
9. Perversions.
10. Mental diseases as such.
11. Unsuccessful or misplaced character.

The third section of the book undertakes a discussion of fundamental factors from the viewpoint of psychological argument. Psychic energy, "psychic causations," the relations of "psychical" and "physical," the constitution as understood by psychoanalysis, the unconscious, the It, the Ego and the Super Ego, etc., are all presented in a simple direct manner. The fourth and last part of this contribution deals in generalities in which the application of psychoanalytic doctrines to philosophy, world reconstruction or betterment, to public life, to pedagogy, to criminology and to marriage are discussed and prophesied.

The monograph appears to be a well presented boiled down account of the aims, doctrines and accomplishments of the psychoanalytic movement, and the text is so constructed as to facilitate its use for teaching

purposes, but it is not characterized by many new developments. It certainly serves its purpose as an "introduction" to this vast field of accumulated researches. Bibliographic suggestions are notably few as compared with most German works of this character and there is no index at the end; however, the table of contents is very elaborate and useful.

LEWIS.

CREATION BY EVOLUTION. Edited by Frances Mason. Published by The Macmillan Co., New York. 1928. Pp. 392. Price \$5.00.

In many respects a most admirable effort to set forth the leading facts of evolution in the several sciences by outstanding specialists. The chapters are short and to the point, and present a high average of excellence of quality and in each instance the pronouncements come from men of outstanding reputation. The book has apparently been written for the purpose of combating the special creation hypothesis, which, to the reviewer seems a rather useless proceeding at this day and age. If science cannot stand upon its own feet by this time it certainly cannot by such a method. Each chapter is, in the reviewer's opinion, distinctly weakened rather than strengthened by its final statement on this point. Otherwise the book is highly to be commended.

WHITE.

GRUNDZÜGE EINER GENETISCHEN PSYCHOLOGIE (Auf Grund der Psychoanalyse der Ichstruktur). By Dr. Otto Rank. Franz Deuticke, Leipzig und Wien. 1927. 1 Teil. Pp. 166.

GESTALTUNG UND AUSDRUCK DER PERSONLICHKEIT (II Teil der "Grundzüge einer Genetischen Psychologie"). By Dr. Otto Rank. Franz Deuticke, Leipzig und Wien. 1928. Pp. 104.

In the first volume Professor Rank has attempted to assemble and correlate the fundamentals of genetic psychology. The subject matter has been arranged in three parts, each one of which includes many topics for discussion. The first part deals with two large subjects, viz.: Psychoanalytic problems and the general foundations of genetic psychology. The former is a descriptive survey setting forth in a systematic and interesting manner some historical considerations, conceptions of idea formations, matters of terminology, the importance of the edipus and castration conflicts, the phenomena of transference and resistance, symbolism, and the question of interpretation. Here also as special topics Rank has discussed in the light of his own fairly well known theories: the various aspects of the neurosis, the ego and reality, the "angst" problem and its libido relations and implications, and the separation from the mother. The physiological process of birth is here given as the source of "Angst" and particularly of "Neurotic Angst." The genesis of symptoms and the quantitative factor in these early situations are always skillfully

brought into the foreground. The feeling of guilt as a factor in the neurosis is duly emphasized, and criticisms are offered to the older ideas of libido formation.

The last division of part 1 is concerned with more specific inquiries into the foundation of psychology, with an introductory excursion through the biologic ramifications of the subject. The position of the mother as both "Ego" and object in fact and in general the psychology of the "Ego" along with the importance of the actual experiences of life are among the more attractive topics of this section.

Sadism and the castration phantasy with the resolution of the overcoming of the sadism, and the developmental principles of compulsion repetition in relation to adaptation or social adjustments are outlined in a thought-provoking manner. Also in connection with the social adaptation, the evolution and development of the Ego and its conflicts with the subjective "Sexual." Rank has cast many elucidating thoughts. This chapter is concluded with a description of the psychic representations of angst and sadism, and with the mechanisms of soul purification.

Part Two has been called the "Genetic Part" of which there are three main presentations. (1) The genesis of genitalism; (2) The genesis of the feelings of guilt; (3) The genesis of the various "Object Relations."

Each one of these subjects has been analyzed in the author's usual capable way.

Part Three is concerned more with the end results of various psychic mechanisms which have previously been touched upon. The principal interest here is in the outcome or the "out workings"—how they became modified in the course of time. One finds in this final part a discussion of projection and the relation to objects, an explanation of identifications and the erection, building up or synthesis of the Ego, and some comments on the emancipation and reality adjustment trends and possibilities.

The second volume which treats principally of configurations and expressions of the personality presents several important and interrelated topics. In the introductory section the questions of metapsychoanalysis, the natural science method of interpreting the mind and its various aspects, the import of the analytic situation in relation with the psychology of the other sciences and the relations of biology and ethics are discussed in a way to prepare one for what is to follow in the subsequent chapters. The second outstanding topic has to do with character and the Ego including the stages of development (biological, ethical, etc.) of the personality with particular attention to the creative types and to the dynamics of their organization. The section in which the relationship between love and the mechanism of projection is explained is one of the most interesting as here Rank gives an analysis of love situations, speaks of the rôle of sexuality and of its psychologic interpretation, and of the "accessory

Ego," discusses love as a disorder and as a remedy for emotional imbalance, describes the significance of the trend called "feminism" and gives love its place in personality formation.

Adjustment and its products (creative results) and its particular phases is given some attention but the content is not at all times easy to follow. Moreover they are not simple mechanisms; as such questions as the construction of the original Ego, the relation of the I to the You, projection and idealization of the Ego, the love types of Ego and problems of conduct are still unsettled and complicated. The section on education and control of impulses is more readable and is principally concerned with the Prometheus Complex and the pedagogic situation from the standpoint of sexuality and personality development. The questions of the importance of sensory identifications and of sexual enlightenment are elaborated. The sixth part is on perception and denial and contains some of Rank's best ideas. Here he treats of the acceptance and denials of sensory existence in connection with the intensity of sensory life, of the character types in this respect, and of the importance and the function of the sensation of guilt as an element in the Ego. The last part describes the importance of the mechanism causing "suffering" and emphasizes the incapability of the individual to change the reaction pattern unaided. Finally the forms of therapy are mentioned, spontaneous tendencies toward healing, etc., and the aims of the analytic approach explained.

The worker trained in strictly Freudian ways of thinking will find a number of fundamental points with which to disagree, but since many of these theories are in a more or less nebulous state any helps toward their final solution should be open-mindedly studied. These monographs have been written in the stimulating way in which Professor Rank usually presents his concepts, and it is a valuable addition to the series already published concerning his particular views and psychoanalytic researches.

LEWIS.

QUANTITATIVE METHOD IN POLITICS. By Dr. Stuart A. Rice. Alfred A. Knopf, New York. 1928.

The marked limitations of this book are well recognized by the author himself, in fact, his modesty is on occasions all too insistent. Such limitations, however, are inherent in the method of attack upon politico-social problems by the statistical technique, and any criticism of Dr. Rice's work may well set forth from the problem of method itself rather than from a detailed appraisal of his special results, although even in the space of a review the latter must be considered.

The belief in the value of quantitative methods has become more than fashionable among American social scientists; it is almost a fetish. Per-

haps the success of this method in the field of economics in measuring the fluctuations in industrial and commercial activity by Wesley C. Mitchell and Frederick C. Mills, and such institutional organizations as the Harvard Business School has given a compelling impetus to the method for sociology generally. Moreover, such statistical implements as the handling of averages, multiple and partial correlations, and the measurements of trends in time series has enabled investigators to handle a mass of complicated data with a certain clarity and precision and to gain insight into "mass behavior"—whether that of prices and price relationships or the behavior of human beings. No serious student of the social sciences can afford to disregard the facts unfolded by this method and its possibilities.

But danger arises when the statistical technique is unaccompanied by critical acumen of a high order and a constant recognition of the qualitative nature of the material dealt with, and the profound assumptions inherent in the logic of the method itself. Back of the collection of data and their measurement lie certain assumptions regarding the nature of "human nature," for example, and until these are made clear and distinct any statistical results may be either confused, or worthless and commonplace.

The present work is primarily a case book on quantitative methods in behavioristic political psychology, a book preparatory to the application of statistical principles to politics generally. The hope is eventually to arrive at generalizations from numerous individual studies. And to Dr. Rice's way of thinking one of the main tasks of a quantitative science of politics is "a search for behavioristic materials representative of intangible subjective elements of political activity." That is, taking the vote as representative of political attitudes of individuals, one has a measurement of "progressivism," "conservatism," or the "intangible subjective elements." Of course, whether one has or has not such a measure depends upon the meaning of "progressivism." If it is assumed that a vote for a Farmer-Labor candidate for senator indicates such an attitude, then the result is merely an illustration of the law of identity, hardly deserving of the enormous labor put forth. One might by defining his terms "progressive," "conservative," and "radical" in such a way find a high correlation between such an index and the index for sugar consumption in America, or a correlation between the suicide rate and banana importation. In other words, a logical demonstration of relationship must be made and cannot be assumed before statistical correlations are at all indicative, and one can easily challenge one of Dr. Rice's investigations in this respect.

This investigation is the attempt to find a correlation between the attitudes of "progressivism" among Minnesota legislators and the density

of "*whatever attitudes* among their constituents led to votes for the senatorial candidate of the Farmer-Labor Party," namely Magnus Johnson, in order to determine the "representativeness" of elected representatives. That is, an index of the density of "progressive attitudes" must first be constructed for each district considered, and this is based upon the percentage of the senatorial vote received by Magnus Johnson in Minnesota, who was the Farmer-Labor candidate in the general election of 1924; then an index of the progressive attitude of the representative of a particular district must be determined for comparison. But how obtain the latter index? By sending a questionnaire to each of the 131 members of the legislature asking for approval or disapproval of 20 proposals, ideas or conditions. These questions raise enormously complex problems in themselves and the index of progressivism for an individual representative would seem to rest upon whether he had a general attitude of laissez-faire toward politicoeconomic problems or one of state ownership and control. Moreover, there were but 42 replies from these representatives permitting of rating. The correlation between the index of this attitude and the index of the vote for Magnus Johnson is supposed to reveal a measure for the "representativeness" of elected representatives. This correlation was $r = .327 \pm .093$. Now, the reviewer considers such a result absolutely insignificant, and not even suggestive as Dr. Rice maintains. One could equally say on the basis of Dr. Rice's results that representatives failed to represent their constituencies. The results, as the author says, are tentative and inconclusive, but *suggestive* in their direction. Are they as suggestive as what a shrewd observer of political assemblies could report after watching the operations of a legislature for a term or two?

Dr. Rice's other studies such as the distribution of individual political attitudes, the social density of attitudes and their distribution, and the special variations of political attitudes mainly conclude in such "suggestiveness" and "tendencies." The study of change of attitude attributable to defined stimuli, in which the attitudes of Dartmouth students on evolution before and after hearing Bryan were compared is so naïve it lowers the whole intellectual force of the volume. In such instances the statistical method is merely a substitute for rigorous thinking.

The test for such an enterprise as Dr. Rice's is on its own level, the pragmatic. And the tentativeness and obviousness of the results cause one to question gravely its methods. It is essentially a question after all whether the material itself doesn't defy this kind of handling and offer insuperable obstacles to "getting anywhere." As honest an attempt as Dr. Rice's would seem to indicate such a conclusion, and in that result lies the worth of this volume.

IRVING ALLEN.

THOUGHT CONTROL IN EVERY DAY LIFE. By James Alexander. Funk & Wagnalls Co., New York City. Pp. 275. Price, \$2.00.

The author advises us in his preface that, "This is no armchair treatise." Since we are further informed that "The illustrations are very largely from the writer's own individual experience—from his own observation and in direct contact with life," we presume it had its origin in a less comfortable situation—one where the strain devolved upon something other than the mental function.

The book contains eight chapters divided into two parts. There is an index. On page eleven thought is defined as "the process of thinking." Thoughts are arranged "into two divisions: (1) Thoughts that flit through the mind, and (2) thoughts that arrest or challenge attention; . . ." Alexander goes on to say that, "This book has little, if anything, to do with the thoughts that just 'flit through the mind.'" "Thoughts enter the mind by the gateway of the senses, the feelings, and conation." (P. 13). "Conation is a word that cannot be defined. . . . It will be helpful to regard conation as a life force . . ." (P. 15).

"Psychologists recognize three classes of emotional states: (1) The Perceptual class, (2) the Ideational class, and (3) the Organic class." (P. 19). The author finds that there are seven primary emotions and a correlated primary instinct. These correlates are listed in the above order as, Fear—Flight or Concealment; Anger—Pugnacity; Disgust—Repulsion; Wonder—Curiosity; Exhilaration—Assertiveness; Depression or Despondency—Self-Repression and the Tender Emotions—Parental Instincts. (P. 29). Instincts are further classified as "The Reproductive, the Gregarious, the Acquisitive, and the Constructive." (P. 34). Hereditary tendencies of the human mind are given as "Suggestibility, Imitation, Sympathy, Play, Habit." (P. 48). The discussion of these tendencies comprises the pabulum for Chapter IV. Chapter V deals about "How Our Temperments Affect Our Thoughts," and "The Key to Our Actions." Temperaments are described as Sanguine, Choleric, Phlegmatic, Melancholic and Nervous. The key to action is found in desire, motive and will.

In Chapter VI, the first chapter of part two, we learn that the first stage in thought-control is to be "Cool, Calm and Collected." One must have the right mental attitude, the proper interest and guard against fatigue. In the second stage one learns to control the imagination of fear by being critical. Will power is developed by autosuggestion *a la* Coué, and Concentration is effected by developing interest in the thing selected. Lack of interest is overcome by the exercise of Will Power. A simple exercise for gaining concentrative power is to repeat the multiplication table, extended or limited to suit one's needs. Of course in doing this one must be careful to avoid strain. In the preliminaries of the third

stage the reader is taught the difference between thoughts and ideas, both symbols being embraced in the word Thought-Control. Thoughts are the rough material of our thinking and ideas are images of something in the mind. The magic and power of ideas are increased by repetition of phrases such as "Day by day, etc." Having learned to concentrate one may simply switch thoughts aside by substituting an opposing idea, Love for Hate, etc. The author submits a list of opposing thoughts in the event that the reader is hazy about or limited in his choice of them. Thoughts to be controlled are divided into A and B thoughts—minor and major worries and annoyances. One simply controls the easiest thought first. Naturally, the next problem in seriatim becomes the easiest. There are two methods in the technique of switching the mind from one thought to another. The direct method is simple substitution; but it must be done instantly. "There must be no delay or the hate thought may form connections (trains of thought) with its powerful associates and thus make control very difficult." The author lays down a rule: "Starve a thought and it will die." "Indirect switching" is ridiculously simple. When one is angry, it is only necessary to count slowly to ten, twenty, thirty, etc., or take a brisk walk. There are also natural aids to thought control. One may merely let one's thoughts wander away from the troublesome idea, exercise the habit of switching or forget about it. To forget a thing one gives it no attention, permits no repetition of it and changes to an opposing thought instantly. In order that one may not forget about his good intention of using thought control it is wise to place a card with the letters T/C in a prominent position in the bedroom or on the desk as a reminder.

Chapter VII deals with "Suggestion, Auto Suggestion, Hetero Suggestion, How to Break Bad Habits and Form Good Habits and How to Control Various Emotional States." Only lack of space and ennui deters the reviewer from entering into careful detail of the last two chapters. In Chapter VIII we learn in part that it is useless to fight bad habits; "we must run away from them." On Mistakes in Chapter VIII we are told that "This tendency can be cured to a great extent by cultivating awareness when doing anything." In Section 58 of this last chapter we are informed that "To be able to control his thoughts in public speaking, the speaker must be thoroughly at home in his subject; . . . If this is an at all troublesome thought it would seem comparatively easy to forget about it. To our immense gratification Professor Freud drew a sentence on page 249. The author states that ". . . the technique involved in the interpretation of dreams, as evolved by the Freudian School, is one for the trained specialist only. The dreams to which I wish to refer are simpler in character; I may term them fear dreams. . . . The analysis is simple. . . . If analysis, by close self-questioning, reveals the fear has its counterpart in his daily life, he should stoutly oppose it by autosuggestion or by one of the methods advocated in this book."

The author relates that he "once dreamt a horrible dream full of bloodshed and scenes of terror and vile people." In the words of Zilboorg's informant, this is "ominous." The real motive for writing this book is therein revealed.

ERNEST E. HADLEY.

COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA. A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilization. By Margaret Mead. Published by William Morrow & Co., New York. Pp. 297. including Appendices and Glossary.

This is a most delightful and fascinating book, an account by the writer of her experiences in living for a number of months with a group of Samoan girls, recording their social customs, habits of thought and speech, and the anthropological data of the tribes as a background. Like Malinowski's work, *Sex and Repression in Savage Society*, reviewed in this journal in the present volume, page 365, it seems on the face of it that some of the savage people solve many of their problems with infinitely better results than we do. The outstanding conclusion of Miss Mead's book that goes to the heart of this apparent discrepancy between the savage and the civilized solution of emotional problems is that the Samoan girl does not pass through any emotional storm or serious period of readjustment at the time of puberty but merges from girlhood into womanhood without any apparent difficulties and with only the obvious physical changes that accompany the alteration in the physiology of her several organs. All of which goes to indicate the truth of what Professor Boaz says in the Forward, namely, "The results of her painstaking investigation confirm the suspicion long held by anthropologists, that much of what we ascribe to human nature is no more than a reaction to the restraints put upon us by our civilization." Both this book and Malinowski's book above referred to strike the reviewer as of very great importance, to the psychoanalytically minded in particular and to those who are interested in the progress of civilization in general. If what they appear to show on the surface is really true then we have made serious blunders and we ought to get to work promptly and right them. The reviewer, however, has the suspicion that while the savages have solved their problems apparently with very much more sense than we have and in a way to produce very much less conflict, that they are to all intents and purposes without neuroses and psychoses, still the fact remains that they are savages and that it is very possible that it is because of these easy-going solutions that they remain so. Civilization is not a process that comes upon us passively. It is the result of an active, energetic attack upon problems and situations which the savage does not even know exist and one can not make war against any aspect of reality without taking the risks that go with such a course of conduct, and the results when success is not the outcome are in many instances neuroses and psychoses. In

other words, it would appear to the reviewer that it is a warrantable belief that these mental disorders are one of the prices that we pay for our higher civilization. This, however, does not close the issue. We ought not to be satisfied without present solutions. We ought not to be satisfied with the terrible price that we are paying provided we can get the same results at less cost, and it may be that by studying these savage civilizations we will get a hint as to the direction in which changes might be advantageously made which will be productive of beneficial results. It is with this end in view that I think these investigations are of the utmost value, and the present work is among the most suggestive bits of field anthropology bearing on these questions of which the reviewer has knowledge.

WHITE.

THE NERVOUS CHILD AND HIS PARENTS. By Frank Howard Richardson. M.D., New York. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1928. Pp. 400.

This well-made book is one of a number by the same author, putting in simple language easily comprehended by the average parent, the modern theories upon the care and training of children. A glance at the table of contents makes us pretty well acquainted with the scope and aims of the book. Part one defines the nervous child, identifies his problem as that of growing-up and his parents' problem that of assisting him in the task. Part two discusses what the nervous child does, from refusing to eat to the more serious difficulties of regressions, phobias and convulsions. Part three takes up the causes of nervousness in children, makes light of "a nervous inheritance" and stresses the environmental factors of home and school during the formative periods of life. There is a sprightly chapter "In Defense of Parents" and some trenchant criticisms of our educational system. Parts four and five discuss the constitutional inferior, mental retardation and the psychoses. Dr. Richardson believes that the nervous child *may be* a constitutional inferior, but would rigidly exclude him from the categories of the mentally deficient and the psychotic. By this he means, I take it, that the "merely nervous" children with which the book is mostly concerned, are to be regarded as fundamentally normal, in distinction to those who are the victims of a biological defect. The constitutionally inferior are to be regarded as a border line group. Not everyone will agree in all points with the description of this group, which is mostly taken from Glueck. There is certainly a large group of constitutional psychopaths who show no stigmata of inferiority, and who are characterized rather by the rigidity than by the instability of their emotional life.

As a whole, the book would seem admirably suited to serve its express purpose as a guide to intelligent parents who are seeking light on the more or less common but perplexing problems of childhood.

WINIFRED RICHMOND.

THE INNER WORLD OF CHILDHOOD. A study in Analytical Psychology.
By Frances G. Wickes, New York. D. Appleton & Co. 1927. Pp.
379. Price, \$3.00.

This is a beautiful and fascinating book, totally different from any of the books on child analysis that have come the way of the present reviewer. In the first place, it has literary merit; the theme of each chapter is developed logically, with a clarity and beauty of expression that make easy reading; illustrative cases in abundance drive home the author's points. But it is not such easy reading that one's attention is not arrested, time and time again, by sentences that seem axiomatic as we read them, but which are found all too seldom in works on child psychology. One is tempted to go through the book and cull out a collection of such axioms, to keep on one's desk as reminders of what to do or not to do with different types of children.

Mrs. Wickes, judging from her book, would seem to have an entree into that inner world of which she writes that is granted to few people in each generation. Anyone who works with children—or perhaps anyone who recalls vividly an introverted childhood—knows how difficult of access is the “city of child-soul,” how high are the walls and how carefully guarded the gates. Strategy and wisdom are necessary in the beleaguering of that city, and a patience which can wait as one waits for the seasons to ripen the grain one plants. But above all strategy and wisdom and patience is love, for of a little child it is indubitably true, as Mrs. Wickes says “we can have only that part which is revealed to us in love.” “If,” she says in the preface, “we would enter into the inner world of childhood we must take with us two things; love, and an understanding which includes both intuitive perception and deep technical knowledge of those forces which rule our conscious and unconscious life.” These qualifications our author seems to possess in a most unusual degree.

Mrs. Wickes has studied with Jung and her book is written from the standpoint of the Jungian psychology; the first chapter is a brief historical survey of the analytical environment and an exposition of the Jungian point of view. The two succeeding chapters deal with the influence of parental difficulties upon the unconscious of the child and with his early relationships. In these we find illustrated over and over again what we all know, that the problem of the child is not his own but that of his parents, and that the analyst can do “pitifully little” if the parents will not courageously face their own problems. Then follows an excellent chapter on adolescence, which ought to be read by every troubled parent of an adolescent boy or girl. The keynote of the discussion is found on page 88: “From the first we must remember that our children do not belong to us. They belong to themselves and to life. We are only the instruments of life through which they come.” There is an excellent discussion of psychological types, followed by a most interesting chapter on imaginary companions and the phantasy life of children.

This should be read in conjunction with the two chapters at the close of the book, on "dreams" and "a correlation of dream and phantasy material." In this part of the book especially there stands out the author's wisdom, her delicacy in handling the fragile products of the unconscious, and her reverence for the individuality of even the littlest child. The discussion of fear and the part it plays in the life of all children, normal or otherwise, is especially good, while the chapter on sex is classical, covering the subject from a normal and sensible point of view, yet with a clarity of vision rarely found in writers on the subject. "When," says our author, "we have done our best in clearing our own minds and in helping the young person who is near to us, we must again and yet again remember the great and mysterious calls of life and of the irrational elements, against the misuse of which the strongest bulwark is a fearless love of truth. Even our own child may be the one to be swept away. In this case we must stand ready to help him, not to forget, but to live through the experience so as to gain understanding. We cannot afford to forego the value of any experience which is accepted and understood. Through such understanding must come to each of us at some time in our lives a knowledge of the terrific powers of good and evil, and of that fire of the gods which either quickens or consumes." With these words, which are typical of the spirit of the entire book, we may well close this brief review.

WINIFRED RICHMOND.

DIRECTORY OF PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS FOR CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES. *Second edition.* The Commonwealth Fund. Division of Publication. New York. 1928. Price, 75c.

The first edition of this directory appeared in 1925. This edition of 1928 is approximately twice the size, the first edition being 99 pages, this edition being 181 pages. Inasmuch as the type in the two editions appears to be the same this gives some idea of the growth of these activities during the past three years.

WHITE.

GRIMHAVEN. By Robert Joyce Tasker. Published by Alfred A. Knopf. New York. 1928. Pp. 241.

Grimhaven—the name is well chosen—a gloomy picture of life in the great San Quentin Prison, written by one of the prisoners; a gripping narrative of daily happenings which holds one's attention from cover to cover.

As one reads this interesting human document he becomes the host of many emotions and many thoughts; among them he must feel the futility and hopelessness of any longer attempting to solve the problems of crime by such institutions as are described in these pages. Here men

are broken in body and spirit; here there is no encouragement, no opportunity, no hope. Frustration and hate are the ruling motives.

The average prison, or worse, is a vestigial organ of culture, relegated to the backwash of the social organism, where it reposes behind its high stone walls in darkness and silence and has remained in a primitive and undeveloped state. Such books as this will help to throw light in dark places and assist growth to take place where stagnation has been the rule.

WHITE.

VARIA

NOTICE

The New York Psychoanalytic Society has established a Trust Fund for the support and extension of scientific psychoanalysis in America.

The fund on October 1, 1928, slightly exceeded \$7,500. The trustees of the fund are: A. A. Brill, M.D., S. E. Jelliffe, M.D., Mr. Alfred L. Rose, Adolph Stern, M.D., Mr. Leo S. Bing, treasurer, and C. P. Oberndorf, M.D., chairman.

The income from this fund will be used to provide treatment for needy persons suffering from nervous disorders, to assist physicians in obtaining adequate psychoanalytic training, and to further psychoanalytic research. It is the purpose of this fund to assist by psychoanalytic treatment some of the many persons of limited means for whom virtually no such facilities exist to-day.

Contributions should be sent to Mr. Leo S. Bing, treasurer, 119 West Fortieth street, New York City.

NOTICE.—All business communications should be addressed to The Psychoanalytic Review, 3617 Tenth Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

All manuscripts should be sent to Dr. William A. White, Saint Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D. C.